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TEXXR

Chronicles

The story behind the story

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The French Government officially launches Tchap, its own messaging app with end-to-end encryption, after patching a security flaw found upon initial release

The French government just launched its own messaging app called Tchap in order to protect conversations from hackers, private companies and foreign entities.

TechCrunch Romain Dillet

Context & Ripple Effects

The launch closes a loop opened a year earlier, when France said it was building its own encrypted messenger to fend off state-level espionage while President Macron's inner circle kept using Telegram (that 2018 announcement framed Tchap explicitly as a sovereignty project). Shipping it now — code open-sourced, with one security flaw found and patched between initial release and official launch — turns that plan into working infrastructure for civil servants.

The stakes of getting it right were visible long after: by late 2023 the prime minister ordered staff off Signal, WhatsApp and Telegram onto French-made Olvid (the uninstall directive), and in 2026 hackers still got into Tchap through a hijacked user account (the account-takeover breach). This launch is the first data point in that longer sovereignty-versus-security record.

First-order effects

  • French civil servants gain a government-controlled end-to-end encrypted channel, directly displacing the foreign apps — notably Telegram, which Macron's circle favored — from official conversations.
  • Open-sourcing the client puts Tchap under public scrutiny immediately, and that scrutiny already paid off once: the pre-launch flaw was found and fixed before the official rollout.

Second-order effects

  • Foreign messaging providers lose a high-profile government customer segment in France, and the state's willingness to mandate domestic alternatives — later formalized in the Olvid directive — becomes a template other ministries and agencies can follow.
  • Every vulnerability disclosed in Tchap now lands on the French government's own desk rather than a vendor's, raising the political cost of each incident and pushing more security work in-house or to French firms like Olvid.

Third-order effects

  • If the pattern holds, European governments institutionalize sovereign communications stacks — homegrown encryption, mandated adoption, open-source auditability — even though Tchap's own hijacked-account breach shows state control does not eliminate the attack surface.
  • The episode feeds a broader decoupling logic in which trust in a messaging platform derives from who operates it, not just how it is encrypted, reshaping procurement across public sectors.

The trend: European governments are steadily replacing foreign messaging apps with domestically operated encrypted platforms, accepting that sovereignty shifts security risk rather than removing it.