The global race to develop quantum computing, encryption, and more demands balancing protectionism and the spirit of cooperation for the US and its allies
Damien Cave / New York Times : Twitter: @aspi_org . LinkedIn: Michael Biercuk Twitter: @aspi_org : This @nytimes article mentions the @ASPI_CTS ‘Critical Technology Tracker’ detailing how “China appears to be lagging more in quantum computers...while narrowing the gap in quantum sensing”. Explore the tracker ➡️ https://techtracker.aspi.org.au/ https://www.nytimes.com/... LinkedIn: Michael Biercuk : Don't you agree it's exciting when someone sees the forest for the trees? The team at Q-CTRL and I were very proud to be featured in The New York Times …
Context & Ripple Effects
This piece lands after half a decade of coverage tracking China's state-backed quantum push: the billions funneled through Pan Jian-Wei's national quantum program, early Chinese bets on quantum encryption as a next-generation security layer, and the parallel scramble over post-quantum encryption standards meant to replace RSA before quantum computers can break it.
What changes here is the frame: rather than asking who leads, the article asks how the US and its allies should compete — and the ASPI Critical Technology Tracker it draws on gives a split answer, with China still behind in quantum computers but closing in on quantum sensing. That nuance is exactly what makes the protectionism-versus-cooperation question hard.
First-order effects
- US and allied governments now have to calibrate controls technology-by-technology: restricting quantum computing exports while deciding whether sensing and encryption research stays open to collaboration with partners like Australia's Q-CTRL, whose Michael Biercuk is featured in the piece.
- China's position in the tracker — lagging in quantum computing, narrowing in sensing — pressures Washington to justify broad restrictions where the gap is widest and to worry most where it is thinnest.
Second-order effects
- Allied coordination on post-quantum encryption standards becomes the immediate test case: if each country sets its own rules for replacing RSA-class cryptography, vendors and standards bodies face fragmented requirements across markets.
- The quantum debate inherits the credibility problems already visible in chip controls — reported ASML DUV retrofits and undocumented domestic-equipment rules show export restrictions leaking, which raises the bar for proving new quantum-era controls would work better.
Third-order effects
- If the pattern holds, strategic technologies get governed by a two-track structure — tightly controlled compute layers inside an allied bloc, with selective cooperation on sensing and standards — rather than either full openness or full decoupling.
- The deeper shift is that research alliances themselves become instruments of statecraft: countries like Australia gain leverage less from building full quantum stacks than from being trusted nodes in whichever bloc's ecosystem they join.
The trend: Strategic technology competition is forcing the US and its allies to replace blanket protectionism with calibrated, alliance-level rules that differ by technology layer.