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Amazon settles the UK CMA's probe into its use of third-party data, agreeing not to use “non-public” third-party seller data to benefit Amazon Retail, and more

The U.K.'s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) today announced that it has accepted proposals from Facebook's parent Meta

TechCrunch Paul Sawers

Context & Ripple Effects

The CMA's scrutiny of platform operators has centered on whether they can use business users' non-public information to strengthen their own competing services. In related coverage, Meta offered limits on its use of other businesses' advertising data for Facebook Marketplace in a CMA-focused Marketplace data proposal.

Amazon's settlement extends that same competitive concern to marketplace seller data and Amazon Retail: the issue is not merely data collection, but whether a platform can turn privileged participant information into an in-house retail advantage.

First-order effects

  • Amazon Retail must stop using non-public third-party seller data to benefit its own retail operations under the agreed commitments.
  • Third-party sellers gain a clearer boundary around data they provide through Amazon's marketplace, while the CMA resolves this probe through commitments rather than a continued investigation.

Second-order effects

  • Marketplace operators face stronger pressure to separate data gathered from business users from data used by their first-party businesses, echoing Meta's Marketplace data-use commitments.
  • Compliance becomes a competitive operating constraint for platforms that both host independent merchants and sell alongside them, increasing the importance of internal data-access controls.

Third-order effects

  • If such commitments become a repeatable CMA approach, competition oversight may increasingly govern platforms through enforceable data-use boundaries rather than only through breakups or fines.
  • The broader structural shift is toward treating privileged platform data as a source of potential self-preferencing, with remedies focused on how it may be shared across business lines.

The trend: UK competition enforcement is pushing multi-sided platforms toward permissioned, purpose-limited use of business-user data when they also compete with those users.