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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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EU competition commissioner says Google's plan to let its price comparison rivals bid for top space on a search page has not led to more traffic for the rivals

Reuters

Context & Ripple Effects

This verdict closes a loop that opened in 2015, when Google denied Europe's antitrust accusations, and ran through its 2017 proposal to auction shopping ad spaces to rivals with a price cap on its own bids. By late 2018 the rivals had given up on that remedy, telling the commissioner in an open letter that Google was failing to give them equal treatment.

The commissioner's assessment — that the auction sent no more traffic to competitors — is the regulator's own admission that its chosen behavioral fix did not work, and it set up the 2020 finding that Google still sends under 1% of shopping traffic to rivals.

First-order effects

  • The price comparison sites' central complaint is now effectively endorsed by the commissioner, shifting the burden onto Google to show its auction remedy works or face renewed non-compliance findings and the EU's escalating daily fine regime.

Second-order effects

  • A failed auction remedy pushes the Commission toward remedies that dictate the interface itself rather than the bidding mechanics — the logic behind the price comparison box Google later proposed at the top of EU search results to avoid DMA fines.

Third-order effects

  • If auction-style behavioral remedies keep failing the traffic test, EU enforcement structurally shifts from negotiated fixes after the fact to ex-ante rules like the DMA that prescribe how dominant platforms must design their results pages.

The trend: EU antitrust enforcement against Google is moving from negotiated behavioral remedies toward mandated interface designs, as each auction-style fix fails to move rival traffic.