A look at the tussle between the US and China over subsea cables; US Big Tech now accounts for 70%+ of all used subsea-cable capacity, from <10% a decade ago
A high-stakes rivalry is playing out over a vast but vulnerable web of underwater cables that carry nearly all global internet traffic
Context & Ripple Effects
The shift in capacity ownership follows a series of security-driven interventions around cable projects: the US backed SubCom in an Asia-Europe bid amid espionage concerns, while Chinese state-owned telecoms pursued their own Asia-to-Europe route. US support for SubCom's Asia-Europe bid and China's planned Asia-Middle East-Europe cable show that route ownership has become part of the wider bilateral contest.
Related coverage has also moved from who builds cables to who can maintain and connect them. US officials raised concerns about China-owned repair ships, and the FCC later proposed restricting cable builders that use specified Chinese technology. Warnings over repair-ship vulnerabilities and the FCC's proposed equipment-based restrictions make Big Tech's expanded role consequential beyond its own network needs.
First-order effects
- US Big Tech's control of more than 70% of used capacity gives a small group of cloud and platform companies greater influence over cable investment, route selection, and the resilience of the links their services use.
- The same concentration makes those companies more directly exposed to the US-China contest over cable construction, equipment, and repair arrangements.
Second-order effects
- Cable suppliers and project partners face stronger pressure to satisfy US security expectations, reinforcing an environment in which geopolitical acceptability can affect project awards alongside cost and technical capability.
- Chinese-backed routes and US-aligned projects may increasingly compete for strategic landing points and customers, rather than operating as a single neutral infrastructure market.
Third-order effects
- If ownership continues to consolidate among US technology companies while security restrictions tighten, subsea connectivity could become more segmented by trusted suppliers, operators, and jurisdictions.
- The pattern would shift strategic influence over global internet transport toward a combination of state policy and a few private infrastructure buyers, though the eventual degree of fragmentation remains uncertain.
The trend: Subsea cables are evolving from shared telecom infrastructure into privately financed, security-screened strategic assets shaped by US-China rivalry.