Google files its proposed remedies in the DOJ's search antitrust lawsuit, including letting browser companies have multiple default agreements across platforms
blog.google/outreach-ini... #google #seo #legal [image] Mastodon: @mttaggart@infosec.exchange : Okay, having read Google's proposed remedies in its antitrust case, they seem to me deeply unserious. For one thing, it completely bypasses the concept of user choice in favor of manufacturer or vendor choice. For another, “multiple defaults” is a meaningless notion. If The Goog comes as a default, so it will remain. … @SuffolkLITLab@esq.social : TL;DR: Google's counterproposal to the DOJ aims to unbundle its Android apps rather than divest key components like Chrome, amidst ongoing antitrust scrutiny. While Google plans to appeal a ruling that labeled it a monopolist, it seeks to revise its approach by March ahead of a trial. https://www.theverge.com/... #law #tech #legaltech ⚖️ 🤖 #autosum Bruce Lawson / @brucelawson@social.vivaldi.net : Startlingly, Google doesn't like the DOJ's idea that it should divest Chrome browser and stop doing search deals. There are some interesting bits in its actual filing, but (despite having done terrible things to my karma in previous incarnations) I am not an American lawyer, so can't really form a useful opinion on the legal arguments. https://blog.google/... Threads: Timothy Buck / @timothybucksf : Shots fired! “If DOJ felt that Google investing in Chrome, or our development of AI, or the way we crawl the web, or develop our algorithms, were at all anticompetitive, it could have filed those cases. It did not.” Dare Obasanjo / @carnage4life : Google has published its counter proposal to the DOJ's request that they sell Chrome, end default search deals, provide its search index to competitors and potentially sell Android to address their search monopoly from search default deals with Apple. … X: Jason Kint / @jason_kint : Google is smoking something. not only did they counter DOJ's robust proposal to remedy their anticompetitive behavior with the bare minimum, they reduced the term from ten years to three (less time than the actual lawsuit). Will fall to sleep laughing tonight. [image] Matt Stoller / @matthewstoller : Google offered its remedy provisions in the search antitrust case it just lost on the Friday night before Christmas week. https://blog.google/... @mozilla : Some of the DOJ's proposed Google Search antitrust remedies risk breaking more than they fix. We hope the court will consider the bigger picture here—because the decisions made today will shape the internet for decades to come 🔗 read more: https://blog.mozilla.org/... @khushitavasant : . @Google says in a blog post, “We will appeal the Court's decision but the process requires that we first file proposed remedies. This is a case about contracts. Antitrust law is clear that remedies should be directed to those contracts, unlike DOJ's overbroad proposal.” @khushitavasant : Proposal also prohibits Google from conditioning licensing, payment, or any other form of consideration on an Android partner agreeing not to preload or place rival general search engines or third-party browsers on mobile devices. @khushitavasant : On AI, Google says Android partners can license Google Play, Search, and/or Chrome without also licensing Gemini Assistant app. It further prohibits Google from conditioning consideration on a partner refraining from the preload of rival generative AI assistive chatbot services. Kamyl Bazbaz / @kamylbazbaz : you are not serious people Forums: Hacker News : Our remedies proposal in DOJ's search distribution case r/technology : Google's counteroffer to the government trying to break it up is unbundling Android apps r/Android : Our remedies proposal in DOJ's search distribution case
Context & Ripple Effects
The remedies phase centers on how to address distribution advantages without necessarily breaking up Google. Earlier coverage framed a Chrome sale as potentially less consequential than the broader sources of Google’s power, while the DOJ’s original case highlighted the scale of search traffic arriving through Apple products and related payments the debate over whether Chrome divestiture would curb Google’s power the DOJ’s account of Google’s Apple-linked search traffic.
Google’s filing advances a behavioral alternative: loosen Android licensing and distribution constraints while preserving Google’s ownership of Chrome. Subsequent DOJ filings show that the dispute over a Chrome sale remained active even after the agency narrowed another requested remedy the DOJ’s continuing push for a Chrome sale.
First-order effects
- Android partners would, under Google’s proposal, be able to license Play, Search, and Chrome separately from Gemini Assistant, with protections against penalties for preloading rival search engines, browsers, or AI assistants.
- Browser companies could pursue default-search agreements across different platforms rather than being limited to a single provider arrangement; Google would avoid the DOJ’s requested Chrome divestiture if its remedy were accepted.
Second-order effects
- Browser makers, device manufacturers, and search rivals would gain more room to negotiate distribution and placement, but the practical impact would depend on whether new agreements materially alter the default choices users encounter.
- The proposal shifts the remedies contest toward enforceable contract and licensing rules, while leaving the DOJ to argue that behavioral commitments cannot substitute for structural relief such as a Chrome sale.
Third-order effects
- If courts favor unbundling and anti-retaliation terms over divestiture, search-antitrust remedies may increasingly target the contractual mechanics of platform distribution rather than platform ownership.
- The case tests whether competition policy can make default positions contestable across browsers and mobile devices without dismantling the assets that help sustain those positions.
The trend: Big-platform antitrust remedies are moving toward a contest over whether interoperability and distribution rules can curb gatekeeper leverage as effectively as structural separation.