$38 Million per MHz to Clear the Air

Eutelsat and SES stand to collect roughly $6.1 billion for removing 160 MHz from satellite service. Meanwhile, satellite operators are making orbit disappear into mobile service: ordinary phones can reach spacecraft without becoming satellite phones. The hardware is receding from view just as its permits, payments and state approvals become impossible to ignore.

Satellite once stopped where mobile began

For most of the commercial satellite era, operators asked where terrestrial networks stopped. They served distant places, wide broadcast areas and routes where laying the next physical connection was difficult or uneconomic. In 2015, Eutelsat and Facebook proposed beaming internet capacity into sub-Saharan Africa, using orbit as the alternative path.

Mobile operators built density, satellite operators supplied reach and device makers designed for one network or the other. By keeping the systems separate, those companies avoided much of the coordination that now defines hybrid service.

The FCC later proposed paying satellite companies $9.7 billion to clear C-band spectrum quickly for 5G, plus billions more in associated costs. Wireless companies wanted the airwaves, but satellite incumbents first had to move their operations and accept the terms.

Direct-to-device service gave carriers a different brief. They wanted orbit to extend the mobile network beyond its towers.

The ordinary handset turned two networks into one system

Samsung’s 2023 announcement of a standardized 5G non-terrestrial-network modem gave device makers a cellular standards path for two-way communication between smartphones and satellites. The handset boundary separating mobile from satellite had begun to dissolve.

By January 2025, Vodafone reported a satellite video call using a standard smartphone through AST SpaceMobile satellites and planned a direct-to-smartphone service in Europe. Vodafone had moved inside the satellite delivery architecture rather than merely buying coverage at its edge.

A carrier now has to assemble handset compatibility, terrestrial coverage, orbital capacity, licensed spectrum, capital and failure handling. Samsung can put non-terrestrial support into a modem, but the carrier still needs a satellite overhead, an approved band and a plan for when either fails.

T-Mobile’s Starlink-powered T-Satellite became generally available as a standalone U.S. subscription, including to people who were not T-Mobile customers, but initially supported texts and location sharing rather than full mobile broadband. AST SpaceMobile later delayed its satellite-to-phone service to 2027 after a Blue Origin mishap. Customers could use familiar hardware, while carriers still had narrow early products and rocket-dependent schedules.

Buyers need incumbents and regulators to clear the band

Operators need more than technically compatible radios. They need an uncontested channel with defined geography, power limits and protection for incumbent users. Regulators settle those terms because interference crosses corporate boundaries.

The Biden administration’s National Spectrum Strategy directed agencies to identify airwaves that could be released for commercial 5G. Earlier users already held much of the desired capacity, so new demand ran into rules built around the old assignments.

Buyers, incumbents and regulators must each act. A buyer agrees to the terms, incumbents set the conditions for clearing the band, and regulators approve the transfer or reallocation.

In May 2026, the FCC approved EchoStar transfers of approximately 65 MHz to SpaceX and 50 MHz to AT&T. The buyers wanted different uses, but both had to wait for the FCC before putting the spectrum to work.

The Eutelsat-SES deal puts a visible price on that process by assigning $6.1 billion to 160 MHz.

At roughly $38 million per MHz, the buyer would pay Eutelsat and SES to vacate an old allocation so the regulator can authorize a new use. A spectrum right becomes network capacity only after the incumbent clears the band and the regulator approves the transition.

Eutelsat and SES can monetize the exit

The clearance deal would give Eutelsat and SES a second way to make money from orbital infrastructure. In 2015, Eutelsat sold remote-area access from space. By 2026, the two companies could earn billions by releasing spectrum for somebody else’s wireless service.

Starlink reportedly operates more than 6,000 satellites across roughly 130 countries, while debt and Starlink’s scale still burden Eutelsat and SES. The clearance payment rewards their position in the band while saying nothing about their ability to win subscribers or operate a more competitive constellation.

SpaceX shows how buyers value those positions. It agreed to acquire unpaired AWS-3 licenses from EchoStar for $2.6 billion in stock after EchoStar sold AWS-4 and H-block licenses to SpaceX for approximately $17 billion. SpaceX is combining terrestrial rights with Starlink’s orbital scale, while AT&T can pair acquired spectrum with an existing terrestrial network.

Other companies own the missing pieces. Samsung works on the device boundary. AST SpaceMobile supplies direct-to-device architecture through carrier partnerships but remains exposed to launch execution. AT&T, Verizon and Vodafone bring customer relationships and terrestrial networks. Eutelsat and SES hold legacy operating assets and spectrum relationships. The FCC determines when those commercial arrangements become authorized use.

No company controls the full system. Competitors must also become counterparties: carriers contract with constellations, constellations acquire licensed bands, and rights holders negotiate with regulators.

Governments now control more of the network

Governments see a network that can extend rural coverage, preserve communications after terrestrial failures and create dependence on an operator based abroad. Once satellites reach ordinary phones, ownership and market access become infrastructure policy.

Recent decisions place the available levers side by side.

France can stop an ownership change, Europe can buy redundancy, and Washington can tie an operating permit to a broader trade negotiation. Satellite operators now negotiate with ministries and regulators over the same service that carriers present to customers as another bar of phone coverage.

Carriers now buy coordination with coverage

A carrier choosing a satellite partner can no longer compare throughput and coverage alone. It must also price device support, licensed bands, launch schedules, regulatory approvals and the risk of state intervention.

A carrier gains reach with every new partner and adds another point of failure. When ordinary phones connect to satellites, larger spectrum transactions pull regulators and governments deeper into service design. Operators and states then seek alternative constellations, domestic control or redundant suppliers.

Regulators can slow transfers, governments can block ownership changes, launch failures can delay service after contracts are signed, and limited early products can keep demand below the level implied by the architecture. Those risks now belong in procurement models alongside capacity and price.

The capacity market offers a useful analogue. In contracted megawatts, legal claims and long-duration commitments make physical capability financeable. Spectrum puts the state inside the claim because public agencies set interference rules, protect incumbents and decide which operators may enter a market.

Carrier procurement teams therefore need to diligence launch schedules, license terms, clearing plans and sovereign exposure together. Europe’s response to patchy Starlink service shows the practical result: buyers seek redundant suppliers and regional control before a disruption forces the choice.

The $6.1 billion payment for 160 MHz makes that chain visible. Satellite connectivity once looked like a line from a dish to a spacecraft; now an ordinary handset reaches orbit only after a handset standard, a carrier agreement, a license transfer, a regulatory order and, often, sovereign approval. The spacecraft can disappear from the customer’s experience because those signatures do not.