Apple publishes a CSAM FAQ to address misconceptions and concerns about photo scanning, but leaves potential government pressure unaddressed

Apple has responded to misconceptions and concerns about its photo scanning announcements by publishing a CSAM FAQ - answering frequently asked questions about the features.

9to5Mac 2021-08-09 Ben Lovejoy

Context & Ripple Effects

Apple’s FAQ followed internal acknowledgments that its photo-scanning proposal had generated concern and “misunderstandings.” It is a communications response to that backlash, but the question of government pressure remains outside the FAQ’s stated answers.

The issue did not end with the FAQ: later coverage shows Apple preparing staff for further questions and proposing independent review of the scanning system, while criticism focused on the company’s closed approach to child-safety policy.

First-order effects

Apple can use the FAQ to answer selected technical and policy objections, but it leaves critics’ concern about government pressure unresolved.
Apple’s communications and policy teams face continued scrutiny over photo scanning, rather than a dispute settled by documentation alone.

Second-order effects

The unanswered government-pressure question increases the importance of Apple’s later independent-auditor proposal as a credibility mechanism for the system.
Criticism that Apple pursued child safety without sufficient outside input, as described in the subsequent critique of its process, shifts the debate from feature design to who gets to validate sensitive platform controls.

Third-order effects

If providers introduce safety systems through internal product-release processes rather than external consultation, independent oversight becomes a central test of whether privacy assurances are credible.
The episode points toward governance of device-level safety features being judged not only by their stated safeguards, but by their resistance to institutional pressure and review process.

The trend: Platform safety features are becoming governance questions, with external review and resistance to pressure as important as the technical design.

