Security experts voice privacy concerns over Apple's new plan to scan users' devices for child abuse images, saying governments will likely increase its scope

Security researchers raise alarm over potential surveillance of personal devices — Apple intends to install software …

Financial Times 2021-08-06

Context & Ripple Effects

Apple’s planned scanning moves its use of hashes tied to known child-abuse material beyond the email flagging described in a prior account of Apple’s hash-based email detection and onto photos on iOS and macOS devices. The same-day rollout report framed the initial deployment as US-only and tied to iOS 15 and macOS Monterey.

The privacy concern is not limited to the initial material being matched: later related coverage records researchers’ warnings that Apple and EU phone-monitoring plans could embolden government surveillance, while Apple itself later cited a slippery slope of unintended consequences when facing pressure for further cloud scanning.

First-order effects

Apple’s US iOS and macOS users face a new on-device inspection mechanism for photos matched against known child-abuse images, making Apple’s child-safety policy an immediate privacy and trust issue.
Apple must defend a boundary around the scanning system’s stated purpose as security researchers question whether governments will seek to widen it.

Second-order effects

The rollout gives governments and regulators a concrete device-monitoring model to evaluate or press for, amplifying the concern later raised around Apple and EU phone-monitoring proposals.
Apple’s privacy positioning becomes harder to separate from its content-safety enforcement: pressure for additional categories or storage locations tests whether its stated limits hold.

Third-order effects

If device-level matching becomes an accepted public-safety tool, the key governance fight shifts from whether scanning exists to who sets the match lists, permitted categories, and expansion limits.
The episode points to safety enforcement moving into consumer-device software, where platform providers—not only communications services—become enforcement surfaces subject to government pressure.

The trend: Public-safety enforcement is increasingly being embedded in consumer-device software, making scope control and resistance to mission creep central to platform governance.

