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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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The former CHIPS Program Office director says repealing the CHIPS Act risks US national security, and tariffs alone won't revitalize domestic chip manufacturing

Tariffs alone will not achieve the goal of revitalising domestic semiconductor manufacturing

Financial Times Mike Schmidt

Context & Ripple Effects

The argument revisits the original premise of the CHIPS Act: earlier coverage showed industry leaders pressing for semiconductor incentives, while reporting also highlighted that available aid would require difficult project choices. The former program director’s warning frames the limits of funding even large chip projects as a reason tariffs cannot substitute for a broader manufacturing policy.

Related coverage reinforces the distinction between announced capacity and durable capability: TSMC’s proposed US investment was portrayed as insufficient to move core R&D leadership from Taiwan. The stakes are therefore not only where fabs are built, but whether policy supports a complete domestic manufacturing base.

First-order effects

  • The comments sharpen the policy case for preserving the CHIPS Act and the CHIPS Program Office rather than treating import tariffs as a standalone industrial-policy tool.
  • Chipmakers and prospective US manufacturing projects face greater planning uncertainty if incentives are put at risk, because tariffs do not directly replace project financing or program administration.

Second-order effects

  • A tariff-led approach could push companies to reorganize production to manage costs rather than add US capacity, consistent with later concerns that chip tariffs could encourage more overseas manufacturing.
  • The debate raises the value of non-tariff supports—capital aid, execution capacity and R&D ecosystems—as differentiators among locations competing for semiconductor investment.

Third-order effects

  • If US policy swings between subsidies and tariffs, semiconductor capacity decisions may become less tied to a stable domestic industrial strategy and more to short-term trade exposure.
  • The broader test for national-security-oriented chip policy will be whether it can sustain manufacturing, technical know-how and customer demand together; factory announcements alone may not resolve those dependencies.

The trend: This is one data point in the shift from tariff-based trade protection toward more integrated, state-backed semiconductor industrial policy.