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SCOTUS Justice Clarence Thomas argues social media platforms are “sufficiently akin” to common carriers and can be regulated “in much the same way”

Last fall, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that it was time to rein in Section 230 immunity.

Protocol Issie Lapowsky

Context & Ripple Effects

This concurrence extends a line Thomas has been drawing since fall 2020, when he argued that "sweeping protection" under Section 230 misreads the law and invited Congress to scale it back. The new move goes further: instead of just trimming immunity, he frames the largest platforms as "sufficiently akin" to common carriers — entities whose gatekeeping power justifies regulation "in much the same way."

The framing matters because it gives state legislatures and litigants a judicial theory to build on, not merely an opinion about one statute. It also sits alongside the same justices' push to revisit the 1964 libel ruling protecting public figures, suggesting a coordinated reexamination of how courts treat mass-communication intermediaries.

First-order effects

  • Platforms like Twitter and Facebook now face a sitting justice articulating a legal doctrine under which their content-moderation decisions could be regulated as carrier conduct rather than protected editorial judgment.
  • State lawmakers pushing Texas- and Florida-style social media statutes gain a Supreme Court anchor for the argument that platform curation is a public-facing service subject to government rules.

Second-order effects

  • Litigants challenging platform bans can recast their claims in common-carrier terms, forcing companies to defend moderation practices in court under a framework designed for railroads and telephone networks.
  • If carriers-like treatment gains traction among other justices, platforms may face pressure to apply rules uniformly across users and viewpoints, eroding the discretion that differentiates their products.

Third-order effects

  • The pattern points toward a structural split in internet law: small services retaining broad intermediary immunity while the largest ones are treated as speech infrastructure with obligations attached — a two-tier regime replacing the uniform shield Section 230 has provided.
  • By 2024, justices weighing Texas's and Florida's laws were still split over how far states can go without colliding with platforms' First Amendment rights, which suggests any carrier framework will have to survive that constitutional tension before it reshapes the industry.

The trend: The Court's right flank is steadily reframing major social platforms from private publishers into regulated speech infrastructure, with each opinion — on Section 230, libel precedent, and carrier status — supplying legal scaffolding for that shift.