Discussion

@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
I've had independent confirmation from multiple people that Apple is releasing a client-side tool for CSAM scanning tomorrow. This is a really bad idea.
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
Yesterday we were gradually headed towards a future where less and less of our information had to be under the control and review of anyone but ourselves. For the first time since the 1990s we were taking our privacy back. Today we're on a different path.
@snowden Edward Snowden on x
No matter how well-intentioned, @Apple is rolling out mass surveillance to the entire world with this. Make no mistake: if they can scan for kiddie porn today, they can scan for anything tomorrow. They turned a trillion dollars of devices into iNarcs—*without asking.* https://twi…
@caseynewton Casey Newton on x
@daiwaka for sure, but I think I'm OK with this tradeoff? FB reported 15.8M cases of CSAM to NCMEC in 2019; Apple reported 205. Seems likely that there is massive under-reporting of very bad stuff on iOS
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
Regardless of what Apple's long term plans are, they've sent a very clear signal. In their (very influential) opinion, it is safe to build systems that scan users' phones for prohibited content. That's the message they're sending to governments, competing services, China, you.
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
The theory is that you will trust Apple to only include really bad images. Say, images curated by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). You'd better trust them, because trust is all you have.
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
Because surely it will ensure this, right? You'd want to ensure that Apple (or someone who hacks Apple's servers) can't change the database selectively to target it to you — and have a normal CSAM database for everyone else.
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
Apple is managing an embargo of reporters right now. It's quite a remarkable thing watching them do this, goal is to make sure everyone reports this when Apple wants and on Apple's terms.
@snowden Edward Snowden on x
Apple plans to modify iPhones to constantly scan for contraband: “It is an absolutely appalling idea, because it is going to lead to distributed bulk surveillance of our phones and laptops,” said Ross Anderson, professor of security engineering. https://www.ft.com/...
@jcenters Josh Centers on x
Lot of Apple pundits running out to defend Apple, not many openly saying how bizarre this move is. Hard to believe Apple just up and built an expensive surveillance system that destroys their carefully crafted privacy image on their own accord.
@mala Danny O'Brien🤖 on x
This is bad. Really bad. And Apple was embargoing the news, so journalist may not be talking to experts, like @ohemorange and @joncallas at @EFF, about the consequences for innocent users — not just Apple users, but anyone who stores data on their devices. https://twitter.com/...
@mala Danny O'Brien🤖 on x
The thinking goes like this: modern encryption works “end-to-end” (from the sender to the recipient), or “at rest” (encrypted only on your device with only you having the key). So why don't we put the govt. intercept point on one or both of these ends?
@mala Danny O'Brien🤖 on x
The reason is that government depts, including law enforcement and the intelligence community, want to be able to peer into all encrypted material as easily as they used to (briefly) spy on web and email traffic, back in the “golden age” of mass surveillance (from 9/11 to 2013)
@mala Danny O'Brien🤖 on x
So for the last few years, intelligence agency experts, like @GCHQ, have been pushing for tech companies to put remotely-controlled software to scan for unlawful content in people's devices, rather than surveil on the network. https://www.eff.org/...
@bdkjones Bryan Jones on x
.@tim_cook @Apple Broad, 1984-style surveillance of the masses is wrong, no matter how good your intentions may be. It is a vile betrayal of Apple's very soul. https://www.ft.com/...
@debostic Daniel Bostic on x
No one is defending explicit pictures of minors but this is category 5 insane. How long until this is used to scan your phone for anti-government photos? How long till authorities in the middle east use this to track down LGBT people? How easy will it be to frame someone? https:/…
@profwoodward Alan Woodward on x
This thread is worth a read. @matthew_d_green explains very nicely why Apple's move to include a CSAM tool on your phone might be a double edged sword: the road to hell is paved with good intentions. A little more public discussion is in order IMHO. https://twitter.com/...
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
Reading through the analysis. This is not... a security review. https://twitter.com/...
