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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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Investigation: earlier in 2023, Vietnam tried to plant Predator spyware on the phones of US Congress members, CNN journalists, and policy experts via posts on X

The attempts appear to have been unsuccessful, but came as the U.S. and Vietnam were negotiating an agreement that President Biden signed last month in Hanoi

Washington Post

Context & Ripple Effects

The reported activity puts a cyber-espionage allegation alongside a period of closer U.S.-Vietnam engagement, making the distinction between diplomatic alignment and intelligence behavior more consequential.

It also sits within a broader run of reporting on politically sensitive communications being targeted, including alleged efforts to obtain data from the phones of presidential candidates and reports that senior U.S. figures' calls were recorded in the Salt Typhoon intrusion.

First-order effects

  • Members of Congress, journalists and policy experts named as targets face a suspected attempt to compromise their mobile devices through X posts, although the reported attempts did not succeed.
  • The allegation adds a security and trust issue to U.S.-Vietnam dealings immediately after their bilateral agreement was signed.

Second-order effects

  • U.S. officials and organizations whose staff engage on public social platforms have reason to treat politically tailored links as an intelligence risk, rather than only a conventional phishing threat.
  • The episode may complicate information-sharing and security discussions with Vietnam, because closer engagement can increase the value of access to U.S. political and policy networks.

Third-order effects

  • If similar cases recur, cyber risk assessment is likely to become a more explicit constraint on partnerships that otherwise deepen for economic or strategic reasons.
  • The pattern points to mobile-device compromise and social-platform delivery becoming persistent channels for state-linked collection against political and media targets, alongside network-level campaigns such as the reported targeting of officials' phones through Verizon systems.

The trend: State-linked intelligence collection is increasingly targeting the personal communications and online habits of political, policy and media figures even as diplomatic relationships evolve.

Discussion

  • @donnchac Donncha Ó Cearbhaill on x
    🚨 The #PredatorFiles spyware scandal continues. New investigation from @Amnesty Security Lab in collaboration with @EICnetwork reveals brazen targeting of civil society, politicians and officials around the world with “EU-regulated” spyware. 🧵 1/ https://securitylab.amnesty.org/ …
  • @amnestytech @amnestytech on x
    🚨 The #PredatorFiles spyware scandal continues... New investigation from @Amnesty Security Lab in collaboration with @EICnetwork reveals brazen targeting of civil society, politicians and officials around the world with “EU-regulated” spyware. 🧵 https://www.amnesty.org/...