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Chronicles

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The US FCC adds Kaspersky Lab, China Telecom Americas, and China Mobile International USA to its national security threat list, barring them from its USF funds

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on Friday added Russia's AO Kaspersky Lab, China Telecom (Americas) Corp (0728.HK) …

Reuters

Context & Ripple Effects

The FCC had already made federal telecom subsidies a security-policy lever when it barred subsidized purchases from Huawei and ZTE after designating them national-security risks. The 2021 designation of five Chinese technology firms, including Huawei and ZTE, broadened that framework beyond the initial equipment restrictions.

Today’s additions extend the list to Kaspersky Lab and the U.S. arms of China Telecom and China Mobile. They also follow the Justice Department and other agencies’ push to revoke China Telecom’s U.S. operating authority, showing that federal agencies were applying separate security tools to the same telecom presence.

First-order effects

  • Kaspersky Lab, China Telecom Americas, and China Mobile International USA become ineligible for Universal Service Fund support under the FCC’s threat-list framework.
  • USF-supported telecom providers must avoid directing those funds to the newly listed companies, extending a constraint already imposed on designated Chinese vendors.

Second-order effects

  • China Telecom Americas and China Mobile International USA face a more restrictive U.S. operating environment as subsidy eligibility joins the separate regulatory scrutiny of China Telecom’s authority to operate.
  • Telecom providers that rely on USF support have a stronger incentive to select suppliers and service partners outside the FCC’s designated-risk list.

Third-order effects

  • The FCC is establishing a repeatable model in which national-security designations determine access to public telecom funding, rather than functioning solely as assessments of particular products.
  • If applied across additional foreign communications providers, this model would further align U.S. telecom procurement and market access with national-security screening.

The trend: U.S. telecom policy is increasingly using eligibility for public funding and operating access as instruments for screening foreign-linked communications companies.

Discussion

  • @brendancarrfcc Brendan Carr on x
    “The Chinese Embassy... said Friday that the FCC ‘abused state power and maliciously attacked Chinese telecom operators again...’” China knows a lot about abusing state power and launching malicious attacks, and they're simply projecting here. https://www.reuters.com/...