Telegram could become a powerful vector for lies and vitriol before the 2022 presidential elections in Brazil, where it is installed on 53% of smartphones
including disinformation. https://www.nytimes.com/... Alexios / @mantzarlis : “While rival apps have adopted stricter and more clearly defined policies on abuse and disinformation, Telegram's guidelines are vague, and the service takes a hands-off approach to content in individual and group chats.” https://www.nytimes.com/... @nytimes : Shortly after Donald Trump was banned from Twitter, Brazil's far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro, told his followers to move to Telegram. Since then, the encrypted messaging platform has racked up tens of millions of new users in the country. https://www.nytimes.com/... Roberta Braga / @robertasbraga : Encrypted messaging platforms were huge vectors of disinformation in the 2018 elections in Brazil — that continues to grow as far-right actors move to Telegram, prompted by Bolsonaro and political leaders, and will absolutely play a role in 2022 elections. https://www.nytimes.com/...
Context & Ripple Effects
Telegram's Brazilian surge is a direct export of America's platform crackdowns: after Donald Trump was banned from Twitter, Jair Bolsonaro told his followers to move to Telegram, and the app rode that endorsement to tens of millions of new users — now installed on 53% of Brazilian smartphones. This continues a pattern flagged earlier in 2021, when far-right extremists fleeing Facebook and Twitter moderation flocked to the same app that had previously fueled democracy movements in Iran and Belarus (the extremist migration to Telegram).
The worry is structural, not incidental: as Alexios Mantzarlis notes, rival apps have adopted stricter abuse policies while Telegram keeps its guidelines vague and takes a hands-off approach to chats. Brazil has been here before — the 2018 WhatsApp rumor wave showed how closed messaging networks can carry debunked falsehoods through an entire election cycle.
First-order effects
- Bolsonaro's base is now concentrated on the one major platform with no meaningful content moderation, making Telegram the default distribution layer for campaign messaging and disinformation heading into the October 2022 vote.
- Telegram's hands-off stance puts the burden of fact-checking on Brazilian journalists and electoral authorities rather than the platform itself, unlike the moderated networks candidates also use.
Second-order effects
- A hands-off platform at national scale forces the state into the moderator's role: by March 2022 Brazil's Supreme Court had ordered Telegram banned outright, then reversed the ban within days once the company suddenly moved to comply with court orders (the brief ban and reversal) — compliance arriving only under legal threat.
- Rival platforms face asymmetric pressure: their stricter policies push high-reach political actors toward Telegram, so enforcement elsewhere effectively subsidizes Telegram's growth as the permissive alternative.
Third-order effects
- If the pattern holds, national courts become de facto content regulators for encrypted platforms that decline to moderate themselves — a governance model that proved fragile when Telegram complied only after a ban was issued.
- The playbook travels: the same 'election integrity' channel structure analyzed across 50 large Telegram channels spreading disinformation before the US election (the US election-integrity channel analysis) mirrors what played out in Brazil, suggesting encrypted group chats are becoming standard election-disinformation infrastructure across democracies.
The trend: Encrypted messaging apps are replacing moderated social networks as the primary vector for election disinformation, pushing national judiciaries to step in where platform moderation will not.