@wbm312 Whitney Merrill on x
Apple... you've really disappointed me today. Pervasive surveillance of private messages isn't the answer. https://www.theverge.com/...
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
This sort of tool can be a boon for finding child pornography in people's phones. But imagine what it could do in the hands of an authoritarian government? https://www.google.com/...
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
These tools will allow Apple to scan your iPhone photos for photos that match a specific perceptual hash, and report them to Apple servers if too many appear.
@realjuliasong Julia Song on x
Spoiler alert: its not just child abuse imagery they will scan for https://twitter.com/...
@sanasaeed Sana Saeed on x
And you'll be hard pressed to find many people opposing this because of the horrific ubiquity and violence of child sex abuse imagery - but this ‘exception’ will be abused beyond this measure. What are other options for fighting child sex abuse imagery? https://twitter.com/...
@daiwaka Daisuke Wakabayashi on x
@CaseyNewton OK, well that's better. But feels like an extremely slippery slope.
@lordvictor Lord Doctor Victor, PhD on x
This is how it always starts. “We're doing it to prevent child abuse”. Makes it hard to complain about without sounding like you're pro-child-porn. Then in a few years they're invading your privacy for all kinds of stuff. Straight up evil. https://www.theverge.com/...
@mikeisaac Rat King on x
big moves in encryption world: Apple to institute tools that scan iphones for child sexual abuse (story by @jacknicas) Facebook has had issues over its decision to keep WhatsApp and Messenger (in the future) fully encrypted and not scannable in this way https://www.nytimes.com/..…
@eff @eff on x
Apple: Think Different. Users: Great! Apple: About encryption and privacy. Users: Yeah!! Apple: We're scanning your private messages, and we're gonna tell your parents. Users: https://arstechnica.com/...
@nicolewong @nicolewong on x
For the folks in the back, IF YOU BUILD IT, THEY WILL COME. Even if this scanning process were secure (which is in doubt), there is NO WAY it's use remains confined to child abuse imagery and a certainty that governments will demand uses to violate human rights. https://twitter.c…
@ryantate Ryan Tate on x
@CaseyNewton @daiwaka since when is it Apple's job to police the content I have on my own device? You POST things to Facebook. Every shitty thing potentially done on a phone is Apple's responsibility now?
@vteagueaus Vanessa Teague on x
100% agree with @matthew_d_green on this https://www.apple.com/... Apple isn't doing “child-safety” - that's for police, social workers, etc. Apple is doing non-consensual scanning of images. Maybe they'll scan for child sex abuse images, maybe for images of pro-democracy protest…
@ladyaeva @ladyaeva on x
so i guess apple plans to have some Plausible Cause generator to flag your phone / icloud to be searched? seems alarming https://www.theverge.com/...
@alexhcranz @alexhcranz on x
on the surface this is great news, but it's also kind of like if Amazon announced Alexa will now call the police if it thinks it hears a murder. Private corporations without oversight should probably not be acting as extrajudicial watchdogs. https://twitter.com/...
@caseynewton Casey Newton on x
@daiwaka seems like they're going to check images uploaded to iCloud against hashes of known CSAM, rather than analyze new images. but we definitely need to know more here
@xor Parker Higgins on x
The unanimity with which privacy experts oppose this move by Apple is striking. There's no question, this concession leads to endless government pressure for more. https://arstechnica.com/...
@mikeisaac Rat King on x
hardcore cryptography folks generally believe highest levels of encryption (like WhatsApp's) = best/safest, with least room for the US Govt to come in and snoop around on messages from the public. but that comes with tradeoffs — namely, trafficking in illicit/illegal materials
@pinboard @pinboard on x
I see otherwise very smart people downplaying Apple's decision to move content policing onto devices. This is the second time (after Face ID) that Apple has deployed a technology that poses a greater threat to our liberty than anything Google or Facebook dreamed up. Good thread: …
@jimhansondc Jim Hanson on x
F*ck You No Tech $ThoughtPolice already abuse their access https://dailycaller.com/... This is a recipe for 1984 https://twitter.com/...
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
No, it's by Mihir Bellare reviewing the PSI protocol. So no review at all of the important bits. Well, let's see how the PSI protocol ensures accountability, ie that Apple can't change the database to selectively spy on specific users.
@bennypinkas Benny Pinkas on x
