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Court docs: Google's “Premier Device Program” gave Android OEMs a greater share of Search revenue for not preinstalling third-party app stores on their devices

Android OEMs couldn't preload apps that could install other apps  —  Newly unredacted sections of Epic's antitrust complaint …

The Verge Chris Welch

Context & Ripple Effects

The court filings add detail to allegations that Google sought to limit Samsung’s Galaxy app store through payments and OEM restrictions in a separate state AG case. The asserted mechanism tied Android manufacturers’ Search-revenue share to their app-store choices.

That OEM-level incentive became central to Epic’s challenge: Epic later asked the court to curb restrictions on alternative-store preloading, before the court ordered Play Store opening measures in the Epic v. Google remedy.

First-order effects

  • Android OEMs participating in the Premier Device Program faced a direct financial trade-off: a larger share of Search revenue in return for not preinstalling third-party app stores.
  • Third-party app-store operators lost a key route to Android users because device makers could not preload apps that install other apps under the alleged arrangement.

Second-order effects

  • Samsung and other OEMs had less commercial incentive to differentiate Android devices with competing stores, reinforcing Google Play’s distribution position.
  • Epic’s complaint gains a more concrete theory of harm: Search-revenue sharing, rather than Play Store terms alone, allegedly shaped app-store distribution choices.

Third-order effects

  • The dispute points toward remedies that address device-maker incentives as well as storefront rules; Epic’s later request to protect alternative-store preloading reflects that broader focus.
  • If platform remedies continue to target preinstallation and distribution terms, Android competition will turn increasingly on whether alternative stores can reach users without OEM revenue penalties.

The trend: Android app-store competition is moving from challenges to store fees toward scrutiny of the OEM distribution incentives that determine which stores reach devices by default.

Discussion

  • @rustybrick Barry Schwartz on x
    I'm sure plenty more to come like this https://twitter.com/...
  • @karlbode Karl Bode on x
    so not only was Google paying wireless carriers not to develop competing app stores (aka: pay them to do nothing), it was paying phone makers not to install competing app stores what incredible, unbridled innovation https://www.theverge.com/...