DNI Tulsi Gabbard told a Congressional hearing that Signal comes “pre-installed” on government devices, hinting at a major shift following the Salt Typhoon hack
www.politico.com/news/2025/03... X: Aaron Rupar / @atrupar : Trump dismisses SignalGate: “I think it's all a witch hunt, that's all. I think it's a witch hunt.” [video] Aaron Rupar / @atrupar : Trump: “Hegseth is doing a great job. He had nothing to do this. How do you bring Hegseth into it? He had nothing to do with it. Look, it's all a witch hunt ... I think Signal could be defective to be honest with you.” [video] Alexa Henning / @alexahenning : This story is stupid. Widespread use started under Biden as the CIA Director testified yesterday, Signal was on his work device and desktop. At ODNI when I got my phone, it was pre-installed. The notion that “can you imagine if the Biden admin did this.” Yea, bc they did. Alayna Treene / @alaynatreene : .@PressSec says the National Security Council, the White House Counsel's Office, and Elon Musk's team will all look into the signal chain exchange & how reporter Jeffrey Goldberg was added to it “Elon Musk has offered to put his technical experts on this,” she said Nick Schifrin / @nickschifrin : And @DNIGabbard says @signalapp is pre-installed on government phones, and “In December of 2024, @CISA stated, “we strongly urge highly targeted individuals to immediately review and apply best practices provided in the guidance to protect mobile communications, including Congresswoman Sydney Kamlager-Dove / @repkamlagerdove : Gabbard & Ratcliffe lied under oath yesterday. It's clear Hegseth shared attack plans via Signal. What else have they been discussing illegally? They should be fired—and the phones of everyone involved should be confiscated to identify any other secret chats they're hiding from [image] @rapidresponse47 : .@PressSec: “Signal has been an approved app for government use. It's an encrypted app... and as @POTUS said yesterday, he wishes that everybody could be in the room... but again, no classified information was discussed in this chat — and ANY time classified information is discussed amongst high-level officials across this administration, secure lines of communication are used.” @nowthisimpact : On March 25, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified under oath that she had no knowledge of classified communications being shared in a Signal group chat. Just one day later, journalist Jeffrey Goldberg — who was mistakenly added to the chat — published texts [video] @rapidresponse47 : .@DNIGabbard: “I want to address, briefly, the Signal chat issue... As the President and National Security Advisor stated, no classified information was shared. There were no sources, methods, locations or war plans that were shared.” [video] @rapidresponse47 : .@PressSec: The President's view on all of this remains the same today as it did yesterday... He went directly to all of you, members of the press, and tackled this story... He has placed great trust in his national security team. As for Signal, this is an approved app. [video]
Context & Ripple Effects
Signal was already embedded in government practice: the CIA director testified it was present on his work device, while government workers had increasingly turned to the app to shield communications. Gabbard’s testimony therefore reframes the controversy from an isolated user choice to a question of how agency-managed devices and approved tools are governed.
The issue became acute after a journalist was mistakenly added to a chat discussing Houthi attack plans, despite Signal not being approved for classified information. An earlier NSA warning about a Signal-related phishing risk also shows that the app’s operational use was already drawing internal security attention.
First-order effects
- Gabbard’s statement makes Signal’s presence on government devices an institutional accountability issue, rather than solely a matter of individual officials installing a consumer app.
- Agencies using the app face immediate scrutiny over whether device availability, approval status, classification rules, and message-retention practices were aligned.
Second-order effects
- The chat controversy shifts attention toward records controls: a subsequent court order to preserve participants’ messages underscores that encrypted messaging can still create preservation obligations for agencies.
- Security teams will have to distinguish risks in Signal’s core technology from phishing and user-management failures, while tightening guidance on what officials may discuss in the app.
Third-order effects
- If government-managed devices continue to bundle encrypted consumer communications, procurement and compliance policy will need to treat messaging apps as part of the official communications stack, with auditable rules for classified material and public records.
- The episode points to a durable tension between officials’ demand for secure, convenient messaging and institutions’ requirements for oversight; the balance will depend on enforcement and retention controls, not app availability alone.
The trend: Encrypted consumer messaging is becoming institutional infrastructure in government, forcing security, classification, and transparency rules to catch up with its operational use.