First-order effects

• Jones's audience moves from publicly visible Pages and videos into Facebook Groups, WhatsApp, and Messenger, where the same company's moderation tooling and outside researchers have far less visibility.
• Facebook's enforcement team inherits a harder problem: the content it just removed now lives on surfaces designed for privacy, so detection shifts from scanning public posts to policing invitations, group growth, and forwarding patterns.

Second-order effects

• The displacement vindicates the argument in Politico's coverage that outright bans have costs reach-limiting alternatives avoid — pressure builds on Facebook to demote 'dangerous' figures rather than delete them, since deletion exports the problem.
• WhatsApp ends up doing the cleanup work downstream, a pattern that scales dramatically by 2025 when it is banning roughly 9.8 million Indian accounts per month through October — enforcement migrating from one product team to another inside the same company.

Third-order effects

• If public-feed purges keep exporting toxicity to private channels, the industry's central moderation battleground becomes encrypted and closed spaces, forcing a direct collision between end-to-end privacy promises and safety obligations that regulators will eventually have to arbitrate.
• Internal findings like the August research showing ~70% of Facebook's most active civic Groups were too toxic to recommend suggest the public-facing cleanup never fixed the underlying supply of toxic content — it relocated it, meaning platform health metrics based on what is publicly visible systematically understate the problem.