Taiwan's vice premier, who is leading US negotiations, says Taiwan would not agree to a 50-50 split in chip production, adding no such condition was discussed
trade discussion to be focused on Section 232 investigation for preferential deal on semiconductors DigiTimes : Taiwan rejects US proposal for 50-50 chip production split John Liu / CNN : Taiwan says will resist pressure from Washington to move half of chip production to US Catherine Baab / Quartz : Taiwan says Trump White House's demand for 1:1 chip production was not even discussed during most recent talks Hong Kong Free Press HKFP : Taiwan says ‘will not agree’ to making 50% of its chips in US Sherry Qin / MarketWatch : Taiwan Pushes Back on Idea of Shifting More Chip Production to U.S. Namrata Sen / Benzinga : Taiwan Rejects US Proposal For 50-50 Chip Production Deal: ‘Never Made Any Commitment’ Focus Taiwan : Taiwan won't agree to U.S. ‘50-50’ chip idea, vice premier says Daily Sabah : Taiwan says ‘will not agree’ to 50-50 chip production deal with US Times of India : ‘Never made 50-50 commitment’: Taiwan refuses US demand to make half its chips on US soil; pushes back amid trade row Xinhua : “50-50” chip manufacturing proposal from U.S. sparks backlash in Taiwan X: Denise Wu / @denisewu : “Our negotiating team has never made any commitment to a 50-50 split on chips. Rest assured, we did not discuss this issue during this round of talks, nor would we agree to such conditions,” vicePremier, Cheng Li-chiun [image] Forums: r/technology : Taiwan will not agree to 50-50 chip production deal with US, negotiator says r/worldnews : Taiwan will not agree to 50-50 chip production deal with US, negotiator says r/Semiconductors : Taiwan will not agree to 50-50 chip production deal with US, negotiator says r/WallStreetbetsELITE : Taiwan will not agree to 50-50 chip production deal with US r/intelstock : Taiwan will not agree to 50-50 chip production deal with US, negotiator says
Context & Ripple Effects
The dispute follows Washington’s stated ambition to secure roughly half of chip and wafer production in the US, while Taiwan has long been central to US efforts to reduce reliance on its semiconductor supply base.
This is a negotiation over the terms of industrial alignment, not simply factory geography. Later coverage of a Taiwan-US investment and credit arrangement suggests the talks could still produce capacity commitments without adopting a literal production-share target.
First-order effects
- Taiwan’s negotiators set a clear boundary against a 50-50 production split, narrowing the range of outcomes available in the Section 232-linked trade discussions.
- US officials must distinguish their public domestic-capacity objective from conditions Taiwan is prepared to accept in a preferential semiconductor arrangement.
Second-order effects
- Chipmakers and their customers face continued uncertainty over how quickly Taiwan-linked production may be expanded in the US, because investment commitments need not equal a mandated reallocation of global output.
- The stance increases pressure to structure any agreement around incentives, tariffs, financing, or specific projects rather than a blunt production-ratio requirement.
Third-order effects
- If this pattern holds, semiconductor supply-chain policy will increasingly be negotiated through bilateral trade packages that seek geographic diversification without fully displacing established manufacturing clusters.
- The underlying constraint remains the US effort to reduce dependence on Taiwanese chips: political goals can accelerate new capacity, but cannot by themselves determine where the broader production ecosystem resides.
The trend: Semiconductor industrial policy is shifting from broad reshoring rhetoric toward contested bilateral deals that trade market access and support for incremental capacity commitments.