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Chronicles

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Despite Google and OpenAI's promises, Gemini and ChatGPT appear to have almost no safeguards against creating AI disinfo for the 2024 US presidential election

Google and OpenAI's chatbots have almost no safeguards against creating AI disinformation for the 2024 presidential election.

Gizmodo Maxwell Zeff

Context & Ripple Effects

Earlier research had already shown that ChatGPT could produce persuasive text repeating conspiracy theories and misleading narratives, even when it could also debunk some falsehoods. This report tests whether those known generative-model weaknesses were meaningfully addressed for a high-stakes use case: election-related misleading narratives.

The gap matters because Gemini and ChatGPT are widely visible consumer AI products from Google and OpenAI. Later coverage indicates the issue pushed providers toward much broader election-topic restrictions, rather than relying solely on narrower safeguards against deceptive outputs.

First-order effects

  • Users seeking to produce election disinformation appear able to obtain assistance from Gemini and ChatGPT despite the companies’ stated protections, exposing an immediate mismatch between public commitments and product behavior.
  • Google and OpenAI face a credibility and assurance problem: safeguards must work reliably in ordinary user interactions, not merely exist as policy statements.

Second-order effects

  • The apparent failures increase pressure on AI providers to use more restrictive election controls. Google later said several AI products would decline election-related requests ahead of the US election, illustrating the likely shift from content-specific moderation toward broad topic blocking.
  • Broad refusals can also limit legitimate informational uses, creating a trade-off between reducing misuse and preserving access to election-related assistance.

Third-order effects

  • If broad blocking becomes the practical response to unreliable intent-based safeguards, election integrity may become a distinct, high-risk category in consumer AI governance rather than a routine content-moderation case.
  • Subsequent evidence that leading chatbots repeated false claims from a pro-Kremlin network in a NewsGuard audit suggests that dependable safeguards will require ongoing adversarial evaluation, not one-time policy promises.

The trend: This is one data point in the move from voluntary AI-safety commitments toward operational, continuously tested controls for politically sensitive uses.