Discussion

@normative Julian Sanchez on x
Apple's put out a FAQ in response to backlash over their new CSAM photo scanning feature. Points out various ways their current design is privacy protective, which is great, but doesn't really alleviate my core concerns. https://www.apple.com/...
@howelloneill Patrick Howell O'Neill on x
Apple's response to ‘slippery slope’ concerns: “Let us be clear, this technology is limited to detecting CSAM stored in iCloud and we will not accede to any government's request to expand it.” https://www.apple.com/... https://twitter.com/...
@howelloneill Patrick Howell O'Neill on x
It's important, as we're discussing Apple's CSAM tech, to note that saying it's simple to disable iCloud backup skips over everything we know about the way people use software. This doesn't win or lose the argument any which way but it addresses one of Apple's points.
@howelloneill Patrick Howell O'Neill on x
It's hard to overstate the power of defaults. History shows that vanishingly few users mess with most of them: “For most users, the default value is the only value.” https://blog.codinghorror.com/ ...
@jasonaten Jason Aten on x
Apple also says that it won't add images hashes to the database, they have to come from NCMEC: “[hashes] are from known, existing images of CSAM that have been acquired and validated by child safety organizations. Apple does not add to the set of known CSAM image hashes.”
@jasonaten Jason Aten on x
On why Apple is doing this: “In most countries, including the United States, simply possessing these images is a crime and Apple is obligated to report any instances we learn of to the appropriate authorities.”
@jasonaten Jason Aten on x
That's the most explicit Apple has been on the record that if you turn off uploading to iCloud Photos, CSAM detection doesn't happen. Apple wants to be clear it isn't “scanning” your photo library on your device.
@jasonaten Jason Aten on x
On the chance it could be forced to expand the scope of the feature: “We have faced demands to build and deploy government-mandated changes that degrade the privacy of users before, and have steadfastly refused those demands. We will continue to refuse them in the future.”
@martinsfp Martin Sfp Bryant on x
Apple says it “will not accede to any government's request to expand” use of its device scanning tech. Easy for them to *say* that, and Apple has resisted such demands in the past, but it's understandable why many are wary of the genie leaving the bottle https://www.theverge.com/…
@aral Aral Balkan on x
Nothing in this FAQ (PDF: https://www.apple.com/...) that Apple has released addresses any of our concerns. It basically boils down to “trust us, don't worry, it'll be fine.” To reiterate what we're asking: Apple must halt deployment of its content monitoring technology (1/2)
@kaepora @kaepora on x
Asking people to disable iCloud Photos in 2021 is not realistic, and Apple knows this. Everyone depends strongly on iCloud Photos not just for sync, but as a critical backup feature for what is often years and years of important photos.
@kaepora @kaepora on x
“Can the CSAM detection system in iCloud Photos be used to detect things other than CSAM?” Again, we get: “No, but actually yes.” 🤦‍♂️🤦 ‍♂️ The Electronic Frontier Foundation *has already documented* instances where CSAM lists were expanded to target non-CSAM content. https://twi…
@kaepora @kaepora on x
“Could governments force Apple to add non-CSAM images to the hash list?” “Apple will refuse any such demands.” — except, they won't. Apple *has already dropped plans for encrypting iCloud backups specifically because the FBI complained*: https://www.reuters.com/... https://twitte…
@kaepora @kaepora on x
Apple just published a FAQ document regarding its content-scanning rollout. Some choice parts: “Does this mean Apple is going to scan all the photos stored on my iPhone?” “No, but actually yes.”🤦‍♂️ Full FAQ Here: https://www.apple.com/... https://twitter.com/...
@alexstamos Alex Stamos on x
[Thread] Apple's child safety protections announcement hurt the effort to find a policy balance on safety and privacy aspects of e2e encrypted comms products
@timsweeneyepic Tim Sweeney on x
I've tried hard to see this from Apple's point of view. But inescapably, this is government spyware installed by Apple based on a presumption of guilt. Though Apple wrote the code, its function is to scan personal data and report it to government. https://www.eff.org/...
@lindellyehuda Yehuda Lindell on x
One thing that really bothers me about the Apple CSAM solution is that it is really easily bypassed. So it will only work for the dumb criminals, but will potentially compromise everyone else. In that sense, it's like the encryption backdoor situation.
@normative Julian Sanchez on x
One of many reasons this is concerning is that it seems awfully likely we get this dynamic: CSAM scanning turns on; there's a big initial burst of reports; creeps catch on & turn off iCloud backup; reports slow to a trickle; “why don't we require them to scan the whole phone?” ht…
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
Maybe Apple will reverse course and maybe they don't. But I don't think they have come to terms with the deep well of antipathy and mistrust this move is going to create. It's going to be with them for years, undoing billions of dollars in priceless customer trust and marketing. …
