Researchers: during the 12-day Iran-Israel war, both sides engaged in unprecedented psychological warfare using AI content and social media to spread propaganda
The 12-day conflict was marked by a flurry of propaganda, disinformation and covert operations aided by artificial intelligence and spread by social media.
Context & Ripple Effects
This conflict extends an information-war pattern visible earlier when AI-made and altered footage of an Iranian attack spread widely on X, including through accounts presented as trusted observers. The reported use of AI and social distribution makes propaganda a faster, more scalable part of the Iran-Israel confrontation.
Later coverage of AI-enabled military operations and studies of pro-Iranian synthetic video suggests that influence operations and operational AI are becoming intertwined, rather than separate digital sidelines.
First-order effects
- Iranian and Israeli audiences, as well as international observers, face a more contested information environment in which apparently authentic war content can be manufactured and amplified quickly.
- Social platforms become a primary distribution layer for state-linked psychological operations, increasing the burden on users, journalists and platform integrity teams to assess conflict claims.
Second-order effects
- The visibility of synthetic propaganda raises incentives for both sides to produce rebuttal content and to challenge opponents' evidence, potentially reducing the time available for independent verification.
- Platforms and researchers face stronger demand to trace coordinated amplification and label or investigate AI-made conflict media; the earlier viral fake-footage episode shows why verified-looking distribution channels matter as much as the media itself.
Third-order effects
- If this pattern persists, AI capability will increasingly shape conflict narratives alongside conventional and cyber operations, making provenance, platform governance and public resilience strategic concerns.
- The durable policy challenge is dual-use: measures that curb deceptive state influence must be designed without assuming that detection alone can settle contested claims during active conflict.
The trend: The story is a data point in the militarization of generative AI, where states use the same tools for intelligence, operations and mass persuasion.