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Chronicles

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Meta disrupts several covert influence operations against Ukraine by Belarus- and Russia-linked actors, including attempts to hack Ukrainian military personnel

Facebook said Thursday it disrupted several covert influence operations targeting Ukrainians, as the company has intensified …

Washington Post Naomi Nix

Context & Ripple Effects

Meta's action follows the late-February removal of anti-Ukrainian operations by Meta and Twitter, extending platform enforcement from coordinated messaging to attempts to compromise Ukrainian military personnel's Facebook accounts. It also sits within Meta's earlier reporting of state-linked disinformation networks, which treated coordinated influence activity as an adversarial-security problem rather than ordinary content moderation.

First-order effects

  • The Belarus- and Russia-linked operators lose the Facebook accounts and infrastructure Meta identified, while Ukrainian users and military personnel face fewer active phishing and influence channels on the platform.
  • Meta must apply its threat-disruption and account-protection systems to a conflict-related campaign that combines influence activity with attempted account compromise.

Second-order effects

  • Removed operators must replace accounts, personas, and distribution channels, raising the operational cost of reaching Ukrainian audiences through Facebook.
  • Meta's enforcement makes platform intelligence and rapid coordination more consequential for detecting campaigns that move between deceptive content and account-targeting tactics.

Third-order effects

  • If this pattern persists, major social platforms become a more formal layer of conflict-era cyber defense, with influence enforcement increasingly tied to user-account security rather than content removal alone.

The trend: Foreign influence operations are converging with account-compromise tactics, pushing platforms to treat coordinated manipulation as a security threat as well as a moderation task.

Discussion

  • @corintxt @corintxt on x
    Fake surrender messages were also spread by hackers who compromised TV networks in Ukraine, per NYT reporting: https://www.nytimes.com/... https://twitter.com/...
  • @nicolesganga Nicole Sganga on x
    NEW: Russian-backed hackers successfully broke into Facebook accounts of Ukrainian military officials. Plus, more on the latest targeting of Ukrainian telecom. And Sec. Mayorkas tells @CBSNews we've not seen retaliatory attacks from Russia. w/ @Bidar411 https://www.cbsnews.com/..…
  • @andymstone Andy Stone on x
    As part of our ever-expanding effort to share what we know about coordinated inauthentic behavior, we're now expanding our regular reporting to include cyber espionage, inauthentic behavior and other emerging harms in one place. https://twitter.com/...
  • @jeffstone500 @jeffstone500 on x
    Ghostwriter, a Belarusian disinfo operation, tried hacking Ukrainian soldiers' Facebook accounts to post videos encouraging Kyiv to surrender, Meta says. The same outfit previously has spread faked diplomatic letters and doctored tweets from US lawmakers. https://about.fb.com/...
  • @kateconger Kate Conger on x
    Facebook says it detected and stopped several new misinformation campaigns in Ukraine, driven by state-backed groups from Russia and Belarus: https://www.nytimes.com/...