Report looks at financial impact on Google and Apple of falling app store commission rates, amid pushback from devs like Valve, Netflix and regulatory scrutiny
Bloomberg : Tweets: @laurengoode , @bsindia , and @mhbergen Tweets: Lauren Goode / @laurengoode : Seems like there's a real opportunity here for someone to create a reliable, intuitive, secure distribution service for companies to sell mobile software (like, another app store?) http://www.bloomberg.com/... @bsindia : Grumbling about app store economics isn't new. But the number of complaints, combined with new ways of reaching users, and competitive pressure are threatening to undermine what have become digital goldmines for @Apple and @Google . http://www.business-standard.com/ ... Mark Bergen / @mhbergen : “They're very aggressive about making sure companies aren't trying to work around their billing. They have whole teams reviewing these flows to ensure they get their tax.” http://www.bloomberg.com/...
Context & Ripple Effects
Bloomberg's report lands at an inflection point in the app-store economics fight: Valve and Netflix are pushing back against commission policies, and regulators have both Apple and Google in their sights over take rates. The grumbling isn't new — what's changed, per the coverage, is that developers now have alternative ways to reach users, which turns complaints into leverage against what the report calls digital goldmines.
The arc since then validates the report's thesis. Spotify and Match told a Senate hearing that Apple abuses its power over developers (Senate testimony from Spotify and Match), Apple later hired economists to defend its commissions as pro-competitive (Apple hiring economists), and by 2024 Apple had conceded a reduced EU commission structure of 17% — or 10% for small developers (reduced EU commission structure). The 2018 pressure was the opening move in a multi-year erosion.
First-order effects
- Apple and Google face direct revenue exposure: every point of commission compression hits their highest-margin services line, and high-spend developers like Valve and Netflix are exactly the accounts with bargaining power to demand it.
- Developers gain negotiating leverage they previously lacked — the report frames alternative distribution channels and competitive pressure as the mechanism converting long-standing complaints into actual pricing pressure.
Second-order effects
- Rival platforms and would-be storefronts get an opening: if commission rates fall at the incumbents, third-party distribution becomes economically viable, forcing Apple and Google to compete on services rather than default placement.
- Apple's response pattern shows substitution rather than surrender — analysts noted that limiting ad tracking could push developers toward paid apps and subscriptions, potentially increasing IAP commissions even as headline rates fall (ad-tracking limits shifting revenue to IAPs).
Third-order effects
- If the pattern holds, the platform take rate becomes a regulated quantity rather than a private one — the endpoint visible in the EU's tiered structure, where commissions differ by developer size and payment method.
- Distribution stops being a moat: the argument that the App Store wins because it is the only choice, not because it offers exceptional distribution (distribution-by-default critique), points toward app stores commoditizing into utilities whose fees are set by regulators and rivals, not incumbents.
The trend: Mobile platform economics are moving from gatekeeper-set take rates toward regulator-bounded, competitively pressured commissions — a shift the 2018 dev pushback foreshadowed and the EU structure has begun to codify.