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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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Security experts believe online voting systems do not have strong enough security guarantees for prime time despite seemingly successful trials in the US

Proponents of mobile and internet voting point to its uneventful track record.  That's not good enough.

Wired Lily Hay Newman

Context & Ripple Effects

This story lands on top of a long paper trail: experts had already flagged that the vendors dominating the US election tech market failed to acknowledge and remedy known vulnerabilities in the systems that run American elections, and two years after voter-registration networks were penetrated, infrastructure remained largely unchanged despite official warnings after the registration-network breaches. The new argument is narrower and sharper: mobile and internet voting trials ran without incident, and proponents cite that calm record as proof of readiness.

First-order effects

  • Security experts are directly rebutting the 'uneventful track record' pitch, telling election officials that a trial's lack of visible failure is not evidence of security — which puts state and local buyers of internet-voting pilots on notice before they sign contracts.

Second-order effects

  • Election-tech vendors marketing remote voting now face a credibility gap against the same expert community that criticized their in-person systems for unremediated vulnerabilities, forcing them to argue verifiability rather than absence of incidents.

Third-order effects

The trend: US election technology is being pushed by security experts toward verifiable, auditable systems, with remote-voting convenience losing to provable integrity as the acceptance criterion.

Discussion

  • @howelloneill Patrick Howell O'Neill on x
    This is a good overview of how the ongoing politicization of election security can drive officials toward internet voting despite expert consensus and evidence of danger. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ...
  • @ilvestoomas Toomas Hendrik Ilves on x
    The US simply lacks the digital infrastructure even to think of doing this. No governmental 2FA, with e2e encryption, years and years of e-governance ludditism and backwardness preclude its use. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ...
  • @wired @wired on x
    Online voting platforms like Democracy Live and Voatz have ambitious long-term goals, but experts caution that they're still not as secure enough to replace traditional methods. https://www.wired.com/...
  • @philipbstark Philip Stark on x
    This is an optimistic assessment. “Not known to have been hacked” is not the same as “not hacked.” Many hacks would not leave a trace. And vendors generally don't allow white-hat hackers to examine/test systems. #NoOnlineBallotReturn #electionintegrity https://www.wired.com/...
  • @lilyhnewman Lily Hay Newman on x
    one important point in the whole internet voting debate is that you can't prove these systems are safe just by piloting them a bunch of times. “nothing noticeably exploded” is not where we want to set the bar https://www.wired.com/...