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Analysis: Apple had more suppliers in China than any other country including Taiwan in 2020; number of Apple suppliers in US also slid despite Trump's trade war

Number of US companies in supply chain also slides despite Trump's trade war  —  TAIPEI — China now boasts more Apple suppliers …

Nikkei Asia

Context & Ripple Effects

This Nikkei analysis lands mid-arc in Apple's long-running supply-chain geography story: an earlier Reuters breakdown found that despite some diversification into India and Brazil, Apple's dependence on China had actually deepened since 2015 (deepened since 2015), and Washington's decoupling campaign had by late 2020 already pushed Apple to study moving 15%–30% of output out of the country (pressured Apple to study moving output).

The new data cuts against both narratives at once — China still topped every country including Taiwan in Apple's 2020 supplier count, and the number of US suppliers fell even as the trade war ran. Later coverage would confirm how slow the unwind is: the China-based share only slipped to 41% in 2020 and 36% in 2021 (slipped to 41% then 36%) before Chinese suppliers climbed back to 52 names by 2023.

First-order effects

  • Apple enters the post-trade-war period with its densest single-country supplier base still in China, and with fewer US suppliers than before Trump's tariffs began — the policy produced no immediate re-shoring.

Second-order effects

  • The gap between Washington's targets and Apple's actual counts forces the debate onto manufacturing sites rather than supplier headquarters — which is exactly what the later US-site data captures, with US manufacturing sites jumping from 25 in 2020 to 48 by September 2021 (US sites jumped from 25 to 48) while the China-based share kept falling only gradually.

Third-order effects

  • Concentration risk keeps resurfacing operationally rather than politically: half of Apple's top 200 suppliers sat in and around Shanghai when China's COVID lockdowns hit (Shanghai lockdown disruption), and by the latest list Chinese suppliers had grown again from 48 to 52 — evidence that headline decoupling and balance-sheet geography move on different clocks.

The trend: Supply-chain decoupling is being negotiated site-by-site rather than country-by-country: political pressure changes where factories sit far faster than it changes who supplies them.

Discussion

  • @mtdtl @mtdtl on x
    Chinese suppliers “willing to take low-margin businesses that other suppliers are reluctant to pick up to gradually level up by working with Apple”. Trend simultaneous to diversification of Apple's supply chain in India and Vietnam. And TSMC irreplaceable https://asia.nikkei.com/…