/
Navigation
Chronicles
Browse all articles
Explore
Semantic exploration
Research
Entity momentum
Nexus
Correlations & relationships
Story Arc
Topic evolution
Drift Map
Semantic trajectory animation
Posts
Analysis & commentary
Pulse API
Tech news intelligence API
Browse
Entities
Companies, people, products, technologies
Domains
Browse by publication source
Handles
Browse by social media handle
Detection
Concept Search
Semantic similarity search
High Impact Stories
Top coverage by position
Sentiment Analysis
Positive/negative coverage
Anomaly Detection
Unusual coverage patterns
Analysis
Rivalry Report
Compare two entities head-to-head
Semantic Pivots
Narrative discontinuities
Crisis Response
Event recovery patterns
Connected
Search: /
Command: ⌘K
Embeddings: large
TEXXR

Chronicles

The story behind the story

← → days · ↑ ↓ browse · Enter similar · o open

Docs from 16 AGs' Google suit: Google sought help from Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft to stall federal efforts to strengthen an online privacy law for children

Unsealed court documents say the search giant sought help from Apple, Facebook and Microsoft to “find areas of alignment.”

Politico Leah Nylen

Context & Ripple Effects

The documents add a privacy-policy record to the state scrutiny already surrounding Google: a 38-state challenge to Google’s search practices focused in part on its contracts with Apple. Related coverage also describes state AG allegations of a Google-Facebook ad-auction arrangement, making intercompany coordination a recurring feature of the litigation record.

What matters here is the breadth of the alleged outreach. Google is described as seeking common ground with Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft on delaying stronger children’s privacy rules, extending the legal focus beyond a single product market or commercial agreement.

First-order effects

  • Google must defend documents that state AGs can use to characterize its privacy-policy advocacy as coordinated outreach to other major platforms.
  • Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft are directly associated with the outreach in the unsealed record, even though the supplied material says only that Google sought their help.

Second-order effects

  • State AGs gain a basis to connect Google’s policy advocacy with the broader pattern alleged in their cases, including the search-contract litigation involving Apple.
  • The named companies face greater pressure to distinguish ordinary policy alignment from conduct that regulators may portray as coordination among large platforms.

Third-order effects

  • If discovery continues to reveal cross-platform efforts around rules affecting data practices, antitrust and privacy enforcement will increasingly examine policy advocacy alongside product-market conduct.
  • The record points toward a more integrated enforcement lens in which dominant platforms’ commercial partnerships and regulatory agendas are assessed together.

The trend: State investigations are widening from individual platform markets to the ways major technology companies align on rules that shape competition and data governance.