@chibaolema Bad Hombre on x
CN Gov't: “Hey Apple, we need you to do a check of all iPhones and Macs in China to find out who might have shared and been exposed to this horrible image using your great new CSAM tool. Don't forget we're a quarter of your company revenue!” https://twitter.com/...
@snowden Edward Snowden on x
No matter how well-intentioned, @Apple is rolling out mass surveillance to the entire world with this. Make no mistake: if they can scan for kiddie porn today, they can scan for anything tomorrow. They turned a trillion dollars of devices into iNarcs—*without asking.* https://twi…
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
@ncweaver @migueldeicaza @benadida @dinodaizovi @alexstamos The hash function will leak out. And that will leave “the secrecy of NCMEC's database” as the only remaining technical measure securing Apple's encryption. But I'm going to tell you a secret: the really bad guys already …
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
If Apple had announced that they were scanning text messages sent through their systems, or photo libraries shared with outside users — well, I wouldn't have been happy with that. But I think the public would have accepted it.
@briannawu Brianna Wu on x
@charlesarthur @ncweaver @pvineetha I was speaking with an expert this week who measures these things. She told me fortnight, Minecraft and Roblox lobbies are where predators find children. It's not iMessage. it feels like we're going after the wrong target.
@matthewkeyslive Matthew Keys on x
@EFF Literally no one here is trying to defend child pornographers or their enthusiasts. But there's a very real slippery slope here, and you can't trust the feds to say, “well, we'd never ask Apple to do that!” Remember when they jailed a journalist over a purported website edit…
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
If 5% of US Apple users disabled iCloud Photos in the next week, Apple would probably reconsider their plans to enable client side scanning. I wonder what that would take.
@briannawu Brianna Wu on x
Apple is not your friend. They are a $2,000,000,000,000 (2 trillion) dollar company with an army of lawyers and marketers that are well paid to have their back. I love their products too, and own most of them. But they don't need you to spend your free time defending them.
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
It's gradually dawning on me how badly Apple screwed up with this content scanning announcement.
@swiftonsecurity SoS on x
#MUSTREAD on recent child-focused Apple features and their disastrous rollout that has destroyed so much nuance and legitimate issues from all perspectives. By someone who has has to deal with the victims and the technology. Thought provoking and strips away theoretics. https://t…
@waynedixon Wayne Dixon on x
@gruber @BriannaWu @gruber @BriannaWu Or you can do it right from a device. You have to verify it's you by answering security questions. But once you have done that, the birthdate will be changed. It does require parental approval to change a birthdate.
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
But they didn't do that. They announced that they're going to do real-time scanning of individuals' *private photo libraries* on their own phones. That's... something different. And new. And uncomfortable.
@chriseng Chris Eng on x
Finally something that isn't a knee jerk reaction to the new Apple child safety features. There are complex tradeoffs and this thread captures many of them. https://twitter.com/...
@sarahjamielewis Sarah Jamie Lewis on x
Let's start by talking about those hashes. Those hashes are not cryptographic hashes. They are *perceptual hashes*. That is to say that unlike the “hashes” you have mostly heard about they are not designed to be collision resistant...in fact mostly the exact opposite.
@benadida Ben Adida on x
So many needlessly tribal fights. Voting: security vs. accessibility. Covid+kids: learning vs. safety. CSAM: privacy vs. protecting kids. We all need to commit to engaging with open minds. We have more common goals than stark differences.
@deeperthrill @deeperthrill on x
It's a travesty. Jobs would have been disgusted. https://twitter.com/...
@kaepora Nadim Kobeissi on x
Vital point to keep in mind for anyone who cares about the Apple CSAM scanning issue: https://twitter.com/...
@kevinmitnick Kevin Mitnick on x
Well, it looks like @scottmcnealy was right - you have no privacy, get over it. How far will Apple go to monitor your device to make sure you are being a good boy/girl. I'm all for putting the pedophiles in prison, but what's Apple's next spyware move? Ready to update to IOS 15?
@sarahjamielewis Sarah Jamie Lewis on x
At the highest level there is your phone and Apple's servers. Apple has a collection of hashes, and your phone has...well tbh if you are like a large number of people in the world it probably has links to your entire digital life. We can draw a big line down the centre. https://t…
@choco_bit Fudge on x
The actual tech behind the CSAM is pretty sound and interesting in the lens of “How can we continue to prevent illegal shit on our services while expanding E2EE to users” But Apple *really* goofed the PR aspect + news outlets/influencers greatly misreporting its operation/nuance
