Sources: Apple is working on an iPhone security upgrade to stop FBI's exploit method from working in the future
Apple Is Said to Be Working on an iPhone Even It Can't Hack — WASHINGTON — Apple engineers have already begun developing new security measures that would make it impossible …
Context & Ripple Effects
This story sits mid-way through the San Bernardino standoff: two weeks after Apple executives warned that new iPhones would be equally exposed to the FBI's 'back door' request, engineers have moved from arguing about the flaw to closing it. That follows internal resistance, with key Apple engineers telling the Times they would refuse to weaken iPhone security or quit rather than comply.
The upgrade is aimed squarely at whatever technique lets investigators bypass the PIN-guessing limits — coverage has pointed to an external forensics firm possibly using NAND mirroring to enable brute-force guessing. If Apple patches the vector while the FBI still holds the method, the bureau's technical advantage becomes a countdown clock.
First-order effects
- Apple engineers are already building security measures intended to make the FBI's current unlock method fail on future devices, directly degrading the tool behind its court demand.
- The FBI faces a shrinking window: every day the exploit works is a day closer to Apple shipping a fix, weakening the practical case for compelling Apple's assistance.
Second-order effects
- If Apple closes this route, law enforcement shifts further toward third-party forensics vendors and workarounds like NAND mirroring — moving hacking capability out of government labs into a commercial market.
- The FBI's reported plan to keep the method secret and discourage a White House disclosure review puts it on a collision course with Apple, which argues unpatched vulnerabilities endanger all iPhone users.
Third-order effects
- Each vendor fix spawning a new hunt for exploits points to a permanent arms race, pushing the policy question toward formal channels like the Vulnerability Equities Process — which later delivered Apple a tip it had already patched in iOS 9 and El Capitan.
- If the pattern holds, device makers treat exploit-proofing as routine product development rather than litigation defense, structurally narrowing what warrants can extract from encrypted hardware and shifting access debates to Congress and courts.
The trend: Smartphone encryption is becoming a rolling arms race in which vendors patch government exploits as fast as forensics teams find them, leaving legal precedent — not technical capability — as the real prize.