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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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Attackers successfully rerouted DNS requests for myetherwallet.com, showing visitors an unsigned SSL cert and apparently taking $13K+ in Ethereum in two hours

At midnight ET last night, MyEtherWallet users started noticing something odd.  Connecting to the service …

The Verge Russell Brandom

Context & Ripple Effects

The MyEtherWallet hijack is an early entry in a pattern the coverage keeps returning to: Ethereum users losing funds not to broken smart contracts but to compromised plumbing. The 2016 DAO drain froze $50M+ and forced a protocol-level debate; later incidents moved down the stack, from guessed low-entropy private keys to registrar-level control.

The endpoint of that descent is visible in the related reporting on GoDaddy, where social-engineered staff let attackers change email and DNS records for crypto trading platforms — the same layer this attack hit. What makes the MyEtherWallet case notable is the tell: an unsigned SSL certificate that careful users caught before connecting their wallets.

First-order effects

  • MyEtherWallet users who ignored the unsigned-certificate warning had their wallet credentials harvested, with over $13K in Ethereum siphoned within roughly two hours before the reroute was stopped.
  • The incident puts DNS resolution — not MyEtherWallet's own code — at the center of the trust question for every web-based wallet front-end.

Second-order effects

  • Registrars and DNS providers serving crypto services face pressure to harden account controls, a pressure that materialized two years later when GoDaddy confirmed staff were socially engineered into changing DNS records for trading platforms.
  • Wallet interfaces gain an incentive to push hardware wallets and offline signing, since any browser-delivered front-end inherits whatever the DNS path serves it.

Third-order effects

  • If attacks keep targeting the registrar-to-browser chain rather than the blockchain itself, custody security consolidates around layers that don't depend on DNS trust — and 'verify the certificate' becomes a user-side control the industry can't assume everyone performs.

The trend: Crypto theft is migrating from smart-contract exploits toward the internet's identity infrastructure — registrars, DNS, and key generation — where a single compromise scales across every service behind it.