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TEXXR

Chronicles

The story behind the story

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As carriers deploy protections against fraudulent texts, scammers are using “SMS blasters” that impersonate base stations to send fake messages to nearby phones

Scammers are now using “SMS blasters” to send out up to 100,000 texts per hour to phones that are tricked into thinking the devices are cell towers.

Wired Matt Burgess

Context & Ripple Effects

Carrier-side SMS controls have progressively narrowed abuse paths, from the FCC's push to block texts from invalid or unused numbers to carriers' closure of an SMS-routing loophole. The new method targets a different layer: the phone's connection to the mobile network rather than the carrier's message-routing systems.

It also arrives amid a documented rise in SMS phishing, including toll-themed phishing spam tied to a popular kit. That makes local, high-volume delivery a meaningful adaptation rather than simply another variation on conventional robotexting.

First-order effects

  • People whose phones connect to an impersonated base station can receive fraudulent texts that do not pass through the carrier pathways where anti-fraud protections operate.
  • Carriers' existing SMS filtering becomes less effective against this delivery route, while scammers gain the reported ability to target nearby devices at high volume.

Second-order effects

  • Mobile operators and device-security teams face pressure to detect or limit suspicious base-station behavior, not just screen message origin and routing data.
  • Phishing campaigns can pair localized delivery with familiar lures, potentially extending the reach of tactics seen in recent toll-payment SMS phishing.

Third-order effects

  • If this approach spreads, SMS anti-abuse efforts will need to cover both carrier messaging infrastructure and the radio-network trust relationship between phones and base stations.
  • The pattern reinforces a broader security dynamic: closing a centralized SMS loophole can displace abuse toward harder-to-monitor edge or over-the-air channels.

The trend: SMS fraud is shifting from exploitable carrier routing and sender identities toward methods that bypass centralized filtering by targeting the device's network connection.

Discussion

  • @andytseng Andy Tseng on bluesky
    The lengths people go to scam you... nowhere is safe, stay sharp!  —  #Cybersecurity #Scams #Phishing
  • @gateklons @gateklons on bluesky
    IMSI catchers (cell-site simulators if you prefer the technical term) strike again.  Scammers also used it in France during COVID-19 I think.  —  Personally I think that state legitimation of telephony and these legacy telco systems and standards violates fundamental rights. …