Sources: FTX's derivatives exchange LedgerX is for sale, attracting interest from Blockchain.com, Gemini, and others; Nov. 17 filing: LedgerX had ~$303M in cash
LedgerX, one of the few solvent pieces of Sam Bankman-Fried's crumbled FTX empire, is for sale and attracting interest …
Bloomberg
Context & Ripple Effects
FTX bought LedgerX to expand into US futures and options, making the unit a regulated derivatives asset within the wider group. Its planned expansion into US derivatives now stands apart from the exchange’s liquidity crisis and failed rescue discussions.
LedgerX had already planned to make $175 million available to the bankruptcy estate from a reserved fund. The reported sale process turns one of FTX’s solvent operations into a potential source of creditor recoveries, a path later reinforced when the court cleared sales of several FTX units.
First-order effects
Blockchain.com, Gemini, and other interested bidders can pursue LedgerX’s regulated derivatives operation rather than build an equivalent FTX-owned business from scratch.
FTX’s bankruptcy estate gains a route to monetize LedgerX while the unit’s reported cash balance and planned contribution make it directly relevant to creditor funding.
Second-order effects
A successful buyer would compete for US crypto futures and options customers using an established regulated venue, pressuring rivals to weigh acquisition against internal expansion.
The sale separates a solvent, regulated business from FTX’s distressed exchange operations, concentrating bidder attention on licenses, infrastructure, and customer access rather than the parent’s broader balance-sheet problems.
Third-order effects
If distressed crypto groups continue selling regulated subsidiaries separately, regulated market infrastructure may increasingly be owned by firms whose core exchange businesses are not tied to the original platform.
The contrast between LedgerX’s saleability and FTX’s failed rescue effort points to a crypto market where regulated operating units can retain strategic value even when a parent group loses confidence.
The trend: FTX’s breakup illustrates how regulated crypto infrastructure can become a distinct acquisition market during exchange failures.
Over $1B in total: $100M last Aug, $550M in Jan, $250M in Feb and $250M in Apr. The timeline and amounts dovetail to the investing sentiment in Bitcoin mining. Didn't know Alameda was such a major force behind the crypto-mining boom https://www.bloomberg.com/...
Scoop w/ the amazing @Yueqi_Yang : Alameda invested $1.15B in miner Genesis Digital Assets during the height of the crypto-mining boom right before the crypto winter sent miners into deep distress. That was Alameda's largest venture bet https://www.bloomberg.com/...
SCOOP w/ @avabmorrison: US authorities are asking crypto investors and trading firms that worked closely with FTX to hand over information on the company and its key figures, including founder Sam Bankman-Fried. https://www.bloomberg.com/...
SBF will eventually be charged, though it might take time. The fraud impacted too many people and too much money was stolen. Good scoop from @KenzieSigalos https://www.cnbc.com/...
Wire fraud is what creates US jurisdiction: “Prosecutors and SEC cast a wide net to gather communications Regulator is also digging into crypto-giant's investor pitches” https://www.bloomberg.com/...
SBF says he was “not deeply aware of” Alameda's finances Forbes says he sent them details of Alameda's holdings as recently as August https://www.forbes.com/... https://twitter.com/...
Alameda had a non-liquidation account. They actually fat-fingered a $3B notional market order(which was converted into a limit order according to their rules). https://twitter.com/...
Dude owned 90% of Alameda was frantically sending Forbes updates on his networth that included Alameda holdings - https://www.forbes.com/... there is 0 chance he didn't know FTX funds were going to Alameda. Zero. https://twitter.com/...
This is HUGE: @FT reports that @SBF_FTX @FTX_Official's “hedge fund took big hit to prop up #FTX exchange” IN 2021 b/c bad risk/margin/volatility management; this is exactly what concerned us in the @CFTC application: https://www.ft.com/... @joshckoliver @kadhim
“The incident, more than a year before FTX collapsed, shows how when one pillar of SBF's crypto conglomerate came under stress, he would shift the weight to another, treating the businesses portrayed publicly as separate as if they were one group.” https://www.ft.com/...
Alameda lost $1b on a trade involving MobileCoin, the Signal crypto token?! Seemingly had to cover someone's position in the midst of a huge spike in its price. 👁️ https://www.ft.com/...
In 2021, Sam Bankman-Fried's FTX exchange took a big hit on manipulative trading in an obscure token He moved the damage off FTX's books to his Alameda trading firm, another sign the 2 nominally separate cos were essentially one Scoop w/ @joshckoliver https://www.ft.com/...
Before FTX blew up trying to support Alameda, the tables were turned - Alameda had to intervene last year to rescue FTX. Anyone who says the two entities weren't operated together is being dishonest. https://www.ft.com/...
Took a big hit? It sounds more like Alemeda (his hedge fund) returned SOME of the $$ to FTX that had been taken w/o customer consent & used to bet on crypto. https://twitter.com/...