Sources: Apple dropped plan to encrypt backups of devices in iCloud about two years ago, after the FBI complained that the move would harm investigations
whose data is now stored in-country, along with their encryption keys. Amazing scoop by @josephmenn https://www.reuters.com/... Walt Mossberg / @waltmossberg : While I like @Apple's policy of encrypting iPhone passcodes in a way even the company can't decrypt, there's a loophole. Here's my 2016 explainer. It's worth reading in light of a new @Reuters report that Apple decided not to close it. https://www.theverge.com/... Zack Whittaker / @zackwhittaker : Good reporting citing a lot of sources, but still unclear precisely why Apple's plan was dropped. Another said that customers “would find themselves locked out of their data more often.”
ReutersJoseph Menn
Context & Ripple Effects
This report closes a loop opened by the Apple–FBI standoff over iPhone encryption that began with iOS 8: while Apple hardened the device itself so even it couldn't decrypt passcodes, the iCloud backup copy remained readable by the company. Walt Mossberg's 2016 explainer flagged exactly this loophole, and per Reuters sources, Apple had a plan to close it — until the FBI argued encrypted backups would harm investigations and the plan was dropped about two years ago.
iCloud backups remain decryptable by Apple and accessible to law enforcement with legal process, keeping open the very loophole Mossberg identified in 2016.
The FBI preserved its investigative pathway into iPhone data without needing a public legal battle, at the cost of Apple's stated security posture for cloud-stored data.
Second-order effects
Security-conscious customers and researchers now have documented evidence that Apple's cloud protections bend under government pressure, complicating its privacy-led marketing against rivals.
The episode set a template other cloud providers face: quiet accommodation when pressed, which raises the stakes for whoever moves first to full end-to-end encryption.
Third-order effects
If the pattern holds, consumer cloud encryption advances only when vendors re-litigate these decisions publicly — as Apple ultimately did with Advanced Data Protection — meaning law-enforcement objections delay but don't permanently stop E2EE adoption.
The structural tension between investigable clouds and end-to-end-encrypted ones becomes a recurring policy question, with each vendor's choice effectively setting de facto surveillance policy for hundreds of millions of users.
The trend: Consumer cloud encryption is advancing in fits — quietly deferred under law-enforcement pressure, then restored through headline product decisions — as the Apple–FBI encryption conflict migrates from devices to the cloud.
We must stop using “encrypted” and especially “end-to-end encrypted”. ICloud backups are encrypted, but Apple has a master key. All that matters is *accessible*. Are iCloud backups accessible by Apple? Yes. https://twitter.com/... https://twitter.com/...
If true, this shows that despite tech's efforts to work in good faith with law enforcement, FBI/DOJ will not be satisfied until they have full and complete access to your phone. https://www.reuters.com/...
Where are we at as a community on this? Does it matter that Apple decided not to implement a security control they planned to because they didn't want to fight the FBI? I'm torn between"WTAF" and “if this stops an encryption backdoor, then okay.” https://www.reuters.com/...
Apple quietly abandoned plans to allow users fully encrypted back-ups after FBI blowback. Went unreported for two years. Huge @josephmenn scoop on a wild news day https://www.reuters.com/...
I don't believe this Reuters story that Apple dropped pans for encrypted backups because FBI. Encrypted backups are a useability nightmare that means customers would lose data. https://www.reuters.com/...
Exclusive: Apple dropped plan for encrypting backups after FBI complained. Fuck security, you guys, the FBI having access is more important! https://www.reuters.com/...
I'll have more to say about this later, but had Apple gone through with this, it would have been a huge advance for consumer and digital privacy. Alas.... https://twitter.com/...
Case in point: If we had more nerds in the FBI, perhaps they might have dissuaded the federal law enforcement agency to pressure a tech giant like this A true nerd would understand that unencrypted backups weaken security for all in an UNACCEPTABLE trade off just to get criminals…
I'm half convinced a lot of the LEO complaints about encrypted iPhones are just a front to make people think cops don't just subpoena the backups from iCloud/Google https://twitter.com/...
The iPhone already has an encryption back door for almost all users: The iCloud backup. Apple was going to close that door, but backed down in fear of angering the FBI. For shame. https://www.reuters.com/...
The larger point of this story, of course, is not that Apple is “bad” on privacy. It's that there is more cooperation across the industry than meets the eye, and no one has an incentive to say so. Apple is much better than most, so there is the greatest pressure on it to deal. ht…
I suspected this was true ever since Apple released iCloud Keychain and did nothing interesting with it. Government pressure works. https://www.reuters.com/...
Apple was considering offering end-to-end encryption on iCloud, but it abandoned the plan after conversations with the FBI. https://www.reuters.com/... No surprise here. iCloud data lets Apple say it's helping without having to break directly into phones.
Apple's new position on protecting iCloud data from the United States government is now remarkably similar to its position on protecting iCloud data stored in the People's Republic of China. https://twitter.com/...
Another huge @josephmenn scoop. At least the FBI needs a search warrant. Remember that Apple turned over storage of Chinese iCloud backups to “Guizhou on the Cloud Big Data Industrial Development Co, Ltd.” https://www.reuters.com/...
Wild story. Important context in that it shows Apple is vulnerable to FBI/DOJ pressure, despite stance on backdoors at the moment -> Exclusive: Apple dropped plan for encrypting backups after FBI complained https://www.reuters.com/... (by @josephmenn)
If Apple had gone ahead with giving users true end-to-end encryption for iCloud backups, it would have given much relief to Chinese iCloud users — whose data is now stored in-country, along with their encryption keys. Amazing scoop by @josephmenn https://www.reuters.com/...
While I like @Apple's policy of encrypting iPhone passcodes in a way even the company can't decrypt, there's a loophole. Here's my 2016 explainer. It's worth reading in light of a new @Reuters report that Apple decided not to close it. https://www.theverge.com/...
Good reporting citing a lot of sources, but still unclear precisely why Apple's plan was dropped. Another said that customers “would find themselves locked out of their data more often.”