@carnage4life Dare Obasanjo on x
The Chinese government just destroyed the $120B online learning industry including complementary apps like Duolingo because it wants tighter control of education. That Apple can or will resist their demands is not credible based on everything we've seen. https://www.reuters.com/.…
@matthewkeyslive Matthew Keys on x
@EFF (And the journalist *didn't even do the defacement*!!! Still, two years, lock 'em up, throw away the key...and let's do a repeat a few years later.) That was the whole point of Van Buren. SCOTUS said gov't's word isn't good enough. Are you listening, Apple?
@carnage4life Dare Obasanjo on x
This is clearly what everyone is concerned about and for Apple & it's defenders to misdirect about the complex cryptographic tech is gaslighting. 1. Apple has bent over multiple times to 🇨🇳 on human rights. 2. The 🇨🇳govt has shown no qualms about tanking billion dollar companies …
@benedictevans Benedict Evans on x
There's a very direct read-across to FLoC as well, and all the Tracking that-Apple-says-isn't-tracking that your iPhone does. Apple has chanted the mantra 'if it's on the device it's private' for a decade and now it's got them into a muddle
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
Someone pointed out that Apple's Intel Macs probably can't run their client-side scanning software because they don't possess a neural engine coprocessor. Real time scanning on Macs is going to require an upgrade to newer M1 hardware (or beyond).
@tapbot_paul Paul Haddad on x
Apple's probably not Private for long iCloud Relay doesn't sound quite as nice.
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
Some other folks have asked whether corporate and enterprise-managed devices will be subject to scanning. What I've heard is that enterprise customers are *very* surprised and upset. Apple hasn't announced if there will be an MDM setting to disable it.
@rsgnl Joe Rossignol on x
There seems to be quite a lot of negative reaction to Apple's CSAM plans. I would be surprised if Apple doesn't respond somehow, be it a Tim Cook interview or delaying the plans entirely.
@sarahjamielewis Sarah Jamie Lewis on x
Because, this thing isn't running in the cloud, it is running on your device and reporting back to Apple. Apple tells it what hashes are “crimelike” and with the help of your phone they learn a number. Your phone is co-opted into the surveillance network. https://twitter.com/...
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
@benadida Tough when you spend two years thinking and writing about an issue, engaging in workshops with people like @alexstamos. And then you're handed the decision by a faceless multinational company operating a PR operation.
@matthewkeyslive Matthew Keys on x
The problem with Apple's decision to scan normally-encrypted data for child porn images isn't why they're doing it — it's that the backdoor opens the door for the feds to say, well, if Apple can do it for this, why can't they do it for other things? https://www.eff.org/... @EFF
@glennf Glenn Fleishman on x
Looking to understand Apple's confusing and complicated new “child protection” initiatives? We at @TidBITS wrote a detailed set of questions & answers with what's known—and our concerns about Apple eroding its privacy promises. https://tidbits.com/...
@briannawu Brianna Wu on x
Something I hope everyone on every side of the Apple photo surveillance issue can agree on. When I ran for Congress, I learned how little we know about what government can force giant tech companies to do behind closed doors. FISA courts, NSA, there is VERY LITTLE oversight.
@sarahjamielewis Sarah Jamie Lewis on x
Even if you 100% trust Apple I think you could sketch up a dozen or so scenarios in which they are forced to use a different database set to compare against and *bam* all of a sudden it's a decentralized mass surveillance network, every authoritarians dream.
@sarahjamielewis Sarah Jamie Lewis on x
So, there is our first (small) privacy leak. Each account will be associated with a number that relates to how many images they have that have perceptual hashes collisions in the database - with no way of knowing the actual odds of those collisions occurring.
@waynedixon Wayne Dixon on x
@gruber @BriannaWu Actually it's not that difficult. You just login into https://appleid.apple.com/ and change the birthdate. I do not recall if you a parent has to confirm it or not. I have a test child iCloud account for development and I change it on a somewhat regular basis.
@snowden Edward Snowden on x
Currently writing: Under His ‘i’ If you own an iPhone, you should probably make sure you're on the mailing list at https://edwardsnowden.substack.com/. https://twitter.com/...
@benedictevans Benedict Evans on x
How long, exactly, did Tim try to see the other point of view here? https://twitter.com/...
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
@MarcoErmini To the general public there is a difference between “keep iCloud backup on because devices break and I don't want to lose my private photos” and “I want them scanned by Apple.” Apple assumed that due to past technical accidents the two were identical to the public. T…
