An FBI affidavit and European media leaks show how Russia's Doppelganger disinformation project operated and give insights into the Kremlin's online tactics
The Country's Propagandists Target the West—but Mislead the Kremlin, Too — In early September, the infamous Russian disinformation project known … X: @b_novak , @ridt , @oajonsson , @ridt , @ridt , @nohodge , @marielle_w_ , @mkimmage , and @kevincollier X: Benjamin Novak / @b_novak : Monday morning must-read by @RidT on “Doppelganger” Really take your time with the four ¶s, they deserve a slow read and thoughtful reflection, esp if you want to think through some of the practical and policy considerations on how to protect an open information ecosystem Thomas Rid / @ridt : This video was an internal production by the Social Design Agency, a disinformation firm in Moscow, produced in early August 2023, likely to be viewed by Vladimir Putin. Note the memo reproduced in the description, discussing the video. https://www.youtube.com/... Oscar Jonsson / @oajonsson : This is from authentic documents within Russia's latest “troll farm” - Social Design Agency - saying that X is the only platform that they can work on. I'm not surprised tbh. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ ... [image] Thomas Rid / @ridt : JUST OUT — September was a wild month for scholars of modern covert influence operations. No longer do we have to rely on a campaign's digital footprints alone. My first analysis of ~3K leaked internal files and fresh FBI evidence on “Doppelganger.” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ ... Thomas Rid / @ridt : Caveats: the SDA leak is incomplete. We don't know what it does not include. The disinformation firm—unsurprisingly—also appears to have a liberal attitude towards facts and figures in its own internal documents, unsurprisingly. Not a new problem for historians of active measures Nathan Hodge / @nohodge : “And perhaps most important, the documents reveal that the biggest boost the Doppelganger campaigners got was from the West's own anxious coverage of the project.” Really excellent insight into the inner workings of a disinfo campaign, courtesy of @RidT https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ ... Mariëlle Wijermars / @marielle_w_ : Great read with some important conclusions about how overblown coverage of low-impact campaigns may actually reinforce them by making them appear more effective than they actually are (as this warrants granting them new contracts and budgets, which in turn increases production) Michael Kimmage / @mkimmage : Excellent @RidT essay in @ForeignAffairs, which teases a quite human story from a cache of mostly very dry records and documents: the puffing up of one's work for reward within a large and in many ways blinkered bureaucracy. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ ... Kevin Collier / @kevincollier : This is without question the best piece written so far this cycle on foreign disinformation operations. And about what I'd argue is only the third most important disinfo op this year. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ ...
Context & Ripple Effects
The disclosures add operational detail to a broader record of Russian information control, including an earlier investigation into the surveillance and censorship apparatus used to sustain Kremlin power. They shift attention from the existence of influence campaigns to the internal reporting and platform constraints that shape them.
They also connect with reporting on Russia-linked fake-news networks aimed at U.S. voters, while complicating simple claims of campaign effectiveness: internal incentives can amplify success narratives before they reach either foreign audiences or Kremlin decision-makers.
First-order effects
- The FBI evidence and leaked files give investigators, journalists, and platforms a more concrete basis to identify Doppelganger’s operating methods and assess its claimed reach.
- SDA’s reported dependence on X makes that platform a central immediate chokepoint for monitoring and disrupting the operation’s distribution.
Second-order effects
- Public exposure raises the cost of outlet impersonation and coordinated distribution: platforms and researchers can compare newly documented tactics with other suspected networks rather than treating each as an isolated case.
- The finding that propagandists could overstate results internally means governments and media organizations should separate observable campaign activity from claims about its audience impact.
Third-order effects
- If such internal feedback failures are common, state-backed influence operations may face a structural intelligence problem: leaders can allocate resources based on flattering operational reporting rather than validated outcomes.
- The durable shift is toward evaluating disinformation through provenance, distribution infrastructure, and independently measurable effects—not visibility or alarm alone.
The trend: This is one data point in the move from broad attribution of foreign influence campaigns toward evidence-based scrutiny of their operational networks and real-world effectiveness.