ASML says it cannot make enough chipmaking tools to meet customer demand in 2027 and 2028. Chinese fabs, meanwhile, have already acquired hundreds of ASML’s less-advanced lithography tools—machines that can be adapted for some of the chips the newest tools were meant to keep out of reach.

Key takeaways

  • Chinese fabs had acquired roughly 343 immersion-DUV tools by early 2026, including about 270 from ASML.
  • ASML’s supply chain spans about 2,000 companies.
  • ASML planned to make at least 60 standard EUV systems in 2026, 36% more than it sold in 2025.
  • ASML expects China to account for about 20% of its total 2026 sales.

Governments can decide who receives the next scanner; they cannot revoke the productive value of a scanner a fab has already bought. US, Dutch, and Japanese officials must therefore decide more than who gets EUV: they must govern access to capable tools, suppliers, and future capacity under separate national rules.

ASML began as the company that made a difficult printing technology viable. Its role has reversed into that of policy-governed infrastructure: advanced chipmakers need its tools, Chinese fabs partly possess them, and ASML must keep expanding production. The acquired DUV fleet is the clearest test of that reversal, because the tool most visibly withheld is not the only one that matters.

ASML solved the printing problem before governments inherited it

In 2016, the coverage record described EUV as a possible rescue for transistor scaling, with mass production potentially beginning in 2018. At that point, chipmakers were still weighing whether an expensive, delayed technology could carry the next phase of production. Intel reported high-volume EUV production at its Ireland plant in 2023. A question about whether the machine could work at volume had become a question about who could obtain it.

Intel assembled the first commercial High-NA EUV tool in 2024. Samsung and TSMC have committed to adopting ASML’s High-NA machines by 2028 and 2030, respectively, joining Intel on a roadmap that also calls for larger photomasks. ASML’s researchers have raised EUV light-source power from 600 watts to 1,000 watts, with a reported potential to increase chip output by 2030. The frontier remains a development program, not a finished machine that competitors can simply purchase and leave unchanged.

Keeping EUV from Chinese fabs has a clear purpose: it denies access to the production platform on which leading manufacturers are building their next processes. It does not follow that every strategically useful chip requires EUV.

China’s DUV purchases made the existing fleet a separate control problem

Chinese fabs had acquired roughly 343 immersion-DUV tools by early 2026, about 270 of them from ASML, according to the Center for Technology & Statecraft figures carried in the coverage. Immersion DUV can be adapted for 7nm logic and high-bandwidth memory. That capability does not establish that Chinese fabs can match EUV-based production on cost, yield, or scale. It does establish why an EUV-only restriction leaves a meaningful manufacturing route in place.

A proposed US bill would extend the restriction to DUV-lithography exports. It would address future access, not the scanners already acquired. Tokyo Electron demonstrated the commercial opening left by narrower rules when it expanded Chinese sales of less-advanced equipment and largely offset the effect of US controls on its business. Customers denied one class of tool could still buy another class of equipment; suppliers could still serve them.

The policy problem has two dates. A license decision governs the next delivery. A fab’s earlier purchases govern what it can attempt now. CSET researchers found that China’s SMEE held only 4% of the older-generation lithography market in 2025, far behind ASML and Nikon, so dependence on foreign suppliers remains substantial. Dependence and possession can coexist; neither cancels the other.

Washington cannot govern ASML’s supply network by licensing ASML alone

ASML’s supply chain spans about 2,000 companies. Its scanners emerge from that network, while fabs also depend on equipment from other makers. In 2024, the United States considered applying the foreign direct product rule to ASML’s and Tokyo Electron’s China equipment businesses. Allies described that prospective step as draconian. Japan subsequently planned broader controls covering advanced chips and lithography equipment.

Each government controls a different part of the route between a supplier and a fab. US lawmakers criticized ASML, Tokyo Electron, KLA, Applied Materials, and Lam Research in 2025 for sales they said had supported China’s chip industry, including sales allegedly made to state-owned or military-linked entities. Their list identified the difficulty: Washington was not dealing with one Dutch product and one Dutch license. It was trying to influence decisions across several companies and jurisdictions.

The Netherlands has an industrial reason to resist treating every restriction as costless. ASML must preserve the suppliers and customer base that make its machines possible, even as allied governments seek to limit where those machines and related tools can go.

ASML’s production slots now matter before its tools ship

ASML planned to make at least 60 standard EUV systems in 2026, 36% more than it sold in 2025. In October, the company said its planned supply—including a previously communicated 30% capacity increase—would still fall short of customer demand in 2027 and 2028. That assessment turns a manufacturing plan into a question of allocation: a chipmaker cannot execute a process transition merely by deciding to buy a scanner if ASML has no delivery capacity for it.

TSMC reportedly asked customers to seek N2 production allocations as far out as the second quarter of 2027, with large allotments nearly sold out for the following two years. ASML’s delivery constraints and TSMC’s foundry allocations are different bottlenecks; neither report proves that a particular missing scanner caused a particular customer’s wait. Together they show why chipmakers have to plan both the tool and the fab capacity it is meant to serve. The related equipment-cycle question is whether those plans stay aligned as factories expand.

ASML also reported strong interest in orders for 2029 and 2030. Interest is not a binding reservation: the supplied reporting does not establish deposits, cancellation terms, or named allocations for those years. TSMC told major suppliers to delay high-end equipment deliveries in 2023 when it grew concerned about customer demand. ASML has identified a near-term shortfall, not proved that every future production slot will remain scarce.

Restricting China also exposes ASML’s dependence on Chinese buyers

ASML expects China to account for about 20% of its 2026 sales. Its China sales rose 109% quarter over quarter in Q3, while China’s share of machine sales rose from 14% to 23%. ASML also reported that Europe accounted for 0% of its revenue in each of the first two quarters of 2026, and urged EU authorities to create demand for chips made in Europe. A Dutch toolmaker cannot replace a large customer market by declaring its home region strategically important.

Nor can restrictions guarantee permanent dependence. SMIC was reported to be testing a domestically produced DUV machine in 2025. Testing is not evidence that it can replace ASML’s capable immersion tools at scale; SMEE’s small market share argues against assuming an easy substitution. But ASML’s CEO has warned that excessive restrictions give excluded countries a reason to accelerate their own technology. The same controls that protect a short-run advantage can finance the determination to work around it.

Frequently asked questions

What share of Chinese fabs’ installed immersion-DUV fleet came from ASML?

About 79%: ASML supplied roughly 270 of the approximately 343 immersion-DUV tools Chinese fabs had acquired by early 2026. That leaves about 73 tools from other suppliers.

How did ASML change its 2026 sales forecast?

ASML raised the bottom end of its forecast from €43 billion to €44 billion, while retaining the €45 billion upper end. Its revised range was €44 billion to €45 billion.

How did ASML’s reported Q3 results compare with expectations?

ASML reported €11.66 billion in Q3 net sales, slightly below the €11.72 billion estimate. Net profit was €4.96 billion, above the €4.1 billion estimate.

What does a High-NA EUV machine cost?

A reported July 2026 figure put the price of a High-NA EUV machine at roughly $400 million. The piece identifies Intel as the first company to assemble a commercial High-NA tool in 2024.

Chinese fabs’ installed immersion-DUV fleet by supplier

Supplier groupTools acquired by early 2026Share of roughly 343-tool fleet
ASMLAbout 270About 79%
Other suppliersAbout 73About 21%
TotalAbout 343100%

ASML once had to prove its newest scanner could reach the fab. Governments can now stop the next one at the border; they cannot call back the DUV machines Chinese fabs have already bought.