Signal says attackers accessed the phone numbers and SMS verification codes for around 1,900 users as part of the recent Twilio breach
End-to-end encrypted messaging app Signal says attackers accessed the phone numbers and SMS verification codes for almost 2,000 users as part of the breach at communications giant Twilio last week. Source: Signal Support .
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Context & Ripple Effects
Twilio had disclosed that an attacker gained unauthorized access after an SMS-phishing attack on its staff, making the incident a supply-chain security problem for services that use its communications infrastructure.
Signal identifies a downstream impact on roughly 1,900 users. Related coverage subsequently tied the same breach to compromised Authy accounts and devices, broadening the incident from Twilio’s internal access to customer-facing authentication exposure.
First-order effects
Affected Signal users had their phone numbers and SMS verification codes exposed through Twilio’s breach, placing the security of a subset of Signal registrations at issue.
Twilio must account for the breach’s impact across customers whose phone-number verification flows relied on its systems, not solely its own accounts.
Second-order effects
The Authy findings show that the incident touched both a messaging customer and Twilio’s own 2FA product, increasing scrutiny of SMS-based verification dependencies across Twilio’s customer base.
Services using Twilio for verification face pressure to distinguish exposure of phone numbers from exposure of usable authentication codes when notifying affected users.
Third-order effects
The episode points to a structural weakness in authentication chains: a compromise at a communications provider can create correlated exposure across otherwise separate apps and identity products.
As providers bundle messaging and authentication services, breach reporting will increasingly be judged by downstream customer and end-user impact rather than by the initial employee compromise alone.
The trend: Security risk is concentrating in shared communications and verification providers, where a single breach can propagate into multiple consumer-facing identity systems.
Recently @twilio, which provides SMS verification services for Signal, suffered a phishing attack. Via Twilio, attackers may have accessed phone numbers & SMS registration codes for 1,900 Signal users. 1/
@signalapp
@signalapp on x
Message history, profile info, contact lists, & other data were NOT & could not be accessed. The information attackers accessed could allow them to attempt to register a Signal user's phone number on a new device if that user had not enabled registration lock. 2/
@juanandres_gs
J. A. Guerrero-Saade on x
Honestly, let's take a minute to appreciate that @signalapp was built to guard precisely against this sort of attack. Reward and applaud well thought out security engineering in action! (h/t @dinodaizovi for the perspective) https://twitter.com/...
@signalapp
@signalapp on x
We have identified and are contacting the 1,900 potentially affected users. We are prompting them to re-register their Signal numbers and encouraging them to enable registration lock. We are also working with Twilio to ensure they upgrade their security practices. 3/
@kevincollier
Kevin Collier on x
Last week Twilio said 125 customers had been affected in its recent breach. Looks like “customers” meant individual orgs, and Signal was one of those. How many others do we know about? (And if you know of any that aren't public, please reach out) https://support.signal.org/...
@josephmenn
Joseph Menn on x
Every time there is a high-end attack on a critical end-to-end encrypted app that fails to obtain content, I am reminded how many even Western officials want to stop end-to-end encryption, which is close to the only thing in tech security that actually works. https://twitter.com/…
@nohackme
@nohackme on x
i ❤️ that @signalapp considered this very attack in their threat modeling, and developed a mitigation. settings>account>registration lock https://twitter.com/...
@carlypage_
Carly Page on x
so it looks like one of those 125 customers was... Signal 😳 https://techcrunch.com/...
@defendtheworld
Alex Radocea on x
I feel like signal continues to underplay how terrible of an idea phone-number based identity is despite being convenient for adoption. Twilio's customer support isn't the weakest point for SMS... it's the global telephony system itself. https://support.signal.org/...
@combat_boot
@combat_boot on x
Oopsie. Especially as certain organisation was touting app as most secure thing ever. Nothing is 100% & leading ppl to believe that it is, encourages risky behaviour. Trivial number of users involved but some targeted. Should serve as warning ref trust https://www.bleepingcompute…
@jsrailton
John Scott-Railton on x
PSA: Do you use Signal? Turn on registration lock today. Here's why... 1/ https://twitter.com/... https://twitter.com/...
@briankrebs
@briankrebs on x
Learned something new about Signal from their rundown of how some users were affected by the Twilio phishing incident: “Registration lock,” which requires your Signal PIN to register your phone number again with Signal https://support.signal.org/...
@asilbwrites
Amanda Silberling on x
If you're a journalist using Signal to talk to sources, go to settings —> account and change your pin + turn on registration lock https://twitter.com/...