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Chronicles

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As the coronavirus speeds up efforts to expand voting from home either through mail-in ballots or online voting, an analysis of the associated security risks

Fear of the coronavirus is speeding up efforts to allow voting from home, but some of them pose security risks and may make it easier …

New York Times

Context & Ripple Effects

The pandemic has already pushed US political operations online, with races moving off the trail and into digital campaigning as gatherings became impossible. The same pressure now extends to the ballot itself, as officials weigh expanding vote-from-home options at speed.

Security analysts have flagged this territory before: experts judged online voting systems not ready for prime time despite seemingly successful trials, and reporting before the midterms documented severe vulnerabilities across levels of the election system. The Times' analysis lands in a debate where the risk case is already well established.

First-order effects

  • States accelerating mail-in or online voting must do so on timelines compressed by the pandemic, adopting channels that Wired-sourced experts say lack strong enough security guarantees for prime time.
  • Campaigns and election administrators face a widened attack surface immediately, since the shift mirrors the pattern Reuters reported for remote work, where weaker home systems and relaxed controls create openings for hackers.

Second-order effects

  • Election-night threat scenarios already discussed by experts — coordinated social media disinformation and ransomware aimed at voter registration systems (as laid out ahead of November) — become more consequential if more of the process runs remotely, forcing states and platforms to harden registration databases alongside any ballot expansion.
  • Vendors selling online-voting and ballot-return technology gain demand from rushed adoption, even as security researchers' skepticism pressures buyers to distinguish audited systems from expedient ones.

Third-order effects

  • If emergency-driven expansion holds, US election infrastructure structurally shifts toward distributed, internet-adjacent participation, making continuous security auditing rather than per-election checks the baseline requirement.
  • A visible incident tied to expanded remote voting would likely trigger regulatory intervention in election technology procurement, formalizing standards that today exist mainly as expert warnings.

The trend: The pandemic is compressing years of debate over remote voting into months, forcing security guarantees for elections to evolve faster than the systems being deployed.

Discussion

  • @jhalderm J. Alex Halderman on x
    1/ In a new research paper today, @MSpecter and I perform the first public, independent analysis of the security and privacy risks of Democracy Live's OmniBallot online voting platform. Full paper: https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/ ... Advice for voters: https://internetpolicy.mit.…
  • @ericgeller Eric Geller on x
    Experts warn voters in states using popular internet voting system: “If at all possible, do not return your ballot through OmniBallot's website or by email or fax.” It “expos[es] the election to a critical risk that votes will be changed, at wide scale, without detection.” https:…
  • @brendannyhan Brendan Nyhan on x
    I've literally never heard a credible expert endorse Internet voting. It is not secure. See (e.g.) our report on protecting the 2020 election https://www.law.uci.edu/... (page 9). https://twitter.com/...
  • @nicoleperlroth Nicole Perlroth on x
    New: A deep dive into the security of remote voting with @SangerNYT @AllMattNYT The focus, once again, is the security of our voter registration systems, the very systems Russia targeted in 2016. New research (surprise) finds online voting open to hacking. https://www.nytimes.com…