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Mandiant: the use of AI to conduct politically-motivated online influence campaigns has grown in recent years, but the impact of such campaigns has been limited

Google-owned U.S. cybersecurity firm Mandiant said on Thursday it had seen increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) …

Reuters Zeba Siddiqui

Context & Ripple Effects

Mandiant’s assessment provides an early baseline in a coverage arc where AI’s political use was already prompting calls for guardrails around AI-generated campaign advertising. Its key distinction is between growing adoption of a tool and demonstrated influence on audiences.

Later coverage reinforces that distinction: OpenAI reported disrupting five covert influence operations, while a DeepMind review found political deepfakes were the most common observed AI misuse. Detection and prevalence do not, by themselves, establish persuasive impact.

First-order effects

  • Mandiant’s finding gives defenders and policymakers a more calibrated threat picture: AI-assisted influence activity is increasing, but the reported evidence does not show commensurate effectiveness.
  • The immediate focus shifts toward identifying coordinated influence operations and measuring their reach or behavioral effects, rather than treating AI-generated content alone as proof of successful manipulation.

Second-order effects

  • Platforms and AI providers face pressure to maintain disruption and monitoring capabilities for political misuse even when observed campaigns have limited impact.
  • Election-related guardrail debates become more dependent on evidence of distribution, targeting, and audience response—not just on the availability of generative tools.

Third-order effects

  • If AI lowers the cost of producing influence content faster than it improves persuasion, the durable challenge will be measuring campaign outcomes and coordinating responses across model providers, platforms, and security firms.
  • The pattern points toward dual-use AI governance centered on misuse monitoring and provenance, with the scope of intervention likely to depend on whether effectiveness catches up to production scale.

The trend: Political AI risk is moving from concern over synthetic-content volume toward evidence-based assessment of whether coordinated campaigns can actually change public outcomes.

Discussion

  • @vijaybolina Vijay Bolina on x
    great research from our colleagues over at @googlecloud @Mandiant sharing their intel and analysis on how adversaries have been using generative AI over the recent past to power their offensive operations. https://www.mandiant.com/...
  • @johnhultquist John Hultquist🌻 on x
    “Thus far, we haven't seen a single incident response where AI played a role” says @JumpforJoyce. A good reminder not to get too caught up in the hype. https://www.reuters.com/...
  • @mandiant @mandiant on x
    “Like any technological innovation, we expect adversaries are going to find applications for AI tools. However, the promise is far greater for defenders, who have the ability to direct the development.” -@JumpforJoyce Read about AI in the cyber landscape: https://www.mandiant.com…