I reviewed the Apple PSI system that will be used for detecting photos with CSAM (child sexual abuse) content while keeping the contents of all non-CSAM photos encrypted and private. This system is only used in iCloud Photos — not iMessage.
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
Hopefully the next review is by an expert in adversarial ML who will explain how they've solved some of the hardest open problems in Computer Science.
@chrisblec Chris Blec on x
This is the final push I needed to move completely away from Apple and Google devices. The metamorphosis begins. https://twitter.com/...
@andrewfeinberg Andrew Feinberg on x
This is some scary shit because it can be adapted for any nefarious purpose at the command of any government. https://twitter.com/...
@benspielberg Ben Spielberg on x
Yikes. This type of surveillance is really Orwellian and destroys @Apple's claim to be a privacy-conscious tech company. https://arstechnica.com/...
@daiwaka Daisuke Wakabayashi on x
Like many parents, I have pictures of my kids without clothes on (try getting a 4 year old to wear clothes). How are they going to differentiate this from legitimate abuse? Are we to trust AI to understand the difference? Seems fraught. https://twitter.com/...
@kaepora Nadim Kobeissi on x
For those who missed it: this is a fundamental flaw in Apple's CSAM tech, that bypasses all of their claimed security guarantees. Apple can trivially use different CSAM datasets for each user. For one user it could be child abuse, for another it could be a much broader category. …
@charlesarthur Charles Arthur on x
More fodder for the @techmeme outraged: Apple has been scanning the hash of iCloud photos against known child abuse imagery hashes since late 2019. https://twitter.com/...
@shawnwildermuth Shawn Wildermuth on x
While I am clearly against any sort of protection for people with illegal photos, this really feels like a slippery slope of injecting tech into our personal networks. Once Apple does it, governments will expect it from all companies. https://twitter.com/...
@charlesarthur Charles Arthur on x
@matthew_d_green @TechmemeChatter Twitter started using a system like this, based on work Microsoft had done, as far back as 2013. This is not a new idea in the slightest, and there's absolutely no sign of it being applied to E2E. https://www.theguardian.com/ ...
@hamasakilaw John Hamasaki on x
Ending child abuse should be a government priority. Engaging in searches without warrants is not the way to get there. This is how it starts, then it goes to gun images, protest images, protest discussions, intimate discussions, etc. https://www.ft.com/...
@jkohlmann Joseph Kohlmann on x
This is deeply concerning. When I saw @matthew_d_green's tweets about this, I thought, okay, already needed to get off iCloud, but what if this type of image scanning based surveillance is eventually integrated into all cloud services and operating systems at a very low level? ht…
@durumcrustulum @durumcrustulum on x
A neuralnet trained on the NCMEC photo dataset, used to selectively decrypt your iCloud images. A doubly-accursed model. https://www.ft.com/... https://twitter.com/...
@pndc @pndc on x
That's one hell of a buried lede, using AI as the smokescreen. In the last sentence of https://www.ft.com/...: “Apple will enable all the suspect photos to be decrypted and [...] passed on to the relevant authorities.” Apple can and will remotely decrypt your device on demand.
@benjedwards Benj Edwards on x
Apple is reportedly planning to autoscan your iPhone for child abuse images. This is insanely disturbing if true It opens the door for false positives and deep surveillance that can be abused in 1000 different ways https://www.ft.com/...
@jkosseff Jeff Kosseff on x
Some thoughts about the potential Fourth Amendment issues associated with the news that Apple intends to scan iPhones for child sex abuse material. https://www.ft.com/...
@seyitaylor @seyitaylor on x
I mean it's become pretty clear that when Apple says privacy, they don't mean privacy from Apple. https://twitter.com/...
@ncweaver Nicholas Weaver on x
Call me cautiously in favor, rather than aghast, by Apple's idea of doing CSAM detection on people's phones: https://www.ft.com/...
@masspirates Mass. Pirate Party on x
FOSTA and SESTA were just the beginning. Now sex trafficking is the excuse to upload all your photos to Apple so they can review them for child abuse https://twitter.com/...
@maxwinebach Max Weinbach on x
I'm not against this by any means but part of scanning your phone for stuff on it rubs me the wrong way https://twitter.com/...
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
Spent the day trying to figure out if the Apple news is more benign than I thought it was, and nope. It's definitely worse.
@beeepbeepboop @beeepbeepboop on x
