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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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OECD lists 1,300+ AI regulations, guidelines, and other policies worldwide as of September 2025, up ~30% since 2022, but international cooperation has stalled

Naoki Watanabe / Nikkei Asia :

Nikkei Asia Naoki Watanabe

Context & Ripple Effects

The OECD’s count shows policy activity accelerating even as the multilateral route remains stuck. That divergence follows the G7’s earlier generative-AI guidelines for developers and users, which offered a shared reference point without resolving national implementation choices.

Related coverage already showed governments pursuing distinct models: Japan framed lighter-touch rules as a way to attract investment, while China introduced broad rules administered across multiple agencies. The new inventory makes that policy dispersion harder to treat as a temporary gap.

First-order effects

  • Governments and AI companies face a clearer picture of a larger, more varied compliance landscape, while the OECD has evidence that policy creation is outpacing international alignment.
  • The stalled cooperation limits the immediate ability of OECD-led and G7-style guidance to serve as a common operating framework across jurisdictions.

Second-order effects

  • National approaches are likely to become more consequential in competition for AI investment, reinforcing strategies such as Japan’s industry-led regulatory pitch rather than a single shared baseline.
  • Companies operating across markets must track more jurisdiction-specific rules and guidance, increasing the value of regulatory capabilities alongside technical AI development.

Third-order effects

  • If policy growth continues without renewed coordination, AI governance could settle into interoperable—or conflicting—national blocs rather than converge on uniform global rules.
  • The central contest shifts from whether AI will be governed to which states can make their domestic frameworks influential beyond their borders, a dynamic visible in international competition over AI policy influence.

The trend: AI governance is moving toward faster national rulemaking and slower multilateral convergence, making regulatory alignment a strategic component of AI competition.