@mattblaze Matt Blaze on x
Another frustrating aspect of anything involving CSAM is the implication that those warning about unintended consequences or technical failures are unconcerned about the problem or with protecting children. In fact, many of us have ourselves been victims of child abusers.
@mattblaze Matt Blaze on x
A frustrating thing about most discussion of the Apple CSAM scanning scheme is the conflation of three different questions: - Will it have a significant impact on CSAM? - What new risks does it expose users to if it works correctly? - What are the new risks if something fails?
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
@MarcoErmini The system scans the photos on the phone. From a technical perspective it does not need to upload the photos to the cloud. Apple has *deployed* it this way, since they assume “turning on backup in case my device breaks” is equivalent to “consent for scanning.” My poi…
@hardmaru @hardmaru on x
One Bad Apple “Apple says that they will scan your Apple device for CSAM material. If they find something that they think matches, then they will send it to Apple. You could have corporate confidential information and Apple may quietly take a copy of it.” https://www.hackerfactor…
@aral Aral Balkan on x
If you were to ask me who is a bigger threat to our human rights today, Google or Apple with these new plans, it's Apple, without a doubt. If you know anything about me or my work in the past decade you will understand exactly what that means. I'm as shocked as you (1/2)
@reneritchie Rene Ritchie on x
Irony is Google, Microsoft, Facebook, etc. been scanning for CSAM for a decade. Apple didn't want violate privacy by scanning full server libraries, so they waited until they could engineer what they believed to be a privacy-centric solution And many see it as a worse violation h…
@moonalice Roger McNamee on x
A terrific analysis of Apple's child safety initiatives by @gruber. Read it and you will understand. https://daringfireball.net/...
@suw @suw on x
I just love all the people who say “Just ditch your Apple products” in response to their screwing with our privacy (details: https://appleprivacyletter.com/ ). Sure, you wanna give me the $$$ it would cost me to replace all my Apple gear, software and compensate for lost producti…
@katebevan Kate Bevan on x
This is good on Apple's move on CSAM: it captures the 3 diff things it's doing, & explains what's happening. I share its “slippery-slope” concerns, & will add that I dislike Apple's “if you've nothing to hide, you've nothing to fear” response to critics https://daringfireball.net…
@gamingguru456 @gamingguru456 on x
Damn that android phone quality looking good rn! https://twitter.com/...
@vickerysec Chris Vickery on x
I will absolutely do it. I will roll my eyes and let out a heavy *sigh* every single time a tech company, politician, or law enforcement agency leverages “for the children” in order to place yet another boot on the throat of privacy. https://twitter.com/...
@alexstamos Alex Stamos on x
I also don't understand why Apple is pushing the CSAM scanning for iCloud into the device, unless it is in preparation for real encryption of iCloud backups. A reasonable target should be scanning shared iCloud albums, which could be implemented server-side.
@counternotions Kontra on x
If you must read only one article to see the absurdity of the bombastic headline regurgitation currently being spewed about Apple's new child pron alerting system: https://daringfireball.net/...
@daphnehk Daphne Keller on x
My colleague @alexstamos unpacks the wealth of nuance being lost in discussions of Apple's sudden, weirdly designed CSAM scanning change. https://twitter.com/...
@convertbond Lawrence McDonald on x
How did Apple go from refusing to open locked iPhones for law enforcement in 2017, to scanning users photos for governments in 2021? https://www.google.com/...
@alexstamos Alex Stamos on x
In any case, coming out of the gate with non-consensual scanning of local photos, and creating client-side ML that won't provide a lot of real harm prevention, means that Apple might have just poisoned the well against any use of client-side classifiers to protect users.
@dinodaizovi Dino A. Dai Zovi on x
Reading through Apple's Platform Security docs for iCloud*, it seems like server-side CSAM scanning of iCloud Photos would be cumbersome and expensive for Apple, so I'm betting client-side scanning is an optimization. _________________________ * https://support.apple.com/... http…
@howelloneill Patrick Howell O'Neill on x
This was a good conversation on Apple's new child safety announcement. Very smart folks with a variety of expertise and POVs including @alexstamos who has worked in the trenches of trust and safety and talks about the horrifying reality of the harm https://www.youtube.com/...
@mattblaze Matt Blaze on x
It appears that the text quoted here originated from NCMEC, not Apple (but was sent on some kind of internal Apple list). In any case, how dare they? There are serious concerns being raised by serious people here, and dismissing them as a “screeching minority” is just bad faith. …
@steven_aquino Steven Aquino on x