remember when apple was like “we'll never let the FBI in your backdoor”? also, choosing a really serious issue like child abuse as a backdoor is intentional; now, if you have any (valid) security concerns, it's going to turn into “if you don't abuse children don't worry”. EVIL. h…
@0xabad1dea Badidea on x
this is the wolf of the total surveillance state wearing the skin of a sympathetic cause https://twitter.com/...
@adrs Arielle Duhaime-Ross on x
“Apple already checks iCloud files against known child abuse imagery, like every other major cloud provider. But the system described here would go further, allowing central access to local storage.” https://www.theverge.com/...
@kevinbaker Ktb on x
don't fall for it. this doesn't stop here. https://twitter.com/...
@kaepora Nadim Kobeissi on x
Dumbed-down explanation: Apple's iPhones will soon start secretly calling the police if they find photos on your phone that match fingerprints of photos depicting child abuse and any content eventually deemed objectionable. This can/will be generalized to secure messaging https:/…
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
A small update from last night. I described Apple's matching procedure as a perceptual hash function. Actually it's a “neural matching function”. I don't know if that means it will also find *new* content on your device or just known content. https://twitter.com/...
@snowden Edward Snowden on x
🚨🚨 Apple says to “protect children,” they're updating every iPhone to continuously compare your photos and cloud storage against a secret blacklist. If it finds a hit, they call the cops. iOS will also tell your parents if you view a nude in iMessage. https://www.eff.org/...
@evacide Eva on x
Louder, for the people in the back: it's impossible to build a client-side scanning system that can only be used for sexually explicit images sent or received by children. https://www.eff.org/...
@benedictevans Benedict Evans on x
There is something quite theological in Apple's idea that doing something in your devices is private and doing exactly the same thing in the cloud is not.
@a_greenberg Andy Greenberg on x
Seems like Apple's idea of doing iCloud abuse detection with this partially-on-device check only makes sense in two scenarios: 1) Apple is going to expand it to non-iCloud data stored on your devices or 2) Apple is going to finally E2E encrypt iCloud? https://www.wired.com/...
@nytimestech @nytimestech on x
Apple unveils changes to iPhone designed to notify parents of child sexual abuse. But some privacy watchdogs are concerned about the implications. https://www.nytimes.com/...
@caseynewton Casey Newton on x
I tried to sort through my feelings about Apple's child safety announcements today. The risk of the slippery slope is real — but there are also real harms taking place on iCloud today, and it's good that Apple has chosen to pay attention to them https://www.platformer.news/ ... h…
@vladsavov Vlad Savov on x
Wonder what 2019's Apple would think of today's Apple. https://twitter.com/...
@bzamayo Benjamin Mayo on x
If the new Apple photo scanning stuff was looking at any and all photos stored on your device, I think there'd be somewhat of an ethical debate to be had. But it's just applied to iCloud Photos, which makes it no different than any other major web service or social network.
@jakecoco Critical Jake Theory on x
Couldn't someone just hack this and then digitally plant images on the phones of dissenters? Quite powerful...Seems like an awful idea to me https://twitter.com/...
@samfbiddle Sam Biddle on x
re: today's Apple news I'm trying to think of another product that will, essentially, automatically report you to the police if it determines you've broken the law *based entirely on private conduct*—Can't come up with other examples yet.
@caparsons Christopher Parsons on x
Earlier today Apple introduced a whole new set of features to monitor what individuals do on their devices. Those features, currently, are intended to address child exploitation online. You can find the details at: https://www.apple.com/...
@carnage4life Dare Obasanjo on x
Being the only major cloud storage service that doesn't scan photos for CSAM was untenable but it's strange how Apple uses client side code as a privacy get out of jail card. The privacy issue is scanning & reporting a user's photos not where code runs. https://techcrunch.com/...
@migueldeicaza @migueldeicaza on x
One interesting outcome of this move by Apple is that it addresses one major concern from policy makers. Not doing anything could lead to end to end crypto being weakened or prohibited across the board by US/EU. This takes away a major source of pressure on tech vendors.
@sweatieangle @sweatieangle on x
Yeah can't stress enough how much I'm really not happy with a robot assessing my nudes. I'm going to be mad af either way, too, because if it shows them to the cops that's a huge breach of privacy, and if it doesn't show them to the cops it's telling me I look old, rude. https://…
