Experts say Hamas using hostages' Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp to livestream attacks and issue death threats is a new tactic; one stream lasted 43 minutes
New York Times : X: @sheeraf , @erant , @synaesthesiajp , and @thegarance X: Sheera Frenkel / @sheeraf : We spoke to over a dozen people whose friends and family were kidnapped on Oct. 7. What we discovered is that Hamas is using a deliberate tactic to terrify the families- hijacking's their social media to send videos and photos. Story with @tminsberg https://www.nytimes.com/... Eran Toch / @erant : The way Hamas had used the social media accounts of the people they tortured, murdered, and kidnapped is a new and terrifying type of atrocity. It's a tough piece, but please read and share this @nytimes story about how Facebook and Instagram was used as a way to share cruelty.... JP Kellams / @synaesthesiajp : Reading this NY Times article is likely one of the most evil, bone chilling things I've read in ages. WTF. https://www.nytimes.com/... Garance Franke-Ruta / @thegarance : “In a new war tactic, Hamas has seized the social media accounts of kidnapped Israelis and used them to broadcast violent messages and wage psychological warfare” https://www.nytimes.com/...
Context & Ripple Effects
This report extends a longstanding platform-enforcement problem: militant groups had already found ways to retain a presence despite platform bans, as platforms struggled to enforce rules against militant groups. Here, the alleged abuse shifts from public distribution to commandeering victims’ trusted accounts.
Related coverage also documented WhatsApp groups used to coordinate attacks during prior escalation, including more than 100 groups formed to coordinate attacks on Palestinians. The hostage-account tactic makes account security, moderation, and crisis response inseparable.
First-order effects
- Hostages’ families and friends face threats and violent material delivered through accounts they recognize, turning social channels into a direct instrument of coercion.
- Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp must rapidly identify compromised accounts and weigh account restriction against preserving material that may be important evidence.
Second-order effects
- The incident increases pressure on platforms to build conflict-specific takeover and emergency-reporting procedures, rather than treating compromised accounts solely as routine security cases.
- It also complicates moderation decisions across messaging and public feeds: rapid removal can limit harm, while delayed action can extend the perpetrators’ reach.
Third-order effects
- If such account takeovers recur, platform safety systems will be judged not only on removing extremist content but on protecting users’ digital identities during physical-security crises.
- The broader shift is toward distribution-layer responsibility for how trusted accounts can be weaponized, with difficult trade-offs among safety, evidence preservation, and access to communications.
The trend: Conflict-related online abuse is moving from propaganda posted by known actors toward the weaponization of victims’ accounts and private communication channels.