Report details how China is using tech products, market foothold, and training, to create dependencies in Indonesia, South Korea, UAE, Israel, and Poland
Patrick Tucker / Defense One : Tweets: @ccp_china_watch Tweets: @ccp_china_watch : At least 16 countries have signed MoU's with China on Digital Silk Road projects. But the scope of Chinese tech infiltration goes well beyond such formal agreements. via @Byron_Wan https://www.defenseone.com/...
Context & Ripple Effects
The Defense One report maps the informal layer of China's Digital Silk Road: alongside the at least 16 countries that have signed MoUs on DSR projects, Beijing builds dependence through products sold, market positions held, and training provided — here in Indonesia, South Korea, UAE, Israel, and Poland. That matters because three of the five are close US security partners.
The mechanism is one the related coverage has documented repeatedly: Chinese-built undersea cables, data centers, and fintech apps across Africa, and the Logink network tracking global sea cargo that experts fear could hand Beijing commercial or strategic advantage. This report extends the pattern to US-aligned states.
First-order effects
- Government agencies and operators in the five named countries now run Chinese-supplied systems and trained personnel, embedding Beijing's technology in their infrastructure whether or not a formal agreement exists.
- For US-allied capitals — Seoul, Tel Aviv, Warsaw — these footholds sit directly inside the coalition Biden is trying to assemble to boost key tech sectors and counter China.
Second-order effects
- Alliance-level countermeasures aimed at chips and equipment miss the installed base: where Chinese products and training already shape procurement, US and allied vendors compete against incumbency rather than price.
- The same playbook operating abroad mirrors what Beijing is doing at home — increased spending on domestic tech to replace Western equipment since late 2022 — so both sides are hardening their own stacks while seeding the other's.
Third-order effects
- If dependency-by-embedment keeps outrunning formal agreements, the contest shifts from export controls and MoUs to standards and operational lock-in — consistent with China's effort to rewrite the norms underpinning 5G and AI after decades of Western dominance.
- Countries hosting dual-use networks like Logink-style cargo tracking face a structural choice between cheap, integrated Chinese systems and costlier sovereign alternatives, with each signing deepening the switching cost.
The trend: Technology statecraft is shifting from formal treaties to dependency engineering, where market share, products, and training accomplish what MoUs merely signal.