An in-depth look at a covert Russian operation to get dual-use specialist microchips, which are protected by EU export controls, into the hands of the state
A rare look inside a covert Russian-led operation to get strategic technology protected by European export controls into the hands of the state
Financial Times
Context & Ripple Effects
Russia’s effort to obtain restricted technology has been visible in earlier reporting on its broader search for semiconductors and other high-tech parts for weapons. This investigation adds operational detail to that arc by showing how EU-controlled specialist chips can be routed toward the state.
The reported operation exposes a route by which Russian state-linked buyers can seek EU-controlled dual-use microchips, creating immediate enforcement and compliance scrutiny around the parties involved.
EU export controls face a practical implementation test: controls can restrict legitimate sales, but do not by themselves prevent covert procurement through opaque channels.
Second-order effects
Distributors and chipmakers may need tighter customer screening and post-sale visibility, addressing the tracking gap for lower-end chip products identified in earlier coverage.
Intermediaries, freight routes, and electronics traders become more consequential enforcement targets as Russia’s scramble for sanctioned technology shifts procurement pressure away from direct purchases.
Third-order effects
If such networks remain durable, export-control effectiveness will increasingly depend on chain-of-custody enforcement across distributors and re-exporters, not only on controls imposed at the original supplier.
The case points to a sustained contest between restrictions on dual-use technology and adaptive procurement networks; its outcome will hinge on whether authorities can connect shipment data, end-use checks, and intermediary accountability.
The trend: Dual-use technology controls are evolving from rules governing exports at the border into a continuous effort to trace and enforce the full electronics supply chain.
One wonders what controls or checks are performed on the illicit goods when they land, given the rise of fake ICs and other components or potentially modified and slipped into the supply chain.
France shut down Ommic this year and sold off its assets to a US chipmaker. But Istok — and Ermakov — are still active. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Istok has produced novel equipment for the Russian military - and used branches of the Ermakov network to source supplies. [image…
“It didn't start with Ukraine. Russian intelligence plays a huge role in getting this sort of technology. They always have. This is what the Russians do.” Inside a Russian operation to smuggle microchips for Putin's war machine. With @xtophercook https://www.ft.com/...
As their yacht bobbed on the Mediterranean, the microchip executive snapped a picture of his Russian partner asleep on the deck. He only knew the Russian by his first name, Maxim. But he knew Maxim was using a shadowy network to get the chips for the Russian defense industry. [im…
Today, Ommic has closed and Rocchi is awaiting trial in France, having been indicted in March. He denies charges of sending secrets to a foreign power that could harm the national interest, exporting dual-use goods to Russia, and submitting false documents. [image]
3/ Russia's war on Ukriane is as much a technological war as it is reminiscent of the WWI. Chips are important for all of the battlefield items below. [image]
Rocchi knew his ultimate customer was NPP Istok, which makes electronic warfare systems for the Russian military. Specialist microchips like Ommic's high-performance gallium nitride and gallium arsenide-integrated circuit boards are vital to defense manufacturers like Istok. [ima…
.@maxseddon & I have written a profile on a Russian chip-smuggling ring working through France, Ireland and UAE centred on one man, Maxim Ermakov. Who he? Well, there are a few clues that he's maybe not *just* a businessman. https://www.ft.com/...
Russia can't make advanced chips on the level of the west and Asia's. “It would be simply too expensive to produce it domestically and it would be militarily inconceivable to go without it,” says @crmiller1. Instead, the Kremlin's intelligence services smuggle them into Russia. […
Many Western companies continue to supply dual-use tech to Russia. They are well aware that the tech they supply is then used in Russian weaponry, but revenue is more important to them than ethics and the risks associated with circumventing sanctions. https://www.ft.com/...
By me and @maxseddon: I think this is a pretty novel insight into the war. We've pieced together how a Russian smuggling network moved stuff from Western Europe for the war effort, but also how the architect in the middle pulled together the network. https://www.ft.com/...
The shadowy network smuggling European microchips into Russia - A rare look inside a covert Russian-led operation to get strategic technology protected …