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PitchBook: Huawei's Hubble fund has backed 56 companies since 2019, many of them involved in chip production, as US sanctions cut off easy access to chips

Dan Strumpf / Wall Street Journal :

Wall Street Journal Dan Strumpf

Context & Ripple Effects

US sanctions cut Huawei off from easy chip purchases, and the company's response has been to buy its way down the supply chain rather than wait for state money alone. PitchBook counts 56 Hubble-backed companies since 2019, many in chip production — a corporate venture arm doing targeted supplier-building alongside Beijing's broader checks, like the $2.25B state funds put into SMIC's fab the same period.

The approach contrasts sharply with the flagship-fab route: [[a:974829|HSMC and QXIC burned hundreds of millions of government dollars without producing a single chip]]. Hubble's many-small-bets model spread capital across dozens of niche suppliers instead, and by Nikkei's later count the portfolio had grown past 60 chip companies, suggesting the strategy compounded rather than stalled.

First-order effects

  • Dozens of Chinese chip-production startups gain a patient investor whose parent company is also a guaranteed customer — Hubble stakes function as both capital and demand for suppliers otherwise locked out of scale.
  • Huawei converts an existential supply problem into an equity position: every sanctioned purchase gap becomes a reason to own a piece of the domestic replacement.

Second-order effects

  • Foreign chip vendors face permanent revenue loss on Huawei-related demand, since each Hubble-backed substitute hardens into a qualified domestic source that outlasts any future sanction relief.
  • Hubble's deal flow competes with state-backed funds for the same scarce domestic chip talent and equipment, pushing valuations up across China's chip startup market.

Third-order effects

  • If the pattern holds, US export controls will have done the opposite of their narrow aim: accelerating a parallel Chinese chip supply chain financed by the very company they targeted, with Huawei as anchor customer and investor rather than mere buyer.
  • China's chip industrial policy shifts structurally from concentrated big-fab bets — the HSMC/QXIC failure mode — toward a distributed supplier network stitched together by corporate venture capital.

The trend: Sanctions are turning Huawei from a chip buyer into a chip investor, seeding a self-supplied domestic semiconductor chain one Hubble stake at a time.