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Chronicles

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Court filings show that Epic committed $444M to “minimum guarantees” for game developers that release on Epic Games Store but stay off of Steam for a year

Here's how much money Epic is burning to make the Epic Games Store a Steam competitor.

PC Gamer Tyler Wilde

Context & Ripple Effects

The $444M figure comes out through Epic v. Valve litigation filings, and it quantifies what had been an open secret: the Epic Games Store's exclusivity strategy is bought, not earned. The same court documents show why Epic could afford it — $5.6B gross revenue in 2018 and $4.2B in 2019, the vast majority from Fortnite — meaning the storefront war is effectively subsidized by one game.

The filing also reframes the broader platform fight: exclusivity-for-cash was not unique to PC. Later court material from Epic's mobile battle showed Google allegedly paying ~$360M over three years to keep Activision Blizzard from launching its own app store, so the minimum-guarantee playbook documented here is one instance of a wider pattern of pay-to-stay-off-rival-platforms deals.

First-order effects

  • Developers signing these deals get guaranteed revenue independent of actual sales performance, while Valve loses launch-window catalog and the day-one audience those titles would have brought to Steam.

Second-order effects

  • Google's alleged ~$360M agreement with Activision Blizzard shows the same buy-the-exclusivity logic migrating to mobile app distribution, forcing every platform holder to budget for defensive payments against rival storefronts.

Third-order effects

  • If the pattern holds, storefront competition consolidates into a capital-intensity contest only companies with a hit cash engine can play — and the 2025 results showing third-party Epic Games Store revenue up 57% YoY to $400M suggest the spend is slowly converting into a real business rather than pure burn.

The trend: Platform wars across PC and mobile are increasingly settled with upfront exclusivity guarantees bankrolled by flagship-game profits rather than won on store features alone.

Discussion

  • @timsweeneyepic Tim Sweeney on x
    That's right! And it has proven to be a fantastic success in reaching gamers with great games and a fantastic investment into growing the business! https://twitter.com/... https://twitter.com/...
  • @folletto Erin ‘Folletto’ Casali on x
    I really appreciate Epic commitment in making such an open investment, and I'm glad they not just can afford doing that, but they are actually doing it. https://twitter.com/...
  • @rereztv Shane Luis on x
    Smithers: “Sir, perhaps we should start introducing features to our Epic Games Store to make it competitive with Steam?” Mr. Burns: “Pshaw! The very idea. Come Smithers, let us engage in monetary tomfoolery!” https://twitter.com/... https://twitter.com/...
  • @sircrackerbulb Ben on x
    103 free games with a total value of $2,407 which I assume is per user? Has anyone done a total cost value of that? I assume epic has paid out a lump sum for each game that goes free for a day right? Surely that's a loss bigger than the exclusivity deals https://twitter.com/...
  • @surny_ Surny on x
    If they spent that money on making sure the store had basic features (shopping cart, social stuff,...) to actually compete with Steam instead of buying up exclusive games and annoying literally everyone maybe it'd actually turn a profit quicker https://twitter.com/...
  • @sircrackerbulb Ben on x
    They spent... $444 Million on exclusives in 2020 and still can't afford to add a shopping cart https://twitter.com/...
  • @liasae Lia on x
    Oh my goodness this is such a fascinating read, and way beyond the headline. (My take is that Epic winning is probably better for software as a whole but they are still pretty evil) https://twitter.com/...
  • @techlinkedyt TechLinked on x
    Apple has published financial numbers for the Epic Games Store, in what may be the first attempt to win a lawsuit by proving your opponents are losers https://www.pcgamer.com/... https://twitter.com/...
  • @pcgamer @pcgamer on x
    Epic is losing hundreds of millions of dollars on the Epic Games Store, but expects to start making yearly profits in 2023. https://www.pcgamer.com/...
  • @ceejaeytf2 CeeJaey on x
    Would be interesting to see sales numbers; how many people buy games when they launch on EGS against those who wait out the year of exclusivity and buy the game on Steam. Most people I know who have an Epic account only use it for the free games. https://twitter.com/...