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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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Russia has been rerouting internet traffic in occupied Ukrainian territories through domestic networks since June, blocking uncensored information and services

New York Times :

New York Times

Context & Ripple Effects

The NYT's report confirms a pattern that built through the spring: after Russian forces knocked out service in Kherson and reinstated it via Rostelecom, Ukrainian officials documented a takeover of Donbas infrastructure, and by June Wired reported Russia forcing multiple ISPs to reroute connections through Russian networks. What was piecemeal seizure of city-level infrastructure has become a systematic policy across occupied territories.

The significance is that routing control is the enforcement layer for everything else: once traffic exits through Russian domestic networks, the same blocking apparatus used inside Russia — Twitter blocks, telco-level Google News restrictions — applies wholesale to occupied Ukraine, with no separate decision required per service.

First-order effects

  • Residents of occupied territories lose direct access to uncensored Ukrainian and Western information services the moment their traffic transits Russian domestic networks, where it is subject to the same censorship and surveillance applied inside Russia.
  • Ukrainian ISPs and local operators in occupied areas are displaced from their own networks, with connectivity now provisioned through Russian carriers.

Second-order effects

  • Occupied residents are pushed toward VPNs and satellite or roaming workarounds — the same evasion dynamic NetBlocks documented when Russians kept accessing Twitter via VPNs after the domestic block.
  • Ukrainian authorities and Western platforms must treat connectivity in occupied territories as severed from the open internet, complicating service delivery, communications with civilians, and evidence-gathering on the ground.

Third-order effects

  • Territorial occupation now includes network-layer annexation: control of routing and egress becomes a standard instrument of asserting sovereignty over contested land, making internet infrastructure a first-day military and governance target.
  • The pattern reinforces a broader splintering in which a state's information controls extend wherever its cables reach, pressuring platforms and regulators to plan for connectivity that is jurisdictional, not just geographic.

The trend: Internet sovereignty is hardening from a domestic policy into a territorial one, with states extending routing-level control to any land they occupy.

Discussion

  • @martijn_grooten Martijn Grooten on x
    This is a good article on Russia re-routing the Internet in parts of Ukraine they have occupied to force traffic through networks they control, which allows them to block services like Google and YouTube https://www.nytimes.com/...
  • @780thc @780thc on x
    “They came to them and put guns to their head and just said, ‘Do this,’” said Maxim Smelyanets, who owns an internet provider that operates in the area and is based in Kyiv. “They did that step by step for each company.” https://www.nytimes.com/... @nytimes
  • @martijnrasser Martijn Rasser on x
    “The digital tactics have put those Ukrainian areas in the grip of a vast digital censorship and surveillance apparatus, with Russia able to track web traffic and digital communications, spread propaganda and manage what news reaches people.” https://www.nytimes.com/...
  • @suhasiniraj Suhasini Raj on x
    Internet traffic in Kherson is being diverted through Russia Internet routing data for a service provider in Kherson shows traffic beginning to flow through Russian networks in May before fully transitioning by early June. https://www.nytimes.com/...
  • @satariano Adam Satariano on x
    Russia is occupying not just physical territory in Ukraine, but also the internet. Connections that once linked to the global internet are now funneled through Russia's censored networks, choking off information and communication. (w/ @scottreinhard) https://www.nytimes.com/... h…
  • @dcu @dcu on x
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine has enabled them to ramp up draconian censorship laws, as well as outlaw more things and put more people at risk of criminal prosecution, Dr Tanya Lokot @tanyalokot tells renowned US publication @WIRED Read here: https://launch.dcu.ie/3JbG6x2 @DCU_SoC…
  • @satariano Adam Satariano on x
    A little-known company called Miranda Media, based in Crimea, is effectively laundering Ukraine's web traffic through Russia's censored internet. The company is run by a former executive with Rostelecom, Russia's largest internet service provider. https://cepa.org/...
  • @satariano Adam Satariano on x
    Russia's takeover of a foreign country's internet has little historical precedent. But it's likely a sign of things to come as the internet becomes a more important battleground in all world conflicts. https://www.nytimes.com/...
  • @satariano Adam Satariano on x
    Ukrainians in occupied cities like Kherson are effectively living with the Russian internet, making their internet activities easier to censor and surveil. Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Ukrainian news outlets and many other services and websites are blocked.