@reneritchie Rene Ritchie on x
What are your thoughts on Apple's new Child Safety protections? It checks hashes of images going to iCloud Photo Library, on-device, against known Child Sexual Abuse Material, and if a high enough number of matches are found, prompts Apple to initiate action #poll
@senblumenthal Richard Blumenthal on x
Thank you @tim_cook for taking action to help catch sexual predators & prevent the horrific abuse of children—now it's time for others in Big Tech to step up & for Congress to pass the EARN IT Act.
@malwarejake Jake Williams on x
Anyone thinking this won't be abused for other purposes clearly has never worked in government (and honestly isn't even paying attention). https://twitter.com/...
@k8em0 Katie Moussouris on x
Apple: Stink different https://twitter.com/...
@samifathi_ Sami Fathi on x
Apple does normal journalism practice?! How incredibly scandalous!!! How dare they! https://twitter.com/...
@unapologeticyt @unapologeticyt on x
This is the opening salvo in the assault to end what shred of autonomy and privacy from corporations and the state that we have left https://twitter.com/...
@freedomofpress @freedomofpress on x
Apple's newly announced “protections” are a terrible step backwards for privacy on its devices, and create a backdoor ripe for governmental abuse https://www.eff.org/...
@caseynewton Casey Newton on x
Also worth saying: child safety advocates have been pushing Apple to do this for a very long time. I talked with Thorn's @juliecordua, who told me she was heartened by today's moves https://www.platformer.news/ ... https://twitter.com/...
@eff @eff on x
Apple's filtering of iMessage and iCloud is not a slippery slope to backdoors that suppress speech and make our communications less secure. We're already there: this is a fully-built system just waiting for external pressure to make the slightest change. https://eff.org/...
@andyyen Andy Yen on x
“Apple will enable all the suspect photos to be decrypted and, if apparently illegal, passed on to the relevant authorities.” —> Imagine what this could do in the hands of an authoritarian govt? Don't have to imagine too hard either given Apple's cozy relationship with China. htt…
@petersterne Peter Sterne🌹 on x
@Whey_standard @SwiftOnSecurity Apple thinks photo scanning is non-negotiable — that for legal and PR reasons, you can't be a major consumer tech company and not scan users' photos — so the only way to encrypt photos on-device was to develop & implement client-side scanning. I ho…
@mistresssnowphd @mistresssnowphd on x
am I reading this wrong or are they planning on comparing all photos to a massive database of child sexual exploitation materials a database in which I'd imagine CSEM survivors would prefer not to be included but I doubt they were asked for consent anyway, so who knows https://tw…
@laurengoode Lauren Goode on x
Apple has “driven a wedge between privacy and cryptography experts who see its work as an innovative new solution and those who see it as a dangerous capitulation to government surveillance.” https://www.wired.com/...
@kaepora Nadim Kobeissi on x
Apple managed an embargo across every tech journalist. They also invited a handful of cryptographers to review their design, but not one that also engaged in public education. The lengths they've put towards controlling the narrative on this rollout is worth noting. https://twitt…
@senblumenthal Richard Blumenthal on x
After a long & forceful push from me & @LindseyGrahamSC, Apple's plans to combat child sexual exploitation are a welcome, innovative, & bold step. This shows that we can both protect children & our fundamental privacy rights. https://www.reuters.com/...
@malloryknodel Mallory on x
It gets worse. The official news from Apple today goes beyond images. It breaks the e2ee of iMessage. https://cdt.org/...
@snazzyq Quinn Nelson on x
Look, I can understand disagreement towards this action but one thing needs to be made clear: Apple isn't just scanning your phone for images of your tiny pp. They're only looking for cryptographic hashes of child porn that's already known or in circulation provided to them.
@gojomo Gordon Mohr on x
personally, I think this sort of “if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear” attitude should disqualify someone from being a “privacy chief” (from: https://www.nytimes.com/...) https://twitter.com/...
@swiftonsecurity SoS on x
Companies doing CSAM (used to be called 'CP') scanning is not new, they don't want to be pedo hosting dumping grounds, but the incredible nuances in pushing this technology stack to the client-side is where Apple's change is what's being discussed. I'm still watching discourse. h…
@swiftonsecurity SoS on x
