Researchers: a network of 200+ Russia-linked X accounts shows how Russian trolls are trying to go viral, including low-quality, high-volume replies to Elon Musk
Kremlin-backed influence network has sought engagement with Elon Musk, Donald Trump Jr. and other influential accounts X: @dnvolz and @mathewjschwartz X: Dustin Volz / @dnvolz : In Nov. 2022, after acquiring Twitter, Elon Musk joked to his millions of followers: “Wait, if I Tweet does that count as work?” An account secretly run by a Russian intelligence agency tried for a humorous reply: “Your boss will be angry.” https://www.wsj.com/... Mathew Schwartz / @mathewjschwartz : “Musk dismantled much of the content-moderation infrastructure at the company ... Former employees have said Musk's changes limit the platform's ability to detect covert influence efforts.” https://www.wsj.com/...
Context & Ripple Effects
The reported network follows earlier signs that X had relaxed distribution limits on Kremlin-linked accounts: tests found such accounts appearing in recommendation feeds after a prior policy reversal.
It also reinforces the broader moderation gap documented by an EU assessment of growing Kremlin-backed reach on social platforms. The distinguishing tactic here is not simply posting propaganda, but using mass replies to seek amplification from highly visible accounts.
First-order effects
- More than 200 Russia-linked accounts can direct low-quality, high-volume replies at Elon Musk, Donald Trump Jr. and other large accounts, attempting to convert their audiences and reply threads into distribution channels.
- X faces a more specific detection problem: coordinated influence activity can be embedded in routine-looking engagement rather than confined to standalone posts or clearly labeled state accounts.
Second-order effects
- High-profile users become an operational target for influence networks; their replies, reposts or algorithmic visibility can raise the value of coordinated engagement even without explicit endorsement.
- The finding increases pressure on X to distinguish authentic replies from coordinated campaigns, a task made harder by the reported reduction in content-moderation infrastructure.
Third-order effects
- If reply-based influence operations remain inexpensive and scalable, platform integrity will increasingly depend on detecting coordinated behavior and distribution manipulation, not only removing individual posts or accounts.
- The episode points to a broader contest over whether large social platforms can preserve open engagement while imposing enough quality guardrails to prevent influential accounts from becoming reliable amplification surfaces.
The trend: State-linked influence efforts are shifting toward exploiting the engagement and recommendation mechanics around high-reach social accounts rather than relying solely on direct broadcasting.