EU diplomats: an EU Council vote to amend a draft law that would have forced WhatsApp and Signal to scan images and links for CSAM was removed from the agenda
Countries clash over how to safeguard privacy when rooting out illegal pictures and grooming on private chat apps.
PoliticoClothilde Goujard
Context & Ripple Effects
The removed Council vote is an early procedural setback for a proposal that put private messaging services at the center of the EU’s CSAM policy debate. Days earlier, Signal’s president had argued that the proposed upload-moderation approach undermines encryption, while experts had already challenged the premise of mandatory messaging scans in the earlier critique of the EU plan.
The dispute is not simply over content removal: it concerns whether detection obligations can be applied to private communications without changing the security and privacy model of encrypted services. The proposal’s subsequent legislative path remains contested in related coverage.
First-order effects
Removing the vote postpones an immediate Council decision on the amendment, preserving the status quo for WhatsApp, Signal and other affected messaging services.
WhatsApp and Signal avoid an imminent requirement to scan images and links under this version of the draft, while EU governments remain divided over the privacy safeguards the measure would require.
Second-order effects
The delay gives encryption-focused providers and privacy advocates more room to press their case that client-side or upload scanning would weaken private messaging; Signal had already made that argument publicly in its warning about upload moderation.
Policymakers seeking CSAM-detection obligations will need to pursue language that can secure broader political backing, rather than treating a scanning mandate as settled implementation detail.
Third-order effects
The episode illustrates a durable regulatory fault line: child-safety mandates for private platforms increasingly turn on where detection is placed relative to encrypted communications, not merely whether platforms must act.
If repeated procedural delays persist, the EU may move toward narrower or more conditional obligations for encrypted services; later coverage of a state position without a forced-search requirement suggests that outcome was a live negotiating path, not a settled result.
The trend: European digital policy is testing whether child-protection enforcement can be expanded without establishing scanning obligations that reshape end-to-end encrypted messaging.
The #EU member states could not agree on #ChatControl today. The Council Presidency has removed it from the voting agenda because they do not have a sufficient majority. 🥳 We need to stay vocal and make it clear that we will not accept mass #surveillance. 📢
#ChatControl vote suspended indefinitely (with regards to Belgian Presidency). This is huge news but it is not the end, Hungarian Presidency already has plans to prioritise this proposal over the next 6 months, so work must continue. #privacy #masssurveillance #ethics #law
The EU commissioner for Justice finally says the quiet part out loud, that the goal of #ChatControl is to break encrypted messaging. Taken from https://www.youtube.com/...
Finally they are saying the quiet part out loud. It's been over two years now and I still can't believe that this is happening in #Europe 🇪🇺 #privacy #EUvsChildSexualAbuse #ClientSideScanning #Chatkontrolle #ChatControl #encryption #E2EE #MassSurveillance
🇬🇧 Vote on #ChatControl postponed - a triumph in our fight to defend the digital privacy of correspondence and secure encryption. 💪 Thank you! But the next attempt will come. The critical governments need to get their act together now: https://www.patrick-breyer.de/ ... [image]
How can the @EU_Commission admit that #chatcontrol would break encryption and STILL support this dangerous proposal that jeopardizes the safety of us all?
And now the EC has come out to admit that the chat control proposal would break encryption as well, stunning. #csaregulation #chatcontrol https://x.com/...
On a panel today, EU Commission VP @VeraJourova admits that proposed CSAM scanning / #ChatControl rule clarifies “that even encrypted messaging can be broken for sake of better protection of children” Previously, EU officials stated no one would be forced to break encryption [vid…
...@EU_Commission admit on record that their CSAR proposal would break encryption. Complete 180° reversal from the repeated claim over the last 3 years from Home Affairs Commissioner @YlvaJohansson that the proposal does not break encryption. #ChatControl #EDPS20
@signalapp ... BREAKING: No qualified majority for Chat Control! Too many countries, MEPs, NGOs, firms & experts say the proposal equals mass surveillance & will break encryption, which will undermine our privacy & security. @mer__edith @echo_pbreyer @DefendDemocracy https://www.…
“This is the paper-world equivalent of having the state open and examine all correspondence, check every photo taken and examine every piece of writing or image shared with others.” - @klillington excellent today on #ChatControl #CSARegulation https://www.irishtimes.com/...
And the @EU_Commission @VeraJourova should withdraw the proposal. It is an unacceptable infringement of human rights, will give rise to creep in scope & send a message to authoritarian govts that mass surveillance is acceptable. Abandon the proposal.
The exact quote from the Commissioner for Values & Transparency: “the Commission proposed the method or the rule that even encrypted messaging can be broken for the sake of better protecting children” #ChatControl
Wild times at the @EU_EDPS 20th anniversary summit: EU Commissioner for Justice @VeraJourova has said the EC proposal for the #CSARegulation would break encryption, and that this is right because of the need to protect children. This is the first time I've *ever* heard the...