Just to state: Apple's scanning does not detect photos of child abuse. It detects a list of known banned images added to a database, which are initially child abuse imagery found circulating elsewhere. What images are added over time is arbitrary. It doesn't know what a child is.
@zackwhittaker Zack Whittaker on x
New: Apple confirmed it will begin scanning for known child sexual abuse materials (CSAM) on iPhones and Macs starting later this year. The scanning will roll out initially in the U.S., but already faces resistance from security and privacy advocates. https://techcrunch.com/...
@mistresslienne @mistresslienne on x
Let's be real tho. This is another move towards fascist surveillance state done in the name of “protecting the children”. Most things done w the intention of “doing good” in this country are actually terrible https://twitter.com/...
@snazzyq Quinn Nelson on x
All of this sounds fantastic. I do feel bad that once an iCloud user exceeds the CSAM threshold it'll go to manual review for verification. I can't think of a worse job that having to view child sexual abuse material all day long. 😔 https://twitter.com/...
@katebevan Kate Bevan on x
This is a really useful discussion of Apple's plans to scan images to detect CSAM. It's smart and elegant, but the concern is clearly mission creep. https://twitter.com/...
@jacknicas Jack Nicas on x
Apple is aiming to prevent child sexual abuse with two new tools: 1. A pretty complex system to spot images of child sexual abuse uploaded to iCloud. 2. A feature that flags to parents when their children send or receive nude photos in texts. https://www.nytimes.com/...
@cendemtech @cendemtech on x
Our release details more of our concerns: #encryption https://cdt.org/...
@migueldeicaza @migueldeicaza on x
A better way of phrasing it: Apple likely chose to implement this system on their own terms, rather than be forced to implement a system imposed on them by legislators that might have had worst outcomes.
@dinodaizovi @dinodaizovi on x
I'm eagerly awaiting more details on this, but I'm not liking what it's looking like so far. This could set a dangerous, worldwide precedent of pushing continuous scanning down to users' devices for whatever content is considered illegal in a particular country. https://twitter.c…
@ryantate Ryan Tate on x
China forced Uyghurs to install an app that scanned for illegal files. Many ended up in concentration camps. Apple today forces this spying on Americans, declaring, “If you're storing [illegal] material, yes, this is bad for you.” https://www.vice.com/... https://www.nytimes.com/…
@koush @koush on x
iCloud and iMessage will be scanning your photos under the guise of “protecting children”, ending their claim to end to end encryption. A tried and true strategy: incite a moral panic and leverage outrage to erode user privacy. https://www.eff.org/...
@malwarejake Jake Williams on x
If your response to very legitimate privacy and abuse concerns is “but the children!”, please unfollow me now. Then read up on parallel construction (and its abuses) because it's context you'll definitely need to fully understand the situation. https://twitter.com/...
@wimremes @wimremes on x
I honestly can't believe that anyone at Apple thinks this is a great idea. They weren't “thinking differently”, they were not thinking at all. Waiting until they SWAT their first parent because they had a naked pic of their kid. https://twitter.com/...
@santiagomayer_ Santiago Mayer on x
We can all agree we must do everything we can to stop child abuse. ...But having Apple scan all my pictures and potentially send them to human reviewers is not something I'm comfortable with. https://techcrunch.com/...
@sophieladder @sophieladder on x
some thoughts on this: - they are only checking the images against known child sexual abuse material (CSAM). this makes me less concerned than if they were using AI (recall nudity AIs flagging pictures of sand dunes) which could incorrectly identify unrelated media https://twitte…
@billt Bill Thompson on x
This should be apparent to everyone. However, this is not a new idea - this from 2013 https://www.theguardian.com/ ... - and so we should be asking broader questions around how we make the net safer, and not simply reacting to the news cycle. https://twitter.com/...
@briannawu Brianna Wu on x
This is the worst idea in Apple history, and I don't say that lightly. It destroys their credibility on privacy. It will be abused by governments. It will get gay children killed and disowned. This is the worst idea ever. https://www.nytimes.com/...
@swiftonsecurity SoS on x
Previous discussion on possibilities of false-positive detections when scanning for CSAM. Apple's approach is even more guarded and requires a threshold to be met to eliminate individual detections. https://twitter.com/...
@feross @feross on x
