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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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Campaign staff and researchers say almost no political campaigns, including presidential ones, have teams for spotting and pushing back on disinformation

Davey Alba / New York Times :

New York Times Davey Alba

Context & Ripple Effects

The gap this story documents has a history: after the 2016 bot wave, experts judged that Facebook handled the 2018 midterms reasonably well only because outside researchers did the monitoring the platforms and campaigns would not. Campaigns themselves never built the function in-house.

What changed since is that the outside layer is under attack — GOP lawmakers now accuse firms like Graphika of colluding with government to suppress speech in a legal campaign against disinformation researchers — just as the supply side industrializes, with analysts describing a booming disinformation-for-hire market recruiting influencers. Defense capacity is shrinking while offense scales.

First-order effects

  • Campaign staff — including presidential operations — enter each news cycle with no dedicated team to detect fabricated stories or coordinated smears aimed at their candidate, leaving rapid-response units to improvise.

Second-order effects

  • Vendors are already pitching: 30+ companies offered AI products to campaigns, but most campaigns declined to buy (wary of the tools), so the market for paid disinformation defense stalls alongside the in-house one.
  • Research firms like Graphika, which supplied the monitoring campaigns relied on in past cycles, face legal exposure from the GOP accusations, raising the cost of exactly the outside help unstaffed campaigns need.

Third-order effects

  • If the pattern holds, political information warfare settles into a structural asymmetry: a commercialized offense (influencer networks for hire) facing a defense run by volunteers, journalists, and platform policy teams rather than the campaigns themselves — with legal pressure on researchers further thinning the independent watchdog layer.

The trend: US political disinformation is becoming an asymmetric market — industrialized attacks against a defense that neither campaigns nor their embattled outside monitors are staffed to sustain.

Discussion

  • @daveyalba Davey Alba on x
    NEW: I talked to dozens of campaign staff members & disinformation researchers about what infrastructure (if any) existed within campaigns to proactively spot disinformation & combat it. The answer: there isn't really much of an infrastructure in place. https://www.nytimes.com/..…
  • @digiphile Alex Howard on x
    After the @nytimes published, the @DNC has released tips for the public, company, & tech companies on combating disinformation: https://democrats.org/... “If you see something, say something” is...not adequate advice. What do other people see here that makes sense, or does not? h…
  • @mathewi Mathew Ingram on x
    Few politicians have teams to spot false statements about them online, or to fight back before it spreads https://www.nytimes.com/...
  • @cindyotis_ Cindy Otis on x
    Campaigns are making tough choices about where to spend money. At this stage, it usually goes to field work, comms, and eventually a GOTV campaign. But I would argue that monitoring for disinformation attacks is a crucial pillar of all of that. https://www.nytimes.com/...
  • @danpfeiffer Dan Pfeiffer on x
    This is an important (and scary) read https://twitter.com/...
  • @daveyalba Davey Alba on x
    .@lisackaplan, who ran counterdisinfo for a 2018 midterm campaign, was able to alert FB to a bunch of inauthentic pages. But as far as she knows, there is not a similar counter-disinformation effort in 2020 campaigns. https://www.nytimes.com/... https://twitter.com/...