US intelligence reports: online terrorist network 764 is using techniques normally used for financial crimes, such as SIM swapping, to commit child sextortion
US cops are ringing alarms about how teenage cybercriminals are veering into domestic terrorism partly for accelerationism but also for the cred. — Amazing @gregotto.bsky.social + Jana Winter story @cyberscoop.bsky.social — cyberscoop.com/the-com-764-... Greg Otto / @gregotto : 🧵Exclusive to @cyberscoop.bsky.social: Police reports show “The Com” is using cybercrime techniques like SIM swapping and social engineering to commit violent crimes. These tactics are traditionally financially motivated but are now targeting victims as young as 10. cyberscoop.com/the-com-764-...
Context & Ripple Effects
Coverage had already documented 764's use of Discord and Telegram to coerce teens into degrading and violent acts, while a broader analysis identified a distributed ecosystem of online predator groups targeting children. This report adds a technical layer: abuse methods associated with account takeover and fraud can be repurposed for coercion.
The overlap also fits reporting on The Com's links to extortion activity, suggesting that criminal know-how and extremist social status can circulate through adjacent online communities rather than remaining confined to financially motivated crime.
First-order effects
- SIM-swapping and social-engineering incidents involving potential victims now carry a safeguarding dimension, not only a fraud-loss risk, for carriers, platforms and investigators.
- For 764's targets, control of a phone number or online account can increase an offender's leverage to isolate, impersonate or pressure them during sextortion.
Second-order effects
- Telecom anti-SIM-swap controls and platform abuse teams may need faster escalation paths with child-safety and law-enforcement teams when account compromise is tied to coercion.
- The report reinforces the relevance of earlier calls for stronger SIM-swap protections and passwordless logins: defenses designed around financial fraud can also reduce a route into nonfinancial victimization.
Third-order effects
- If this crossover persists, cybercrime intelligence will need to classify harm by the actor's objective and victim impact, not simply by the technique used; the same tradecraft can serve theft, extortion or ideological violence.
- The broader pattern is a convergence of online child exploitation and criminal technical ecosystems, consistent with prior reporting on a global network of online predator groups and 764's coercion of teens through social platforms.
The trend: Financial-fraud tradecraft is increasingly becoming reusable infrastructure for online coercion and extremist-linked abuse, widening the set of institutions responsible for detection and prevention.