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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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Sources: to allocate shares in its public listing, Unity is considering using a process similar to the Dutch auction Google used during its IPO

Miles Kruppa / Financial Times :

Financial Times Miles Kruppa

Context & Ripple Effects

A day after Unity's S-1 filing laid out a $34-$42 range targeting up to $1.05B, FT sources say the Goldman Sachs-led deal team is weighing a Dutch auction-style allocation — the mechanism Google used in its own IPO — which would let the order book, not bankers, set who gets shares and at what price. It matters because the Goldman-led listing was shaping up as a conventional bookbuild, and auction mechanics directly threaten the underwriter's discretion over allocation.

The follow-through in the coverage suggests the auction idea did not survive contact with demand: Unity ultimately priced at $52, well above the filed range, and still closed its debut up 31.44%.

First-order effects

  • If adopted, institutional buyers lose the guaranteed allocations a traditional bookbuild rewards, while smaller bidders gain direct access — and Goldman Sachs' role narrows from gatekeeper to facilitator.

Second-order effects

  • Unity instead priced at $52, above its filed $34-$42 range, yet still left a 31.44% first-day pop on the table — evidence that even a bank considering the auction reverted to conventional pricing when demand ran hot.

Third-order effects

  • As long as hot listings keep popping regardless, issuers have little incentive to force auctions on their banks, leaving IPO pricing power concentrated with underwriters and reviving the auction idea only periodically.

The trend: High-profile tech issuers keep circling the Dutch auction as an alternative to banker-priced IPOs, but strong demand keeps pulling deals back into the traditional bookbuild.