@Apple This @EFF write-up explains why this backdoor is a disaster: “To say that we are disappointed by Apple's plans is an understatement.” “It is a shocking about-face for users who have relied on the company's leadership in privacy and security” https://www.eff.org/...
@juliet_shen Juliet Shen on x
Regarding the Apple and CSAM scanning news, the biggest difference is that the extension of this canning to client photos that haven't been shared anywhere, AND the use of a neural network to detect unknown CSAM. They've been scanning iCloud for a while https://nakedsecurity.soph…
@dangillmor Dan Gillmor on x
That iPhone is Apple's phone, not yours. And this completely betrays the company's pious privacy assurances. This is just the beginning of what governments everywhere will demand. All of your data will be fair game. If you think otherwise, you're terminally naive. https://twitter…
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
So the Apple scanning system just dropped. https://www.apple.com/...
@missingkids Ncmec on x
“Apple's expanded protection for children is a game changer,” said John Clark, president and CEO of NCMEC. https://www.apple.com/...
@josephfcox Joseph Cox on x
New: much more interesting than Apple checking iCloud for known child abuse images is Apple will scan all images sent and received by children in Messages app to detect nudity. This is for new images, not already known. Expert concerned could be expanded https://www.vice.com/...
@carnage4life Dare Obasanjo on x
This is a good example of where the US & EU privacy philosophies diverge. US media argues big tech should police private communications in online groups which is a straight line to including iMessage. EU considers private messaging to be sacred by law. https://www.apple.com/...
@chrismessina Chris Messina on x
I'm with @CaseyNewton and have very mixed feelings about Apple's #ChildSafety initiative. However, these computing devices open up children to enormous forms of novel abuse that can cause lifelong trauma and suffering. Taking some time with this one. https://www.apple.com/... htt…
@captn3m0 Nemo on x
Reminder that the Indian government has successfully bullied Apple in the past to make iOS changes (TRAI). Could they pressure Apple into adding new hashes (of political memes) in the next iOS release? I'd rather not find out. https://twitter.com/...
@jsrailton John Scott-Railton on x
NEW: @Apple to start checking photos on iPhone & iCloud against a blacklist of CSAM imagery. To watch out for: Now that the tech is on the table, how soon till China & other authoritarians w/political blacklists lean on Apple to search citizens' phones? https://www.apple.com/... …
@eigenrobot @eigenrobot on x
my expectation is just like everything else this will start with child porn and then get expanded to terrorism and then subpoenas will start going out and then edgy politics content etc etc usual course of affairs https://twitter.com/...
@foxcahn Albert Fox Cahn on x
So, Apple makes its entire iOS ad campaign about “privacy”, but then starts scanning your photos, messages, and searches? Not only does this normalize this mass surveillance, but it's only a matter of time before the algorithm makes a huge mistake. https://www.apple.com/...
@bcrypt Yan on x
if i'm reading this right, it seems you can opt out of this scanning by disabling icloud backup for photos, even though all the CSAM matching happens locally https://twitter.com/...
@kaepora Nadim Kobeissi on x
2021: Child safety 2022: Terrorist recruitment prevention 2025: Firearm regulation enforcement 2027: “Combating misinformation” https://www.apple.com/...
@matthew_d_green Matthew Green on x
Oh good! They're scanning your end to end encrypted iMessages for nude photos. But only “if you're a kid.”
@stroughtonsmith Steve Troughton-Smith on x
As a parent, this might make a lot of sense. On the other hand, Apple's about to drive a whole generation of teenagers & peer groups away from iMessage, to never come back. This feels like a radioactive feature, opt-in or not https://twitter.com/... https://twitter.com/...
@mom_mykayla Aphrodite on x
As a parent, I am so happy to see companies begin to take child safety more seriously. Child Safety - Apple https://www.apple.com/...
@migueldeicaza @migueldeicaza on x
@slava_pestov @hadeon_eon I don't have data myself; regardless of that number, Stamos echoed my observation: Apple is likely under pressure to weaken encryption across the board with this as a core issue. Possibly the math was “better do this than be forced to weaken everything”
@zollotech Aaron Zollo on x
Been reading a lot about Apple's upcoming Child Safety protections coming to iOS 15. It's still private and Apple is not looking at all of your images physically and everything is under multiple layers of encryption. https://www.apple.com/...

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