I learned a helluva lot just now about Apple's upcoming child safety features by reading this brilliant @GlennF and @rmogull FAQ for TidBITS. A must-read story. (h/t @jsnell) https://tidbits.com/...
@gruber John Gruber on x
@BriannaWu So I *think* this is why the Messages feature gives so much control to the kids, even those 12 and under. Control meaning that they always get a clear warning upon receiving or attempting to send a flagged image that proceeding will result in a notification to their pa…
@briannawu Brianna Wu on x
@gruber Strongly agree, I can live with the design of iCloud as it exists - though what could happen next concerns me. It's the iMessage component that gives me far more pause.
@gruber John Gruber on x
@BriannaWu That said, I *think* it's very difficult to change the age of a child's iCloud account. I forget why I tried that for my son a few years ago, but I gave up. (I wanted to make him “older” for something, but don't recall the details.)
@briannawu Brianna Wu on x
2/ I have a family member who enacted total lockdown on *everything* her child read. So when her child would go to the library to check out books, upon returning home she would pass them to my family member. She would then research *every single* book online and clear it.
@briannawu Brianna Wu on x
3/ Any discussion of sex, certainly any discussion of homosexuality, anything promoting a secular worldview would be censored. If you don't think parents like that are going to change their child's age in iCloud to create a permanent surveillance state, you're just wrong.
@briannawu Brianna Wu on x
1/ RE: Apple's plan to scan every photo in iMessage with machine learning and alert parents to nudity. I think a lot of well-meaning Silicon Valley people don't understand what life is like in the Religious Right South. Let me share so you can imagine how it will be misused.
@gruber John Gruber on x
@BriannaWu Good thread. It has occurred to me that while the CSAM iCloud photo detection is the feature garnering the most attention, the Messages image detection for kids has more potential to be problematic *as it exists*.
@kaepora Nadim Kobeissi on x
The Apple Privacy Letter's raised 4200+ signatures within 24 hours. Interested to see whether Apple will turn a deaf ear (having already called folks “a screeching minority") next week or whether they'll address the issue. If you still haven't signed: 👇 https://appleprivacyletter…
@josephmenn Joseph Menn on x
Thoughtful thread by @alexstamos on this. He has been working on these issues for years, trying to protect kids from horrible abuse without serving the cause of mass surveillance. Apple not participating and then coming out of nowhere with its own elegant/odd thing is so...Apple.…
@mmasnick Mike Masnick on x
Worth reading. Lots of important nuance here https://twitter.com/...
@reneritchie Rene Ritchie on x
If you're still confused by Apple's CSAM initiative, try looking at it through this lens: Apple can't abide known CSAM images on, or trafficked through, their servers, but they don't want to scan actual private user libraries to catch them, and this system solves for that
@gassee Jean-Louis Gassée on x
Very useful/detailed John Gruber explanation. Also points to hasty/wrong/prejudiced WaPo article. https://twitter.com/...
@briannawu Brianna Wu on x
This is my point. You can't think about these systems *AT THEIR BEST.* You have to ask hard questions about how they could be misused. As an industry, we massively suck at considering the downside. In this case, the downside is outed, potentially dead children. https://twitter.co…
@carnage4life Dare Obasanjo on x
@benedictevans Apple has insisted on defining privacy as “we can't see your data” then criticized Google & Facebook on privacy. However there's also “we protect your data from governments” where their track record is worse than others which is the elephant in the room for on-devi…
@carnage4life Dare Obasanjo on x
@benedictevans @eric_seufert @TreyTitone Governments can ask them to scan for XYZ you've uploaded to iCloud today. Apple has opened the door to scanning content on your device. Even Gruber concedes this is new and now depends on how much you trust Apple to say “no” to various gov…
@thegrugq Thaddeus E. Grugq on x
@Paxxi @pwnallthethings And yet there's only 250 cases from iPhone. Which suggests that something isn't adding up with that narrative. The CSAM database can only find known CSAM photos that have been added. So new content won't get flagged, only existing content that has to come …
@thegrugq Thaddeus E. Grugq on x
@Paxxi @pwnallthethings I'd like to know what those Facebook numbers represent. New CSAM? Or people uploading CSAM that gets flagged by the db? And how many users are doing this? I saw one number was 20m, but that can't be right. That's like the entire adult male population of Gr…
@thegrugq Thaddeus E. Grugq on x
@Paxxi @pwnallthethings The real number is 236 in 1yr for iPhone. Which is a bit lower than 17m a month.
@paxxi Pär Björklund on x
@thegrugq @pwnallthethings I meant that if Facebook detects that much, that's an indication of how prevalent it is on regular sites, no “dark web” required.
@paxxi Pär Björklund on x
@thegrugq @pwnallthethings These numbers suggest it's common on regular services which is easily accessible on an iPhone. https://twitter.com/...
