Sources: years after FBI began tracking Russian disinformation efforts and US intelligence agencies drew up counter operations, the US still equivocates
I don't have much faith in the Russians stopping any of their illegal activity, so the question becomes what have we done to make our infrastructure more secure and to impose costs on Russia? Cyber Command is one piece of the puzzle but a lot more to do http://twitter.com/... TheBeat w / @thebeatwithari : “The Russians are onto something. They found a weakness, and they will be back in 2018 and 2020 with a more sophisticated and targeted approach.” - Former NATO Ambassador Douglas Lute told the @washingtonpost: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Andrea Chalupa / @andreachalupa : This article is hilarious: the Americans go to NATO HQ and give a presentation warning the Europeans of what the Europeans had been trying to warn the Americans of for years. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Kim Dozier / @kimdozier : Anatomy of a hack: US intelligence & law enforcement saw warning signs of Russian meddling in Europe & later in US but never fully grasped the Kremlin's ambitions. US policymakers didn't appreciate the dangers, then scrambled to fight back. @washingtonpost http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Kim Dozier / @kimdozier : The US & USSR fought an all-out information battle. After USSR collapse, Clinton & Congress shuttered the US Information Agency, charged w/influencing foreign populations. “They thought it was all over & that we'd won the propaganda war.” -last USIA chief http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Eric Garland / @ericgarland : MUST-READ: How the Kremlin's tactic of pushing propaganda through *paid freelance journalists* was successful in 2016 and especially 2017. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Adam Entous / @adamentous : Obama asked the CIA to plan a half-dozen covert operations against Russia under a secret global cyber “finding.” When Trump took over, officials tried to follow through but ran into obstacles at every turn, with @nakashimae @GregJaffe http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Eli Lake / @elilake : Counterpunch has been publishing articles from Alice Donovan, a Russian government troll posing as an American freelancer. Killer story from @adamentous @GregJaffe & @nakashimae http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... PropOrNot ID / @propornot : And they were outraged (outraged!!) when we had them on our List of Russian propaganda outlets... cc @NatCounterPunch http://twitter.com/... Christmas Carroll / @profcarroll : I remember last Thanksgiving reading WaPo article about @propornot identifying sites including CounterPunch spreading Kremlin propaganda. Most folks refused to believe it. This Christmas I'm reading how FBI confirms at least one writer was a Kremlin asset. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Omri Ceren / @omriceren : “Russia hawks” in the Obama admin “wanted far-reaching options” like “creating fake websites” Surprised Putin and the KGB didn't capitulate at the first hint. http://twitter.com/... Yasha Levine / @yashalevine : Election influence ops: This WaPo story is nuts, complete with CIA proposals to create fake websites and fake personas. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Omri Ceren / @omriceren : Obama admin did worse than nothing on Russia for 8 yrs. Pursued the Reset, gifted Russia with cash-flush unleashed Iran ally, reversed 70 yrs of US policy aimed at boxing Moscow out of MENA, they ceded Levant to Putin, etc But after Trump won, they say, they became Russia hawks? http://twitter.com/... Sasha / @sashaingber : Obama's 11th-hour actions had cleared the way for spy agencies to conduct cyber-operations to counter the Russian threat. But the CIA still had to finalize the plans, and the Trump White House wanted to review them. Obstacle after obstacle. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Toomas Hendrik Ilves / @ilvestoomas : The Europeans had for years warned senior U.S. officials about Russian meddling in their elections. The Americans listened politely but didn't seem alarmed by the threat, reflecting a belief that its democratic institutions and society weren't as vulnerable as those in Europe. https://twitter.com/... Michael Weiss / @michaeldweiss : CounterPunch and Veterans Today published pro-Assad articles from a Russian agent posing as an American journalist. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Casey Michel / @cjcmichel : .@NatCounterPunch unwittingly ran anti-Clinton, pro-@wikileaks Russian propaganda articles: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... pic.twitter.com/dsVLPwFIL9 Maer Roshan / @maerroshan : Wow. Propaganda-spewing Kremlin trolls have regular bylines in the American press. A Wash Post blockbuster. http://nzzl.us/eCxCMzB Eric Geller / @ericgeller : Fascinating new @washingtonpost story about years of U.S. awareness of Russian information warfare. Apparently McMaster and Bossert have clashed over who manages cyber operations. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... pic.twitter.com/d5EXY8PTK1 Adam Entous / @adamentous : The FBI in 2015 tracked fake Russian personas as they meddled in U.S. politics but kept the investigation secret. By the time policymakers woke up to the threat in 2016, it was too late. How decades of decisions helped Putin outmaneuver the United States. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Greg Jaffe / @gregjaffe : As Kremlin trolls burned across the Internet Washington debated options. With new info on covert options to counter Russian threat. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Greg Jaffe / @gregjaffe : A threat overlooked: “I thought our ground was not as fertile,” said Tony Blinken, Obama's deputy secretary of state. “That proved a bit naive.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... See also Mediagazer
Context & Ripple Effects
This story closes out a year of accumulating warnings: the FBI had been tracking Russian disinformation since 2015, and by late 2017 reporting showed the bureau knew Fancy Bear was targeting hundreds of government officials yet warned only a few of them. Behind the scenes, the Obama administration had asked the CIA to plan roughly half a dozen covert cyber operations under a secret finding — plans the incoming White House reviewed and delayed rather than executed.
The Washington Post's account matters because it documents the gap between capability and will: intelligence agencies drew up counter-operations, but sources describe an equivocating US response that never imposed decisive costs on Moscow. The question former NATO Ambassador Douglas Lute poses — what has been done to harden infrastructure and impose costs — frames everything that follows in this coverage.
First-order effects
- The CIA's planned covert cyber operations against Russia sit unexecuted while the Trump White House delays implementation, leaving the FBI and DHS to manage the threat through warnings and tracking rather than offensive action.
- Government officials and policy makers targeted by Fancy Bear remain largely unwarned, with protection extended only to a handful despite more than a year of knowledge.
Second-order effects
- The equivocation pushes defensive responsibility down to individual agencies: Cyber Command eventually conducts its own first known overseas cyberoperation targeting Russian operatives ahead of the midterms, effectively substituting tactical deterrence for the withheld strategic response.
- Diplomatic tools fill part of the vacuum — Obama's earlier move to expel dozens of Russian diplomats and seize estates, later revealed to be partly a response to a breach of FBI communications, becomes the template for visible-but-limited cost imposition.
Third-order effects
- If the pattern holds, election defense gets institutionalized rather than decided at the top: the FBI, DHS, NSA, and Cyber Command task forces formed before the midterms are made permanent, shifting counter-interference from ad hoc presidential decisions to standing bureaucracy.
- Russia adapts to the permissive environment with cheaper tools — by 2024, documented direct ties connect its government to an AI-powered network of fake news sites aimed at US voters, showing disinformation industrializing faster than the policy response matures.
The trend: US counter-disinformation policy is migrating from stalled presidential-level covert action toward permanent interagency task forces, even as Russian operations shift to cheaper AI-driven influence networks.