EU study: social media companies have failed to stop pro-Russian disinformation since 2022 and the “reach and influence of Kremlin-backed accounts” grew in 2023
X's failure to slow the spread of disinformation on the Internet would have violated E.U. social media law, had it been in effect — https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... X: Daphne Keller / @daphnehk : Couple of things that trigger my anxieties. What @mathver calls “content or conduct” that “cross[es] the threshold, resulting in an “actual or foreseeable negative effect” sounds a lot like a way to define “lawful but harmful” speech restricted by law... @euromaidanpress : Elon Musk's policy shifts on X led to 36% surge in engagement for Kremlin-affiliated accounts, exacerbating Russian disinfo on Ukraine—European Commission Reach of Kremlin-aligned social media accounts grew by 22% across platforms between Jan & May 2023 https://euromaidanpress.com/ ... Daphne Keller / @daphnehk : @mathver And while there are obvious reasons to focus on Russia/Ukraine content, that's also exactly what I'd cover first if my goal was to justify the greatest possible state authority over speech, and the strongest restrictions. This will set a tone/precedent for whole DSA. Daphne Keller / @daphnehk : Super interesting for anyone trying to understand how to make DSA risk assessments etc. concrete. @akinunver : “In absolute numbers, pro-Kremlin accounts continue to reach the largest audiences on Meta's platforms. Meanwhile, the audience size for Kremlin-backed accounts more than tripled on Telegram,” the report found. https://www.bbc.com/... @zerohedge : Well, if the covid mail-in ballot strategy fails to win the 2024 elections again, at least they can blame Musk https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... @washingtonpost : The research found that, despite voluntary commitments to take action against Russian propaganda by the largest social media companies, including Meta, Russian disinformation against Ukraine, thrived. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... @washingtonpost : Twitter under Elon Musk's ownership has played a major role in allowing Russian propaganda about Ukraine to reach more people than before the war began, according to a year-long study released this week by the European Commission. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... @washingtonpost : Allowing the disinformation and hate speech to spread without limits would have violated the Digital Services Act, the EU's social media law, had it been in force last year, the commission study concluded. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... @tech_oversight : Days after the DSA went into effect, the EU sent a warning shot over the bow to social media platforms like @Meta, @X, @TikTok_US, and @Google. Stop aiding Russian disinformation campaigns or else. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ ... Erik de la Reguera / @erikdelareguera : “Preliminary analysis suggests that the reach and influence of Kremlin-backed accounts has grown further in the first half of 2023, driven in particular by the dismantling of Twitter's safety standards.” One of several reasons why I'm moving to #Mastodon. https://op.europa.eu/... LinkedIn: Felix Kartte : 🚨 The European Commission just published our framework for conducting risk assessments on large online platforms to help enforce … Forums: r/FoxFiction : Musk's new Twitter policies helped spread Russian propaganda, E.U. says See also Mediagazer
Context & Ripple Effects
The study follows tests indicating that X had lifted limits on Kremlin-linked accounts, while Meta and YouTube were also reported to be retreating from political-misinformation enforcement amid moderation disputes.
It turns a platform-policy debate into a compliance issue: the Commission’s finding ties the growth of Kremlin-backed audiences to the DSA’s emerging duties for major services, with Telegram’s reported audience growth showing the problem is not confined to one platform.
First-order effects
- X and other major platforms face sharper EU scrutiny over whether their systems are containing Russian disinformation, rather than merely responding to individual posts or accounts.
- Kremlin-backed accounts retain expanded distribution and engagement on the services identified in the study; the reported tripling of their Telegram audiences underscores the immediate cross-platform reach.
Second-order effects
- Platforms retreating from political-misinformation policing must weigh lower enforcement against greater DSA exposure; the broader moderation retreat at Meta and YouTube makes that trade-off sector-wide.
- Regulators gain evidence to press for measurable risk controls and transparency, setting up the subsequent finding that Twitter had the highest disinformation rate in the first half of 2023.
Third-order effects
- If enforcement remains uneven, platform governance will increasingly be judged by recommendation, verification, and amplification design—not just by whether prohibited content is removed.
- The DSA could make disinformation-risk management a lasting competitive and regulatory differentiator for large platforms, though the eventual standard will depend on how EU investigations and enforcement translate these findings into requirements.
The trend: European platform regulation is shifting from voluntary content moderation toward accountability for the systems that amplify coordinated influence operations.