@alexstamos Alex Stamos on x
@thegrugq @Paxxi @pwnallthethings The minority, but worst reports are those that involve the live abuse of a child. Those are often reported to NCMEC and also referred live to the relevant authorities by a combination of the child safety investigator (was part of my team) and law…
@antoniogm Antonio García Martínez on x
@benedictevans What about the on-device nature of it makes it worse? Assuming the cloud implementation scanned the same set of photos...
@alexstamos Alex Stamos on x
@thegrugq @Paxxi @pwnallthethings The vast majority of Facebook NCMEC reports are hits for known CSAM using a couple of different perceptual fingerprints using both NCMEC's and FB's own hash banks. What constitutes a “report”, which can have multiple images and IPs, is one of the…
@ajlburke Andrew Burke on x
Here's a level-headed and detailed explanation about all the new Apple bad-image-detection features, including when one should actually start to worry, a startling revelation about existing FBI back-doors, and a good ol' take down of a sloppy journalist https://daringfireball.net…
@benedictevans Benedict Evans on x
The irony of Apple's theory that any analysis done on the device is automatically private and anything analysis in the cloud violates your privacy - they built a CSAM detection system that is *potentially* much worse for your privacy *because* it happens on your device
@reneritchie Rene Ritchie on x
@charlesarthur @benedictevans My guess is that 1 is mainly Apple no longer being willing/able to tolerate CSAM on their servers and this is their engineering solution to that
@charlesarthur Charles Arthur on x
@reneritchie @benedictevans I agree with Gruber's take that the 2018 delay on E2E iCloud backup encryption was done in order to incorporate this. The timings all feel right. I think there's probably been CSAM but it's been hard to action (can't be seen to root through iCloud phot…
@charlesarthur Charles Arthur on x
@benedictevans I doubt 2 would have much effect? Why do you think it would? Seems like 1 should have a dramatic effect of identifying offenders, if the proportion holding is anything like the FB/WApp numbers would imply.
@benedictevans Benedict Evans on x
What's the net effect on CSAM on iOS of both: 1: on-device scanning of images uploaded to iCloud for matches to known CSAM and 2: iOS internet traffic going through a double-blind encrypted relay, so IP addresses can't ID users (And could Apple, politically, do 2 w/out 1?)
@cdhowe Carl Howe on x
Unlike most of the alarmist pieces published this week, John @Gruber writes a comprehensive analysis of how Apple's new child safety initiatives actually work. Bottom line: while not perfect, it protects personal privacy a lot more than you think. https://daringfireball.net/...
@fromjrtosr Fernando on x
Apple saying they will “reject any such demands from a government” is laughable at best and a flat out lie at worst. Once any government makes it a law for Apple to use a different set of hashes, what then? Are they stopping business in China? In the US? In the EU? Ridiculous. ht…
@simardcasanova @simardcasanova on x
I'm a big fan of @apple and I use a ton of their products and services But on top of being creepy, we currently has zero *credible* reassurance that this system won't be weaponized by authoritarian regimes or used for unrelated purposes Maybe bc such a reassurance cannot exist ht…
@notpatrick Patrick Beja on x
Probably the best summary I've seen of Apple's recently announced child safety initiatives, including where critics are excessive or plain wrong, as well as genuine concerns for potential abuse in the future. https://daringfireball.net/...
@aral Aral Balkan on x
are. I do not say this lightly or take any pleasure whatsoever in saying it. I cannot stress enough how important it is that this line does not get crossed. https://appleprivacyletter.com/ (2/2)
@kaepora Nadim Kobeissi on x
We are now at over 3,000 screeching voices of the minority! We tried to vet every signature. Our open letter now illustrates a very strong opposition to Apple's new content screening measures. Thanks @Snowden for keeping me and @georgionic up all night! https://appleprivacyletter…
@thegrugq Thaddeus E. Grugq on x
@pwnallthethings Is CASM on iPhones a big problem? How do they get it there from the dark web? Don't pedos believe this capability already exists and avoid iPhones to begin with?
@arnoldkim Arnold Kim on x
Great overview and take on Apple CSAM stuff by @gruber - Apple's messaging/clarity on this could have been much much better, but it's not entirely a messaging issue. https://daringfireball.net/...
@mattrosoff Matt Rosoff on x
Amazing how many sources got this story completely abjectly wrong. The slippery slope arguments are reasonable and worth considering—but if you don't get the technology, you can't even begin to plausibly make those arguments. https://daringfireball.net/...
@parrots Curtis Herbert on x
If you're like me you might have had a hard time cutting through the noise to understand exactly what is going on. This is a very good piece breaking down exactly what Apple is doing, and what they can and cannot see. A good 101 before convos about pros and cons and slopes. https…

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