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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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An interview with White House OSTP Director Michael Kratsios, a Peter Thiel protégé confirmed by the Senate on March 25, on US plans to counter Beijing on AI

Michael Kratsios will work to counter Beijing without disrupting U.S. businesses  —  WASHINGTON—Many Trump …

Wall Street Journal Amrith Ramkumar

Context & Ripple Effects

Kratsios returns to lead OSTP after an earlier White House technology role and a prior hands-off AI-regulation message to companies. His Senate confirmation gives that approach an institutionally confirmed voice at the center of White House science and technology policy.

The interview places his remit in a continuing policy tension: competing with Beijing while limiting collateral constraints on U.S. firms. That tension also sits alongside the administration’s later effort to organize AI policy around China competition, as reflected in Sriram Krishnan’s White House AI agenda.

First-order effects

  • OSTP now has a Senate-confirmed director responsible for articulating the White House’s AI posture, with Kratsios explicitly positioning counter-Beijing policy around preserving room for U.S. businesses.
  • U.S. AI companies receive a clear policy signal that competitiveness—not only domestic oversight—will shape the administration’s framing of AI decisions.

Second-order effects

  • Companies and trade groups seeking federal AI policy will have an incentive to frame their requests as strengthening U.S. competitiveness while minimizing operating burdens.
  • Other agencies working on AI will face pressure to reconcile security-oriented measures with the administration’s stated goal of avoiding unnecessary disruption to domestic firms.

Third-order effects

  • If this balance holds, U.S. AI governance may become more state-mediated: government policy would shape the sector chiefly through strategic competition and industrial priorities rather than broad stand-alone regulation.
  • The durability of that model remains uncertain, because measures intended to counter Beijing can themselves impose compliance or market-access costs on the businesses the policy seeks to protect.

The trend: AI policy is increasingly being organized as strategic industrial competition, with governments trying to align national-security goals and domestic AI-sector growth.