Discussion

  • @jason_kint Jason Kint on x
    Thread incoming. AGs lawsuit v Google posted upon orders of court. Simply put, there is A LOT. I previously called Google “screwed” despite redactions but there are more eye poppers. I'm starting with Facebook market rigging allegations. Congrats Sheryl Sandberg on redaction. /1 …
  • @khushitavasant Khushita Vasant on x
    In the @Google adtech #antitrust complaint *just* made public, the Texas-led lawsuit says this about the @Facebook agreement: “In Google's words, the Jedi program ‘generates suboptimal yields for publishers and serious risks of negative media coverage if exposed externally’”.
  • @patrickmcgee_ Patrick McGee on x
    Facebook and Google allegedly agreed on quotas for how often Facebook would win publishers's auctions — “literally manipulating the auction with minimum spends and quotas for how often Facebook would bid and win,” complaint alleges. https://twitter.com/...
  • @leah_nylen @leah_nylen on x
    In its own internal documents, Google said that “if it could not ‘avoid competing with FAN [Facebook Audience Network],’ then it wanted to collaborate with Facebook to ‘build a moat,’” the states allege
  • @khushitavasant Khushita Vasant on x
    Facebook's support for header bidding posed a severe threat. So, #Google made overtures to #Facebook. “Internal Facebook communications reveal that @Facebook executives fully understood why @Google wanted to cut a deal with them: “they want this deal to kill header bidding.”
  • @jason_kint Jason Kint on x
    As you think about way real-time markets work, it's not only about pricing, too. It's about access to that data and even the effects of terms around time guarantees and thresholds. Facebook got longer time, again likely due to its market size and Google wanting to “Kill HB.” /12 …
  • @patrickmcgee_ Patrick McGee on x
    Then comes @Facebook. In March 2017 Facebook throws its weight behind header bidding. Big threat. “Facebook communications reveal that Facebook executives fully understood why Google wanted to cut a deal with them: “they want this deal to kill header bidding.” https://twitter.com…
  • @leah_nylen @leah_nylen on x
    Facebook had suggested publicly that it might adopt header bidding, which led Google to approach the social network about a deal. As Facebook executives described it internally: “they [Google] want this deal to kill header bidding.”
  • @thezedwards @thezedwards on x
    “Facebook decided to dangle the threat of competition in Google's face so it could then cut a deal to manipulate publishers' auctions in its favor.” - just released court documents @ https://storage.courtlistener.com/ ...
  • @khushitavasant Khushita Vasant on x
    Facebook's header bidding announcement was part of an “18 [month] header bidding strategy”—to draw Google in, as per internal @Facebook communication at the highest level, the unredacted adtech lawsuit reveals.
  • @leah_nylen @leah_nylen on x
    The two companies reached an agreement nicknamed “Jedi Blue.” Facebook would get “information, speed, and other advantages in the ~43 billion auctions Google runs for publishers' mobile app advertising inventory each month” in exchange for abandoning header bidding.
  • @leah_nylen @leah_nylen on x
    Update to my earlier piece: Apple that no representative from the company attended the Aug 2019 meeting.
  • @patrickmcgee_ Patrick McGee on x
    Google doesn't want to compete with Facebook. Says it would rather “build a moat” by collaborating instead. Facebook anticipated this in “an 18 month head bidding strategy” — new unredacted detail.
  • @thezedwards @thezedwards on x
    And now we know what Google has been actually doing to slow down ePrivacy.. The unredacted documents between Google & Facebook @ https://storage.courtlistener.com/ ... are outrageous. There are going to dozens of important ad tech, digital privacy stories from all the details we …
  • @jason_kint Jason Kint on x
    Here is (just some of) the previously language in the Facebook and Google allegedly illegal market rigging deal. Do you think this drew any red flags for the executives reviewing the deal? /14 https://twitter.com/...
  • @jason_kint Jason Kint on x
    It also involved providing a bunch of help in identifying users, allegations compare some of the methods to “inside trading” in that Facebook was uniquely win certain terms to block inside info. Congrats, Dan. /10 https://twitter.com/...
  • @jason_kint Jason Kint on x
    A gag order on its lower fees which absolutely impact how auction dynamics work. When I always have called Facebook and Google a duopoly, it was my hope people would understand the two companies were taking most growth and a deal like this plays into it. /11 https://t.co/eXojwWhK…
  • @jason_kint Jason Kint on x
    We hadn't seen Facebook's own internal messages showing it was blatantly obvious why Google wanted this alleged quid pro quo with Facebook so they would exit the market. “They want to kill header bidding.” Yeah, that's clear. /8 https://t.co/y9DaEEaXaM
  • @jason_kint Jason Kint on x
    Who would be the biggest target here? Well, Facebook had announced it was entering the market. (note, there are allegations that was done for bait)... we knew this but it's helpful to see the complaint in clear text and what Facebook got in return. /7 https://twitter.com/...
  • @jason_kint Jason Kint on x
    This is why killing header bidding was the #1 priority for a top Google executive. See the new information which is now unsealed ... and just let me know if it's at all unclear. /5 https://twitter.com/...
  • @jason_kint Jason Kint on x
    According to these allegations, Google's initial way for this executive to achieve this goal involved just stopping competition, innovation and investment. “forestall major industry investment in FB...” /6 https://t.co/l2wWk3ODQ3
  • @jason_kint Jason Kint on x
    Header bidding was bad because it allowed publishers to bypass fees which we now learn ranged between 19-22% of revenues. Also, a bit of foreshadowing here in the removed redactions as to why Facebook was a part of the threat. /3 https://twitter.com/...
  • @jason_kint Jason Kint on x
    It's pretty amazing to see the actual quotes from discovery. For instance the express purpose to “kill HB.” That's short for “header bidding” which was a significant threat to Google's business. /2 https://twitter.com/...